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NOTES
Ad Valorem Taxation-Procedural Developments in the Discovery of
Unlisted Property
Although all North Carolina property owners are required to list

their property for ad valorem taxation each year' and substantial criminal2 and civil penalties3 are imposed for failure to do so, taxpayers fail
to list assets worth millions of dollars each year.4 To hold property to
its fair share of the tax burden, the Machinery Act of North Carolina 5
provides for the listing, assessment, and imposition of penalties on prop-

erty that the owner fails to list. The discdvery statute' places an affirmative duty on tax officials to discover property, to list it, to appraise and

assess it, and to take the action necessary to prevent failures to list.7

In separate decisions filed the same day s the North Carolina SuGEN. STAT. § 105-285(a) (1972).
1d. § 105-308 (1972) provides:
In addition to all other penalties prescribed by law, any person whose duty it is to
list any property who willfully fails or refuses to list the same within the time prescribed
by law shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred
dollars ($500.00) or imprisonment not to exceed six months. The failure to list shall be
prima facie evidence that the failure was willful.
Any person who removes or conceals property for the purpose of evading taxation
or who aids or abets the removal or concealment of property for the purpose of evading
taxation shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine not to exceed five hundred
dollars ($500.00) or imprisonment not to exceed six months.
3
See note 15 and accompanying text infra.
'The response of 55 North Carolina counties to an informal survey made in 1971 revealed
that the appraised evaluation of unlisted property discovered by them during 1970 was
$201,927,855. The surveyor cautioned that he figure should not be relied on because it was unreasonable to believe that all the counties which responded understood the request and responded in
the same way. However, he noted, "the pattern disclosed is plain." H. LEwis, DISCOVERED PROPERTY: AN IMPORTANT SOURCE OF TAX REVENUE, (Institute of Government, Property Tax Bulletin
No. 36, 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STATS. §§ 105-271 to -395 (1972) (enacted as Ch. 806, [1971] N.C. Sess. L._.._,
Ch. 1121,
-C...;
h. 932, [1971] N.C. Sess. L.
as amended Ch. 931, [1971] N.C. Sess. L.
C.......h. 1162, [1971] N.C. Sess. L. .._). This note is limited to a narrow
[1971] N.C. Sess. L.
topic within the total statutory scheme. A full understanding of the ad valorem tax structure
requires a recognition that the Machinery Act is an integrated body of statutes creating a tax cycle
completed each year without overlap, providing for the annual revenue requirements of local
government. For an excellent outline of the ad valorem tax structure, see H. LEwis, THE PROPERTY
TAX, AN INTRODUCTION (The Institute of Government, University of North Carolina, 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312 (1972).
7
1d. § 105-312(b) (1972).
May 10, 1972.

'N.C.

2

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

preme Court reviewed two discovery proceedings by county tax officials
made under the statute.' In re Strong Tire Service, Inc."0 held that the
difference between the reported and actual values of a taxpayer's inventories constituted discovered property. In re McLean Trucking Co."
focused on the procedural elements of a discovery, holding that a discovery is made when tax officials become fully aware of facts sufficient to
require the property to be listed. It further held that tax officials lost
their authority to list and tax discovered property in a particular year
when they were fully aware of facts to justify listing the property before
the county board of equalization and review had adjourned but waited
until that body had adjourned before initiating discovery proceedings.
The broadening of tax officials' duty to discover property under
Strong and the limitations on the tax officials' discovery power imposed
by McLean will require ad valorem tax administrators to review their
practices. The purpose of this note is to examine the reasoning of the
court in McLean and to determine the impact of the decision on the
administration of ad valorem tax in North Carolina in light of Strong.
The statute establishes the procedure a local government unit must
follow to effect a discovery.' Typically, discovered property is listed
under the direction of the tax supervisor who, if possible, may make a
tentative appraisal. 3 A rebuttable statutory presumption arises that in
addition to the current year, the property should have been listed by the
taxpayer for the preceding five years. 14 The property is taxed and substantial penalties are imposed for each of the years in which the owner
failed to list. 5 Both listing and appraisal are subject to approval by the
county board of equalization and review and if that body has adjourned
for the year, by the board of 'County commissioners. 6
'Ch. 806, § 1109, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 367, as amended N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 105-312 (1972).

10281 N.C. 293, 188 S.E.2d 306 (1972).
"281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452 (1972).

"N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 105-312(d) (1972). For purposes of this note, the discussion of discovery

will be limited to personal property. The discovery of real property so far as it differs from personal

property is provided for in subsection (c).
'31d. § 105-312(d) (1972).
14Id. § 105-312(0 (1972).

"ISd. § 105-312(g)-(h) (1972). For the present year, the penalty is 10% of the amount of the
tax. For the prior year, the penalty is 20%. For the year five years prior to the present year it
becomes 60%. The entire bill is considered due for the present year. Id. § 105-312(i) (1972). If
payment is late, interest is charged. Id. § 105-360 (1972).

15d. § 105-312(d) (1972). The county commissioners constitute the membership of the county
board of equalization and review; however, the board is a separate government agency. Id. § 105322(a) (1972).
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The board of equalization and review meets during each tax year
for a period which must begin between the first Monday in April and
the first Monday in May. It is supposed to complete its duties within
three weeks; however, it may extend its term as required to perform its
duties but never later than July 1.17
The board of equalization and review must review the listings and
valuations assigned by the list takers and the tax supervisor, exercise its
authority to change the listings and valuations, and make corrections
to comply with the provisions of the Machinery Act. In addition, the
board has authority to make discoveries and to hear taxpayers who
appeal the listings and valuations determined by the list takers and the
tax supervisor."8 Prior to its adjournmerit, the board certifies and fixes
the tax rolls, thereby establishing the identity and value of property
taxable for that year,19 subject only to limited changes by the board of
county commissioners, one of which is the addition of discovered prop20
erty to the rolls.
Cities and towns as taxing units also have power to discover and
list,21 but they must accept county appraisals.22 Nevertheless, a city or
2
town can appraise discovered property if the county fails to do So. 1
The discovery statute enacted by the 1971 General Assembly 24 represents a substantial revision of the comparable provision in the Machinery Act of 1939.25 A commission created by the 1969 General Assembly to recommend changes to the Machinery Act 2 1 reported that it
intended not to change the statute substantively but to redraft it in the
interest of clarity. The commission noted a feeling among local tax
officials and the State Board of Assessment that the discovery statute
should expressly apply to property returned with an understatement in
value, number, and amount. Although tax officials felt that the pre1"1d. § 105-322(e) (1972).
18Id. § 105-322(g) (1972).
"Id. § 105-323 (1972).
20
1d. § 105-325(a)(5) (1972).
2
1d. § 105-312(o (1972).
2
'2d. § 105-327 (1972). A city, however, may establish its own valuations if located in more
than one county. Id. § 105-328 (1972).
-1d. § 105-312(o (1972).
2"See note 5 supra.
-Ch. 310, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 600.
"1The Commission for the Study of the Local and Ad Valorem Tax Structure of the State of
North Carolina. Res. 92, [1969] N.C. Sess. L. 1600.
"REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF LOCAL AND AD VALOREM TAX STRUCTURE
OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

300-02 (1970).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

1971 statute tacitly applied to such property, the 1971 version expressly
included substantially understated property within the definition of discovered property.
Although the former discovery statute was enacted more than
thirty years ago, Strong was the first case raising the issue of whether
it applied to understated property. In Strong the taxpayer listed its
business inventories for ad valorem taxation on business abstract forms
provided by the county. A portion of the form called for the listing of
"inventories" by total value rather than by itemization. The abstract
was completed and signed by the taxpayer's agent who swore that the
listing was a "full, true and complete list" 8 of the property the taxpayer
owned. After investigating the taxpayer's business records and state tax
returns, the county tax supervisor determined that the taxpayer had
significantly under-reported the value of its inventories from 1963
through 1968.9 The tax supervisor treated the difference between the
value of the inventories on the taxpayer's books and the reported value
for each year as discovered property. After giving Strong opportunity
to appear, the board of county commissioners approved the action and
imposed taxes and penalties."
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court sustained the position of the county commissioners, holding that "[w]hen inventories are
identified and listed only by value, gross understatement of value is
evidence that all of the taxpayer's inventories were not listed."', The
court found that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the
taxpayer had not listed a portion of its inventories and that the board
of county commissioners properly applied the statute. The court rejected the argument of the taxpayer (accepted by the superior court) that
the taxpayer had listed its inventories even though understated in value
and that once property is listed, it cannot be deemed discovered property.32 The taxpayer had argued that the change in its listing was an
attempt to revalue the property after its valuation had been fixed for
that year by the board of equalization and review.3 3 The court distin1281 N.C. at 295, 188 S.E.2d at 308.
"The percentages of the taxpayer's actual inventories reported to the county was [sic] 45.87%

for 1963; 41.26% for 1964; 35.32% for 1965; 31.71% for 1966; 27.13% for 1967; and 21.12% for
1968." Id. at 295, 188 S.E.2d at 308.

rhe board of equalization and review had adjourned, and the board of county commissioners acted under Ch. 310, § 1108, [1939] N.C. SEss. L. 637, as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-

325 (1972).
31281 N.C. at 299, 188 S.E.2d at 310 (emphasis by the Court).
32ld.

13 d. at 299, 188 S.E.2d at 309.
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guished Spiers v. Davenport34 and Wolfenden v. Board of County
3 5 both urged by the taxpayer. In those cases, the court
Commissioners,
had reversed actions by the board of county commissioners increasing
the valuation of property after the board of equalization and review had
adjourned and the taxpayer had paid his taxes. The Strong court distinguished the cases on the ground that Spiers and Wolfenden involved
"specific listed property,"3 that is, property identified by item, while
the taxpayer in Strong listed his property "in bulk,' 37 indicating that
the court found that the question of listing had not been raised in either
case. In both these cases, the taxpayer specifically listed the property
by item; thus, both were obvious attempts to reassess listed and previously appraised property. In Strong, the issue was whether the taxpayer's property had been listed at all.
This interpretation of the former discovery statute was eagerly
awaited by tax authorities. Although there had been no judicial determination of the question, two opinions of the Attorney General38 had
expressed the view that the pre-1971 statute did not encompass undervalued property. Under Strong the discovery statutes reach inventories
reported at a substantial understatement of value. This development
emphasized the responsibility of tax officials to seek understated property and will necessitate extensive inquiry into business listings and
determination of valuation problems.
In McLean the taxpayer was an interstate common carrier of
freight, incorporated in North Carolina, with one of its sixty-six terminals located in Winston-Salem, the site of McLean's principal office in
the state. In 1969 McLean listed in Winston Township, Forsyth County,
all the tractors and trailers that were assigned to the company's
Winston-Salem terminal (Winston Township is coterminous with the
corporate limits of Winston-Salem). It also listed in Btoadbay Township, Forsyth County, certain tractors and trailers not assigned to the
Winston-Salem terminal which operated on an unassigned basis
throughout the McLean system.3 9 Prior to April 22, 1969, the Forsyth
34263 N.C. 56, 138 S.E.2d 762 (1964).
-152 N.C. 83, 67 S.E. 319 (1910).
3281 N.C. at 297, 188 S.E.2d at 309.
'id. at 298, 188 S.E.2d at 309.
"Letter from Harry McMullen, Attorney General of North Carolina, to Thomas C. Hoyle,
December 22, 1950; 40 Op. N.C. Arr'Y GEN. 775 (1969).
"McLean's unassigned fleet of tractors and trailers listed in Broadbay Township included
tractors and trailers which were operated in North Carolina as well as other states. The listing did
not include "Group II" tractors which did not operate in North Carolina except in rare cases. The
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county tax supervisor" questioned whether the tax situs of these unassigned vehicles lay in Broadbay Township, where McLean maintained

a storage lot for the vehicles and where the property had been listed in
previous years,41 or in Winston Township, where the company's principal office was located.42 Decision of this issue would determine whether
the vehicles would be subject to city taxes as well as county taxes. The
attorneys for Forsyth County and the City of Winston-Salem obtained
information from the taxpayer's counsel concerning the use and prior
history of the lot and made visits to the lot. After the county board of
equalization and review had adjourned and the taxpayer had paid his
county taxes on the unassigned vehicles, the county and city attorneys
advised the tax supervisor that in their opinion the tax situs of the
unassigned vehicles was Winston Township and Winston-Salem. After
notifying the taxpayer, the county tax supervisor listed the unassigned
vehicles in Winston Township and Winston-Salem as discovered property, and the board of county commissioners approved his action."2
valuation of the vehicles was $4,318,560. 281 N.C. at 244-45, 188 S.E.2d at 453-54.
10The city of Winston-Salem had elected to use the listings of property determined by the
county rather than establish its own listing system. Ch. 310, § 1201, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 641, as
amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-326(a) (1972). Therefore, the county tax supervisor was responsible for the proper listing of property both for the county and the city.
"In 1950, in response to an inquiry from McLean's attorney, the former county attorney
expressed the opinion that the tax situs of the vehicles was in Broadbay Township, an opinion that,
under the statute's requirement that personal property be relisted each year, was necessarily subject
to an annual reevaluation. Nevertheless, that opinion was relied upon by all parties for nineteen
years, that is until September 8, 1969, when the county attorney wrote McLean's attorney that
"since the date of the former opinion, the facts regarding this situation are slightly different, and
the interpretations of the law have been clarified somewhat." 281 N.C. at 248, 188 S.E.2d at 45556. 2
1 Ch. 310, § 800, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 621, as amended, Ch. 836 [1947] N.C. Sess. L. 1142;
Ch. 1102, [1951) N.C. Sess. L. 1134; Ch. 1012, §§ 2,3, [1955] N.C. Sess. L. 987-88; CH. 940,
[1969] N.C. SEss. L. 1086 (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-302 (1965)) provided:
(a) [A]II tangible personal property . . . shall be listed in the township in which the
owner thereof has his residence . . . . The residence of a corporation, partnership or
unincorporated association, domestic or foreign, shall be the place of its principal office
in this State...
(d) [Tiangible personal property shall be listed in the township in which such property
is situated, rather than in the township in which the owner resides, if the owner or person
having control thereof hires or occupies a . . . place for storage ...
-Ch. 310, § 1108, [1939] N.C. Sess. L. 637, as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-325 (1972)
provided in part:
After the Board of Equalization has finished its work and the changes effected by it have
been given effect on the tax records, the Board of County Commissioners may not
authorize any changes to be made on said records except as follows:
(5) To add any discovered property under the provisions of this Act.
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McLean appealed to the State Board of Assessment, which affirmed the

action of the county commissioners. McLean then petitioned for judicial
review, and the superior court of Forsyth County affirmed the findings

of the State Board of Assessment.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed. Accepting the ad-

ministrative decision that the proper tax situs of the vehicles was Winston Township,44 the court nevertheless held that the county commissioners' jurisdiction to add discovered property to the tax records ap-

plied only to property discovered after the board of equalization and
review had adjourned for that year. Terming the natural and ordinary
meaning of "discovered" to be "newly found and not previously
known"45 and reading the record to indicate that the tax officials of the

city and the county were fully aware of the facts governing the tax situs
before adjournment of the county board of equalization and review,"
the court held that the discovery could not be deemed to have taken
place after that board had adjourned, and thus the listing was void.47
For purposes of analysis, a property tax discovery under the statute

may be divided into two distinct elements: factual inquiry and legal
determinations. When tax officials, while performing their duty to look

out for unlisted property, suspect that certain property has not been
listed, they inquire into facts necessary to determine whether the prop-

erty is in fact listed," whether it is taxable,49 and whether it has a situs
"Relying on In re Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 263 N.C. 345, 139 S.E.2d 633 (1965), that
"situated" means more or less permanently located, the court concluded the vehicles were not
"situated" on the lot because, "fa]s
of 1 January 1969, and for many months prior thereto, none
of these vehicles was stored upon this lot or elsewhere in Broadbay Township ... " 281 N.C. at
250, 188 S.E.2d at 457.
For a discussion of intrastate situs problems of personal property, see H. LEwis, INTRASTATE
TAX SITUS OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY (The Institute of Government, University of North
Carolina, 1963).
"1281 N.C. at 252, 188 S.E.2d at 458.
"The court also concluded that the former discovery statute also limited the power of the city
as well as the board of county commissioners to list the discovered property after the board of
equalization and review had adjourned. Id.
"The taxpayer had also contested the assessment of the vehicles at 100% of their value. The
taxpayer argued that since they were engaged in interstate commerce, their tax value should be
apportioned among the states in which the vehicles operated, contending that an assessment at
100% of the value was a violation of the commerce clause. However, since the taxpayer had not
contested the county assessment based on 100% of the vehicles' value and since the city listing was
void, the question was not reached in this case. The issue was raised when the taxpayer listed its
unassigned vehicles in the city for 1970 taxes, and the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the
assessment at 100% valuation but remanded the case because the valuation of the vehicles was
defectively formulated. In re McLean Trucking Co. 281 N.C. 375, 189 S.E.2d 194 (1972).
"See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312(a)(2) (1972).
"Id. §§ 105-274 to -281 (1972).
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within the jurisdiction of the taxing unit." In addition, they must also
determine the legal consequences of these facts under the appropriate
statutes and constitutional provisions. Since tax officials often determine the legal consequences of facts as they are collected, the two
elements are not always seen as separate. However, if a complex legal
question is presented, it is possible for tax officials to know all the
relevant facts before they or the taxing unit's attorney can determine
their legal consequences, thus producing a distinct two-step process.
Once satisfied that they have made a discovery, the statute requires
that tax officials list the discovered property in the taxpayer's name and
send him notice of this right to a hearing,' an act which does not take
place until both the necessary factual and legal conclusions have been
reached. By requiring tax officials to take this action, the statute itself
provides precise evidence of when a discovery is made. In contrast, the
court's holding that a discovery is made when tax officials are fully
aware of the facts not only assumes that factual inquiry and legal determinations are a single process but also requires a subjective inquiry into
the state of mind of tax officials.
The court's error is evident if its test is applied to differing discovery situations. If a tax official finds an unlisted automobile," the facts
necessary to make a discovery as well as the legal conclusions are
usually readily apparent, and the tax official can make the factual inquiry and legal determination at the same time. In such a situation, even
tax officials may see the discovery as a single-step process, and the
court's test will pose little difficulty in application. However, the court's
test is inadequate in circumstances in which the discovery does not
depend on an uncovering of facts but on a determination of their legal
consequences. For example, property owned by a redevelopment commission is exempt from ad valorem taxation if the property is held and
used for a public purpose.53 If it were leased to private individuals, its
exemption might be questioned, but despite their awareness of all the
facts regarding the property, responsible tax officials would probably
not list the property as discovered until a legal determination of its
exemption had been made, usually by the taxing unit's attorney. By
" 1d. §§ 105-301, -304, -305 (1972).
51d. § 105-312(d) (1972).

52Tax supervisors are provided with a list of motor vehicles registered in the supervisor's
county. Id. § 105-314 (1972).

"Redevelopment Comm'n of High Point v. Guilford County, 274 N.C. 585, 164 S.E.2d 476
(1968).
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treating a discovery as a one-step process, the court seems to have
imputed to administrators the capacity to make instant determination
of potentially complex questions of exemption and tax situs.
Factual inquiry alone can be highly complex, and cases may arise
in which raw data are known but in which, as in Strong, business accounting records require audit, an analysis that may be beyond the
capacity of the examining tax official. Information from state income
and franchise tax returns provide such an audit, but these returns are
unavailable for inspection until two or three months after the board of
equalization and review has adjourned. Under these circumstances,
McLean raises the serious problem of determining when tax officials are
sufficiently aware of the facts to be held to have made a discovery. They
may have fully investigated the taxpayer's business records; nevertheless, if they must wait until months after the board has adjourned to
determine if there is an understatement, McLean may preclude a discovery.
Only one other court has faced the issue of when an ad valorem
tax discovery occurs. In a statutory framework similar to North Carolina's,54 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Noyles v. Hale55
was required to determine the time of discovery in circumstances analogous to the facts in Strong. In that case, the taxpayer was an executor
who had listed the property of an estate by value rather than by item.
He under-reported, and the board of assessors listed the difference between the actual and reported values as discovered property. The taxpayer appealed, alleging that the discovery had occurred when members
of the board of assessors became aware of the understatement before
the tax rolls were fixed. He argued that since the property was not
entered on the tax rolls until after they had been fixed, the later listing
by the board was void. Rejecting the taxpayer's contention, the court
refused to apply the test later formulated in McLean and held that the
discovery occurred when the board of assessors, as a body, listed the
property, thereby focusing its attention on the corporate act of the
board. Functionally, the corporate decision of the board in Noyles is
equivalent to the listing and sending of notice under the North Carolina
statute, for both constitute acts manifesting the time when the tax officials have determined both elements of a discovery. By limiting its
definition of "discovered" to the dictionary meaning of the word, the
34Ch. 320, § 78, [1868] Mass. Sess. L. 238.
-"137Mass. 266 (1884).
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North Carolina court foreclosed an inquiry into the time at which a
discovery takes place as reflected in the statute.
A municipality is a taxing authority separate from the county
where it is situated56 although it is bound by statute to adopt county
valuations.57 Under statutory authority, it may establish its own listing
system or, as a convenience, it may secure its listings from the county."
Lying wholly within Winston Township, Winston-Salem had elected to
accept the county's Winston Township listings. Although WinstonSalem relied on the county for its listings, no express provision of the
Machinery Act requires it to relinquish its independent tax powers.
However, the city's long standing use of the county listings resulted in
a virtual acquiescence to the listing actions of the county. 9
In understanding the imposition of the time limitation, it is crucial
to determine whether the court approached the action of the county in
the attempted discovery as if it were the sole taxing authority or as if it
were the "agent" of the city exercising the city's discovery power. The
court's treatment of Smith v. Town of Dunn6" indicates that it questioned the discovery power of a city where it adopts county listings. In
Smith the town board of Dunn, independently of any action by the
county, discovered and added to the town's listings property which in
the town's view had been "improperly" listed in another township of the
county. The court held that the property, although "improperly" listed
within the county, was unlisted as far as the town was concerned, and
therefore the town correctly exercised its discovery power. While this
decision might have been controlling in McLean, the court cited Smith
only as general authority that unlisted property could be construed to
include property improperly listed." The court's limitation of the holding in Smith is explained if the court tacitly distinguished Smith on the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-326 (1972).
-1d. § 105-327 (1972).

-id. § 105-326(a) (1972).
"Not only had Winston-Salem and Forsyth County integrated their listing systems, they had
also combined their tax collection departments. Pursuant to Ch. 230, [1941] N.C. Priv. L. 229,
Winston-Salem and Forsyth County entered into a contract February 28, 1942 in which "all
County taxes shall be collected by the County-City Tax Collector and all property taxes, poll taxes,

and late listing penalties due to the City of Winston-Salem shall be likewise collected by the

County-City Tax Collector at his office to be maintained in the Forsyth County Court House"
In addition the operation of the joint office was placed under the supervision of the Forsyth County
Commissioners. Joint Tax Collection Contract Between the City of Winston-Salem and Forsyth
County, February 28, 1942.
-160 N.C. 174, 76 S.E. 242 (1912).
"1281 N.C. at 252, 188 S.E.2d at 458.
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ground that there the city, possessing its own listing system, had initiated a discovery on its own. Implicit in this distinction is the assumption
by the court that Winston-Salem had given up its own listing and discovery powers when it acquiesced in the county listings. Apparently the
court was not alone in making this assumption, for a principal contention of both the city and county before the court was that if the county
commissioners could not correct the listings, a city taxpayer could list
his property wherever he pleased in Forsyth County, and if the county
failed to correct the listing prior to the adjournment of the board of
equalization and review, Winston-Salem would be powerless to tax the
property."
Despite its treatment of Smith, the court recognized, at least in
principle, the independent discovery power of Winston-Salem. Since the
city as well as the county were fully aware of the facts, the court stated
in dicta that Winston-Salem was also precluded from discovery proceedings because "[t]he power conferred by G.S. 105-33 1(e) upon cities
and towns is, by the terms of that statutory provision, no more extensive
than the power conferred by that section and by G.S. 105-330 upon the
'
Board of County Commissioners. "63
Through the court's failure to identify the city's part in the attempted discovery, McLean may be read as limiting the discovery powers of the county commissioners. The fixing of the tax rolls by the board
of equalization and review for a given year is subject only to certain
limited alterations by the board of county commissioners. In contrast,
the statute does not provide for a time limitation on discoveries. The
policy that lies behind the freezing of the tax rolls is to prevent listed
property from being subject to a change in tax liability and to provide
stability for taxing units that must complete a tax cycle each year. The
same policy is not applicable where the property has not been subject
to tax liability at all because it was unlisted. The opinion does not offer
any explanation for the imposition of the time limitation other than that
"G.S. 105-330 makes it clear that the authority of the Board of County
Commissioners to change its listing extends no further than a change
as to property 'discovered' after the County Board of Equalization and
Review has finished its work and ceased to function. 64 Such a result is
clear only if the court, despite its general acknowledgement of the inde"Brief for Appellee at 10, In re McLean Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 188 S.E.2d 452 (1972).
"281 N.C. at 252, 188 S.E.2d at 458.
GAId.
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pendent authority of the city, analytically lost sight of its significance
and treated the attempted discovery as an attempt by the county alone
to change the listing of McLean's property after the tax rolls had been
frozen for that year. The court apparently saw the county attempting
to effect through a discovery what the court had previously condemned
in Spiers and Wolfenden: an alteration of the tax records of previously
listed property, potentially changing its tax liability after it had already
been determined and fixed for that year by the board of equalization
and review.
If the action of the county tax authorities listing McLean's property in Winston Township is analyzed from the standpoint of the city,
there was a true discovery, not an enlargement of county tax liability
of the kind condemned in Spiers and Wolfenden. Recognizing under
Smith that the property was unlisted as far as the city was concerned,
Winston-Salem could have initiated a discovery on its own and separately listed the property which, for county tax purposes, would still be
listed in Broadbay Township. Since the county listing would be unaffected, the policy in Spiers would be inapplicable. The only change in
the liability of the property would be the additional city taxes imposed
as a result of the city's discovery.
However, the city's long standing use of the county's listings influenced the city either to overlook its statutory authority to list separately
or, more likely, to assume that the county would make discoveries for
the city since the city would appear to have no right to waive such a
necessary tax power. Having decided to treat the Winston Township
listings as listings for Winston-Salem, both the county and the city seem
to have assumed that the county was empowered, in Winston-Salem's
behalf, to exercise the city's discovery authority. Thus, there being only
one set of records (those of Winston Township), in making a discovery
as the city's agent, county officials necessarily changed the county listings records, an act which the court interpreted as changing the tax
liability of already listed property, thereby invoking the prohibition in
Spiers.
But if the procedure is viewed in light of the city's interest to add
previously unlisted property to its adopted listings, the same tax consequences result as if the city independently discovered the property. The
only additional liability incurred was city taxes resulting from the discovery authorized by the city. At this point in its analysis, the court
seems to have lost sight of what was in substance, though not in form,
a city discovery. The county did not have any interest at stake in the
proceeding, for whether the property was listed in one township or the
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other could not effect county tax liability.
McLean imposes a difficult practical burden on tax officials, intensified by the inclusion of understated property within the discovery
statute. Under McLean, tax officials are placed in a dilemma: if they
hesitate to make a discovery, awaiting, for example, a ruling on an
exemption question, the discovery might be foreclosed by the adjournment of the board of equalization and review; on the other hand, if they
list the property without awaiting a ruling, they risk initiating an unwarranted discovery proceeding.
In dealing with a case in which an understatement of inventory is
suspected, a tax official seeking to minimize the impact of McLean will
probably have to list "value of unlisted inventory" as soon as he has
reasonable grounds for assuming that substantial understatement is
present. Valuation may be deferred until supporting data are available,
at which time the board of equalization and review or the board of
county commissioners can make an appraisal, perhaps after state income and franchise returns have been examined. 5 Such an approach
places a premium on gamesmanship at the expense of orderly administration. Fortunately for tax officials, they are not liable for honest errors
they make in listing. Until the result in McLean is altered by statute or
subsequent decision, ad valorem tax discovery procedures in North Carolina will remain in some disorder.
THOMAS S. STUKES

Constitutional Law-Changes in Party Affiliation and the Right to Vote
in the Primary
Does the Constitution allow a state to bar a qualified voter from
voting in a party primary for a period of months or even years after he
has switched his party affiliation or last participated in another party's
nominating procedures? The Supreme Court's increasing solicitude for
the right to vote and for freedom to associate for political purposes has
culminated within the last few years in the application of its new "com"One useful result of McLean is that it prevents supervisors from diplomatically. arbitrating
a valuation on the discovered property before it is listed. This has been a common practice not
sanctioned under the statute. Valuation occurs after the listing of the property. The tax supervisor
places a valuation on the property if it is feasible and the final valuation is set by the appropriate
board. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-312(d) (1972).
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pelling state interest" test' to cases challenging restrictions on the right
to vote as a violation of equal protection and restrictions on freedom
of association as a violation of due process, both guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment. 2 At the same time, voters have apparently abandoned traditional, long-term party loyalty in favor of an increasing
tendency to vote for particular candidates or for the party most acceptable to them in a particular election. Since the beginning of 1971, federal
courts in several states have faced challenges to the constitutionality of
state statutes which condition a person's right to vote in his party's
primary elections solely on the length of time since he switched his party
registration or since he last participated in primary or convention activities of another party, without regard to the voter's motives or to the
bona fide character of the switch.'
In Rosario v. Rockefeller,4 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld a New York law5 requiring changes in party affiliation
to be made before the last general election preceding the primary (a
period of approximately seven to nine months) in order for the new
party member to be eligible to vote in the next primary. Reversing the
district court's decision, the appellate court found no constitutional
restriction on the right to vote or freedom of association and no violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection.' The
state had justified its statute as necessary to protect the integrity of the
political party system in that it prevented "raiding," which was defined
as "voters of one party fraudulently designating themselves as voters of
another party in order to determine the results of the raided party's
primary. ' 7 The Second Circuit accepted the state's argument that the
'See Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 715-16 (1970) for an analysis
of the elements of the compelling state interest test.
2See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), for explicit recognition of the application of
the "compelling state interest test" to alleged denials of both the right to vote and the freedom of
association.
3Rosario v. Rockefeller, 458 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2062 (1972) (No.
71-1371); Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447 (D.R.I. 1972); Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415
(D.N.J. 1972); Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1972), appeal docketed, 40
U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631); Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153
(E.D. La. 1971), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971) (No. 71-715); Gordon
v. Executive Comm. of the Democratic Party, 335 F. Supp. 166 (D.S.C. 1971) (per curiam).
'458 F.2d 649 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 2062 (1972) (No. 71-1371).
5N.Y. ELECTIONs LAW § 186 (McKinney 1964).

6The court of appeals also reversed the district court's holding that § 186 violated the Voting
Rights Act of 1970. Since this note considers the constitutonal issues of Rosario and comparable
federal district court cases and since no other case on point discussed this issue, the Roasrio court's
treatment of the statutory challenge will not be examined.
1458 F.2d at 651.
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prevention of raiding is a compelling state interest and held that the
means chosen for protecting the interest represented a minimal infringement on first and fourteenth amendment rights.
Until very recently, the right to vote in state elections was considered a mere privilege granted by the state subject to any restrictions the
states might wish to impose, provided only that the state not violate the
Constitution in regulating the franchise. 8 Citizens had no "right" to vote
in state elections, 9 and the state wielded virtually unlimited powers in
the regulation of voting in its elections. 0 Although these earlier cases
are still cited in current decisions, the emphasis has shifted to the restriction that the regulations imposed by the states not violate any part of
the Constitution."
In recent years the Supreme Court has treated the franchise as a
right protected by the Constitution, even though not expressly guaranteed for state elections:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice
in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good
citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room
for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily abridges this
2
right.'
In Reynolds v. Sims 3 the Supreme Court described the right of suffrage as a "fundamental matter in a free and democratic society" and
emphasized its importance by requiring that "any alleged infringement
of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."' 4
The right to vote in a party primary receives the same zealous
protection and is subjected to the same tests of constitutionality whenever the primary elections determine candidates for the general election
or have been made an essential or integral step in the election process.15
'Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904).
'Yet as early as 1886, while still recognized as a mere privilege rather than an absolute right
guaranteed by the Constitution, voting was characterized as "a fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
"Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959).
"E.g., Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91
(1965).
"Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964).
13377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"Id. at 561-62.
"Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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The traditional test for the constitutionality of a statute allegedly
in violation of the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection
required only that the classification be rationally related to the achievement of legitimate state goals which the statute was designed to effect.
In the application of this test, the law was presumed constitutional;
unless the classification was wholly irrelevant to the state's objective, the
act was upheld. 6 However, the Court increasingly carved out exceptions
to the general rule and required stronger justification whenever certain
types of classifications, based on "suspect criteria" or affecting "fundamental rights," were involved.17 In Williams v. Rhodes1 the Supreme
Court explicitly held that only a "compelling state interest" could justify
infringements on the "precious freedoms" of "the right of qualified
voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively" and "the right of individuals to associate for the advancement
of political beliefs."' 9 The following year, in Kramer v. Union Free
School District,'"the Court applied the "compelling state interest test"
to a New York law permitting only parents and guardians of children
enrolled in local schools and the owners and lessees of taxable real
property in the district to vote for members of district school boards."
As applied in Kramer, the test dictates that any statute affecting the
right to vote must be carefully scrutinized and should be upheld only if
it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest 22 and if the classifi"McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). For arguments that the compelling

state interest test is an invalid measure of infringements on the right to vote, and application of
the traditional standard, see, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 634 (1969)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan,
J.,
dissenting).
"See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Harlan, J.,dissenting);
Cocanower & Rich, Residency Requirements for Voting, 12 ARIz. L. REv. 477 (1970); Note,
Durational Residency Requirements in State Elections: Blumstein v. Ellington, 46 IND. L.J. 222

(1971).
18393 U.S. 23 (1968).

"Id.
at 30.
-395 U.S. 621 (1969).
211d.
"More recently, the Court applied the compelling state interest test to durational residency
requirements which bar participation in state or local elections until the voter has been a resident
of the state or locality for a prescribed length of time. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972),
Tennessee's statute requiring a year's residency in the state and three months in the county for
eligibility to vote in state and local elections was struck down on the ground that the time limitation
was only tenuously related to the state's need for knowledgeable voters or to its valid interest in
preventing fraud. States can effect their interest in requiring that voters be bona fide residents by
tests aimed directly at the elements of residency rather than by conclusively presuming that staying
in the district a designated period of time automatically converts the person into a bona fide
resident sufficiently knowledgeable about the issues to exercise the franchise.
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cation was drawn with sufficient precision to be deemed necessary to
achieve the state's asserted goal.?

The decision in Rosario and the issues it presents should be evaluated in the context of the several recent federal district court opinions
examining similar statutes. 24 In Fontham v. McKeithen,21 the sole case
besides Rosario to sustain such a law, a six-month suspension of eligibility to vote in a party primary2 6 was approved by the federal district court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana. However, the court applied the
traditional "rational relation" test for equal protection cases, an ap-

proach which seems clearly erroneous in view of the pattern of Supreme
Court decisions.27
2ln a number of cases, including Kramer, the Court has avoided the question of whether the
interest asserted by the state in support of its challenged legislation constituted a compelling state
interest; instead, it held that the classification was not drawn with sufficient precision to be deemed
"necessary to promote" the state's goal. E.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per
curiam).
"There is no Supreme Court decision which actually confronts this question. Jordan v. Meisser, 92 S. Ct. 947 (1972) (mem.), has sometimes been claimed to be on point; however, Jordan
was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question because the plaintiff there could have
enrolled after the normal deadline under an exception for prsons who did not have the age,
residential, or other qualificatons at the time of the normal deadline for registration of one's party
affiliation. See 458 F.2d at 654 n.6.
Two other Supreme Court cases are sometimes cited as supporting the constitutional validity
of durational party membership requirements. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971), dealt with
Georgia's restrictions on a person's eligibility to get on the ballot. The Court found no onerous
limitations or inequities in the different routes for achieving a place on the ballot such as were found
in Williams v. Rhodes, in which the restrictions strongly favored certain parties and were so great
as to affect voters' rights to vote for the candidates of their choice.
In Lippitt v. Cipollone, 92 S. Ct. 729 (1972) (mem.), affg 337 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Ohio
1971), Ohio law denying a candidate's right to run in the primary of one party within four years
of the time he voted as a member of a different party was held constitutional. The fact that the
Supreme Court has left at least three of the six cases dealt with in this note, involving durational
party membership requirements for eligibility to vote in primary elections, on its docket a substantial period of time suggests that it does not consider Lippitt, or the considerations on which it based
its almost immediate decision in Lippitt, as dispositive of the issue. The right of a person to run
as a candidate is not given the constitutional protection accorded the right to vote; thus, issues in
the two kinds of cases involve different considerations unless restrictions on candidacy are so
burdensome that they infringe on the right to vote or other fundamental rights, as in Williams v.
Rhodes. Bendinger v. Ogilvie, 335 F. Supp. 572, 576 (N.D. Il1.1971); Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp.
447, 452 (D.R.I. 1972); Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108-09 (N.D. 111.1972), appeal
docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631).
2336 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. La. 1971), appealdocketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971)
(No. 71-715).
"LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:270.204 (Supp. 1972).
"See notes 17-23 and accompanying text supra.
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In Gordon v. Executive Committee of the Democratic Party,28 a
federal district court struck down provisions of a South Carolina law
which required a voter in a primary election to swear that he had not
voted in any primary, convention, or precinct meeting of another political party that year.2 9 The "real intent of the statute," as interpreted by
the court, was to prevent voting in two primaries for the same election;
consequently, the enactment was upheld only to the extent it proscribed
this fraudulent practice.30 Although Gordon was one of the first decisions in the country to deal with the question of durational membership
requirements for voting in primary elections, the court's per curiam
opinion did not treat the issue of "raiding" at all.
In Yale v. Curvin,31 Pontikes v. Kusper,32 and Nagler v. Stiles,33
however, three-judge federal district courts declared unconstitutional
statutes specifically described as designed to prevent "raiding" of one
party by members of another. In each of these cases the restriction on
the first to vote was much more severe than in Rosario. New Jersey
required a voter to abstain from voting in two subsequent annual primary elections before voting in the primary of another party. 4 Rhode
Island denied a voter the right to vote in a primary for twenty-six
months after voting in another party's primary or signing candidates'
petitions to run in another party's primary or as an independent." And
Illinois permitted voters to participate in primaries only after twentythree months had elapsed since they last voted in the primary of any
other party. All three of these cases regarded the prevention of raiding
as a legitimate, perhaps even compelling, state interest, but felt that the
means adopted by the legislatures imposed greater restrictions on the
right to vote than were necessary to achieve the professed goal. Under
these constructions the statutes failed to meet the "compelling state
interest" test.
The opinions in Yale v. Curvin and Nagler v. Stiles, both of which
were decided after Rosario v. Rockefeller, sought to distinguish Rosario
"335 F. Supp. 166 (D.S.C. 1971) (per curiam).
"S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.71 (Supp. 1971).
"335 F. Supp. at 169.
31345 F. Supp. 447 (D.R.I. 1972).
12345 F. Supp. 1104 (N.D. I1. 1972), appealdocketed,40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16,1972)
(No. 71-1631).
"343 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.J. 1972).
"N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-45 (1964).
3R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-15-24, -16-8 (1969).
"6ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-43(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972).
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as involving a less onerous burden on the right to vote and on the
freedom to associate for political purposes. Yet much of the reasoning
of these cases, as well as the earlier Pontikes v. Kusper, would seem to
apply equally to the less restrictive statute involved in Rosario.
Rosario was clearly correct in measuring the right of a citizen to
vote in a party primary against the compelling state interest test, despite
the Fontham court's conclusion to the contrary. Any burden or condition imposed on the right to vote requires the same close scrutiny elicited by an actual denial of the franchise." The normal presumption of
constitutionality of state legislation is derived from the basic assumption
that the institutions of state government are structured to represent
fairly all the people. When a challenged statute denies or conditions the
right to vote, the challenge in effect attacks the foundation underlying
the presumption of constitutonality, and the presumption cannot be
invoked.38 The burden thus devolves upon the state to justify both the
interest served by the enactment and the means chosen to achieve that
interest whenever fundamental rights are limited or denied.39
Does the prevention of raiding constitute a "compelling state interest" as the court held in Rosario? "'Raiding' occurs when members of
one party vote in the primary of another party for the sole purpose of
bringing about the nomination of the weakest candidate."' " The Court
has repeatedly recognized a compelling state interest in the prevention
of fraud and corruption.41 The need to protect against subversion of the
party system by persons with no loyalty voting in its primary is analogous to the state's desire to bar non-residents from entering the state,
pretending to be residents, and voting in its elections-an interest upheld
in Dunn v. Blumstein as a "legitimate and compelling governmental
goal."42 Federal courts have nonetheless split on the issue of whether the
44
prevention of raiding qualifies as a compelling state interest.43 Rosario
31Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S.

Ct. 995, 1000 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Green v.
McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630, 632 (E.D. Mich. 1971); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969). But see McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
"Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 (1972).
1"Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. Ill. 1972), appealdocketed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631); accord,Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447,450-51 (D.R.I.
1972); Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415, 416 (D.N.J. 1972).
"See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 92 S. Ct. 849, 857 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,

637 (1969).
"92 S. Ct. at 1004.
"'The difference apparently stems from doubts by some courts that raiding represents a
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and Nagler v. Stiles45 said "yes," Gordon" found no compelling purpose
which could possibly justify restrictions of this nature on the right to
vote, and Yale v. Curvin47 avoided the issue as unnecessary for the
disposition of the case.
Even if the compelling interest is found to exist, the means chosen
to achieve the professed state goal must still be evaluated. Only if the
classification is shown to be necessary to promote a compelling state
interest can restrictions on fundamental rights be upheld.48 Not only
must the state adopt means which actually tend to help achieve its goal,
it must follow the least burdensome path of furthering even the most
compelling interest. "[I]f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve
those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity,
a State may not choose the way of greater interference.""9 Rosario
found a minimal invasion of constitutional rights in the New York
statute requiring changes in party affiliation before the preceding general election in order to vote in the primary. However, the court's argument seemed to turn on the assumption that no measures less restrictive
would be equally effective in preventing raiding. "Allowing enrollment
any time after the general election would not have the same deterrent
effect on raiding for it would not put the voter in the unseemly position
of asking to be enrolled in one party while at the same time intending
to vote immediately for another.""0 The Rasario court dismissed the
provision for challenges to individual voters as too cumbersome to
serve as an effective barrier against bad faith party cross-overs since no
objective criteria exist for testing party loyalty in contrast to the concrete evidence available to establish a voter's place of residency. 2
substantial threat to the electoral process rather than from any disagreement over the legitimacy
of the goal. See, e.g., Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. II1. 1972), appeal
docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631). A state cannot logically justify

restrictions on fundamental rights as a means of preventing an event which is unlikely to occur
even without preventive measures.
1458 F.2d at 652.
45343 F. Supp. at 417-18.
11335 F. Supp. at 169.
47345 F. Supp. at 453.
8

Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1000 (1972); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,

704 (1969) (per curiam); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
4
Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 (1972).

11458 F.2d at 653.
5
N.Y. ELECTIONS
11458 F.2d at 653.

LAW

§ 332 (McKinney 1964).
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Yet, as Pontikes v. Kusper pointed out, it is not clear that raiding
would constitute a substantial problem in the absence of statutes limiting the right to vote in primaries after a change in party affiliation.
"There is no evidence to indicate that raiding is more likely to take place
than 'honest' switches of affiliation. Forty-four states do not impose
post-election restraints on changing affiliation. This would indicate that
raiding is not a serious threat to the multi-party system. 5 3 In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it would seem that these other six
states could get along with laws merely requiring an oath of affiliation
and providing for individual challenges of alleged raiders just as easily
as the forty-four. 4 In fact, the primary function of such restrictive
statutes may be to protect the advantage of the dominant party by
imposing a high price on transfers of party allegiance rather than to
serve the avowed purpose of preserving party integrity. 5
The difficulty of preventing raiding by the use of individual challenges does not necessarily justify resorting to more restrictive techniques for achieving the same goal. Adoption of a conclusive presumption of non-residency until a would-be voter has been in the state a
specified length of time56 or as long as he remains in the military service57 has been held to violate the equal protection clause. Conclusive
presumptions barring certain classes of would-be voters from the franchise almost inevitably violate the compelling state interest test by excluding some citizens with a stake in the outcome equal to that of other
individuals allowed to vote. Admittedly, existence of an improper motive for switching party registration is less susceptible of proof than
residency, but it is not necessarily impossible to ascertain. Significantly,
the burden is on the state to prove the necessity of a challenged statute
as a means of achieving a. compelling interest. 9 If forty-four states
manage without such prohibitive laws, the remaining six presumably
should not be able to limit the franchise in this manner without demon"Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1108 (N.D. II1.1972), appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W.
3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631); accord, Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447, 451 (D.R.I.
1972); Nagler v. Stiles, 343 F. Supp. 415, 417 (D.N.J. 1972).
"See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-59, -74, -87 (1972).
"Fontham v. McKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153, 173-74 (E.D. La. 1971) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting)
appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971) (No. 71-715).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1007 (1972).
"7Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
"See Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1007 (1972); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-96
(1965).
"Dunn v. Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995, 1003 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
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strating a special need for more stringent protection against raiding, a
need which has apparently not been established."
Is the requirement that a voter change his party registration six
months in advance of the primary or before the preceding general election effective in preventing raiding? According to the court in Rosario,
"[flew persons have the effrontery or the foresight to enroll as say,
'Republicans' so that they can vote in a primary some seven months
hence, when they full well intend to vote 'Democratic' in only a few
weeks."" On the other hand, it seems doubtful that anyone unscrupulous enough to change his party affiliation with the intent of sabotaging
the primary of a party to which he feels no loyalty would actually be
deterred by the relatively minor inconsistency involved in making the
switch before a general election in which he intends to vote for a different party. New York's law simply requires the malicious crossregistrant to plan ahead12 and is much less likely to restrain the potential
"raider" than the person who honestly feels that his over-all party loyalty lies with a party other than the one which he prefers in the upcoming general election.13 One of the factors on which Dunn v. Blumstein
turned was the recognition that honest new residents would be barred
from voting while those willing to swear falsely to length of residency
would not;64 the New York primary law is similarly too imprecisely
"Rosario sought to justify the New York statute by the existence of the smaller Conservative
and Liberal parties, which were considered particularly vulnerable to raiding and were offered as
evidence of New York's special need for protection against raiding. 458 F.2d at 652 n.3. But this

fact alone cannot license a state to deny or restrict the right to vote in ways that would otherwise
be constitutionally impermissible without some showing that raiding is likely to occur or that less
stringent restrictions are insufficient to repel the danger.
61458 F.2d at 653.
6
See Fontham v. MeKeithen, 336 F. Supp. 153, 174 (E.D. La. 1971) (Wisdom, J., dissenting),
appeal docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971) (No. 71-715).

OConceivably, the states are actually seeking to "preserve the integrity of the political party
system" by denying primary participation to anyone who does not exhibit a more or less permanent
attachment to the party. But the need for stability of the political system does not justify exclusion

of voters lacking long-term party attachments anymore than the need for political stability of a
state authorizes the unconstitutional goal of "fencing out" from the franchise persons with views

alien to the state and who have not been residents long enough to absorb state attitudes or at least
to develop feelings of loyalty towards the state. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 53 (1969) (per curiam)

(Marshall, J., dissenting): Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965). Nor is it clear that allowing relatively unrestricted
switches in party membership will damage the party system. Historically, many politicians as well
as individual members have changed their party affiliation for opportunistic as well as ideological
reasons; changes of this type may well add vitality to the party system rather than dilute it. Lippitt
v. Cipollone, 92 S. Ct. 729, 730 (1972) (mem.) (Douglas, J., dissenting), affg 337 F. Supp. 1405

(1971).

6492 S. Ct. at 1005.
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drawn to achieve its asserted purpose and gives the very person the law
is intended to restrict an advantage over the honest citizen who falls
within its terms.
If the time limit imposed on party membership as a condition to
voting in the primary elections excludes people who have as strong a
loyalty to the party or interest in the outcome of the primary as a
substantial number of the long-time party members, the statute cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny.65 Such time limits are inappropriate
in a period when voters increasingly base their choice upon the candidate or the parties' stands on a current issue. 6 Voters need not commit
their loyalties to a party on a long-term basis, from the national down
to the local level, to qualify as being genuinely interested in a primary
election. 7 Candidates within the same party frequently recommend conflicting programs; the national party may espouse issues totally different
from those with which the local party is concerned; and the events of
any moment may focus the spotlight on previously insignificant questions or completely re-align the standing of potential candidates. The
privilege of voting for any candidate in a primary should not be contingent upon the voter's willingness to commit himself far in advance to a
party whose candidates and issues may stand for opposite positions on
different levels of government or at different times. While the six-month
period of the New York law permits a more knowledgeable decision and
greater flexibility in adjusting to changing issues and candidates on
varying levels of government, the difference between the statute examined by Rosario and the twenty-six-month law of Rhode Island is
merely a matter of degree. Even six months beforehand, the issues and
candidates of a particular election are often unidentifiable; many voters
in sympathy with the stand of one party or its candidates for that
election would be barred from voting in its primary because they were
unable to discern until too late how the choice would present itself.68
"5In Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969), the Supreme Court held

that "[w]hether classifications allegedly limiting the franchise to those resident citizens 'primarily
interested' deny those excluded equal protection of the laws depends, interalia,on whether all those

excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected than those the statute includes."
6

Yale v. Curvin, 345 F. Supp. 447, 451 (D.R.I. 1972).
"Id. at 453; Pontikes v. Kusper, 345 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (N.D. I11.1972), appeal docketed,
40 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. June 16, 1972) (No. 71-1631).
appeal docketed, 40 336 F. Supp. 153, 174 (E.D. La. 1971) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), appeal
docketed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1971) (No. 71-715).
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CONCLUSION

Although the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit characterized the New York law as a minimal infringement on the precious
freedom of association and the right to vote, the reasoning behind several federal district court cases dealing with comparable, more restrictive statutes would seem to call for a contrary interpretation of the effect
of New York law. The compelling state interest test for determining
whether restrictions on fundamental rights are unconstitutional requires
that the state interest furthered by the legislation be a compelling one,
that the statute carry the burden of justifying the restriction, that the
restriction be necessary to promote the interest, and that the classification be precisely tailored so that the lines of exclusion correspond almost
exactly with the exclusions necessary for achievement of the legislative
goal. The Second Circuit apparently diluted the compelling state interest test, for it ignored the requirement that the classification be precisely
tailored. It found the restriction necessary to achieve the state's interest
in preventing raiding even though it was not clear that raiding constituted a significant problem or that much less restrictive means might
not suffice to deal with whatever danger was present. In view of the
development of the compelling state interest test and its recent application to durational residency requirements for voting, restrictions on the
right to vote in primary elections cannot be conditioned upon the length
of time since the voter switched his party registration or voted in another
party's primary. The right to vote, whether in a general or primary
election, ranks among the most cherished rights of our democratic system. Without strong evidence that raiding represents a serious threat to
the integrity of the electoral process, no state can justify denying a
citizen's fundamental constitutional right to vote in a primary election
solely because he participated in the nominating procedure of another
party for a recent prior election or within a specified period of time.
NORMA

S. HARRELL

Constitutional Law-Cognovit Notes: Pretrial Waiver of Constitutional
Rights in Civil Cases
In D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.1 and its companion case, Swarb
192 S. Ct. 775 (1972).

1973]

COGNOVIT NOTES

v. Lennox,2 the Supreme Court examined the constitutonality of cognovit clauses for the first time in nearly seventy years.3 In Overmyer
the Court affirmed the constitutionality of cognovit clauses in arm's
length contracts between economic equals although it indicated that it
might find the same clauses unconstitutonal "where the contract is one
of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining power, and
where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision." 4
Recent criticism of cognovit clauses stemmed from concern that
unsophisticated consumers who accept cognovit provisions in credit arrangements forfeit their constitutional rights to notice and a hearing
prior to judgment without benefit of due process of law.' In Overmyer,
the Court has indicated that the constitutionality of cognovit clauses
signed by individual debtors will depend on the validity of the waiver of
rights in the particular cognovit clause.' If the constitutional rights were
validly waived when the contract was signed, then a judgment filed later
without notice to the debtor is secure against charges of denied due
process.
7
The waiver rationale, previously applied in two lower court cases,
should silence criticisms of cognovit procedures if the courts enforce
that approach stringently by applying a strict presumption against waivers and by enforcing the criminal definition of waiver in cognovit cases.8
The facts of Overmyer passed muster as a valid waiver of rights
292 S. Ct. 767 (1972).
'National Exch. Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904); Grover & Baker Sewing Mach. Co. v.
Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). These are the most recent cases in which the Supreme Court
examined cognovit notes.
'92 S. Ct. at 783. As will be developed, not every such clause necessarily need be found
unconstitutional.
'Id. at 778 n.4.
'Several writers and one state court had suggested that cognovit waivers of the rights to notice
and hearing could never be valid. See Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 232-33, 250
N.E.2d 474, 482, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382, 393 (1969); Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 111, 141-43 (1961); Note,
Cognovit Judgments: Some ConstitutionalConsiderations,70 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1126 (1970).
But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent,
375 U.S. 311 (1964). Overmyer is possibly distinguishable from Ezrine in that consent to jurisdiction was limited to the state of Ohio under the Ohio statute, whereas the Pennsylvania statute in
Ezrine placed no limit on possible jurisdiction. 92 S. Ct. at 777 n.l. See also Justice Douglas'
dissent. Id. at 784.
7
Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091
(E.D. Pa. 1970), affd on other grounds, 92 S. Ct. 767 (1972).
aln crim ,n
Icases a waiver of constitutional rights must be demonstrably knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938).
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under the strictest of standards, so the Court declined to decide whether
it would countenance standards less strict than those applied in criminal
cases. Grounds for justifying lower standards for cognovit waivers were
suggested when the Court noted that waiver of constitutional rights in
civil cases "parallels the recognition of waiver in the criminal context
where personal liberty, rather than a property right, is involved." 9
The distinction between criminal and civil cases, however, is no
basis on which to erect different standards of waiver of constitutional
rights. Indeed, if an approach less rigorous than that outlined above is
taken in cognovit cases, the protections for cognovit debtors will be lost
just when they were recognized, and the criticisms of denied due process
will be resurrected.
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN
COGNOVIT CASES

In the past the Supreme Court has not hesitated to apply a strict
presumption against waiver of constitutional rights in the civil context. '
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy," in which the Court declared that it
would "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" to protect a civil party's right to jury trial,'2 is perhaps the strongest statement
of the position.
There is no justification for a retreat from that policy in favor of
cognovit procedures which waive the due process rights to notice and a
hearing prior to judgment. Recent cases have left no doubt that these
rights are considered the bedrock of due process in civil as well as
3
criminal proceedings.'
Furthermore, different standards of waiver should not rest on the
distinction between personal and property rights in criminal and civil
cases because the fourteenth amendment guarantees personal rights and
property rights equally in terms that suggest no basis for distinction.
The purpose of property rights, as much as personal rights, is to secure
individual liberty and independence from dominance by the govern'92 S. Ct. at 782.
"Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S.
408 (1882).
"301 U.S. 389 (1937).
121d. at 393.
"See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964); Mullane v. Central
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Wuehter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
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ment. 11 In the words of Professor Reich:
[P]roperty performs the function of maintaining independence, dignity, and pluralism in society. . . The Bill of Rights also serves this
function, but while the Bill of Rights comes into play only at extraordinary moments of conflict or crisis, property affords day-to-day protection in the ordinary affairs of life. Indeed, in the final analysis the Bill
of Rights depends upon the existence of private property. Political
rights presuppose that individuals and private groups have the will and
the means to act independently. But so long as individuals are motivated largely by self-interest, their well-being must first be independent. Civil liberties must have a basis in property, or bills of rights will
not preserve them."5

Thus personal rights and property rights serve the same important end.
They are equally guaranteed by the Constitution because they protect
equal values. Since this is so,there is no basis for a distinction between
personal and property rights which would justify different presumptions
against waiver in criminal and civil cases. Speaking of the "conceptual
difficulties created" by such a distinction relating to federal jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court said recently in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 6 "[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property
rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights."
Thus the Court should continue to indulge every reasonable presumption against waivers of constitutional rights, whether the waiver
occurs in criminal or civil cases.
STANDARDS OF WAIVER IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES

Johnson v. Zerbst'7 is generally cited as defining the standard for
waiver of constitutional rights in criminal cases. In that case the Court
held that a waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right."18 The precise language used in Zerbst was borrowed
from civil law. The same words had been used for at least a century to
describe the standard for express waivers in contract law, 9 and the
"See Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 92 S. Ct. 1113 (1972); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
"Reich, supra note 14, at 771. Professor Reich also demonstrates how it has come to be
"widely thought that property and liberty are separable." Id. at 772.
92 S. Ct. 1113, 1122 (1972).
17304 U.S. 458 (1938).
"Id. at 464.
"Hoxie v. Home Ins. Co., 32 Conn. 21 (1864); cf. Clark v. West, 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1
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elements of knowledge and intent have characterized definitions of
waiver generally for an even longer period."0 In every legal context,
waivers have been thought to comprise knowledge and intent as a matter
of elementary definition."1 In criminal cases since Johnson v. Zerbst,
very stringent concepts of both knowledge and voluntariness have developed in order to protect against waiver of rights where personal liberty
is at stake. 22 The same concepts, for the same reasons, would apply to
cognovit waivers.
Knowledge. A criminal defendant is not held to have knowingly
waived his rights unless he was aware that he had those rights and he
understood the consequences of his waiver. A cognovit debtor merits no
less protection, for any standard of fairness is offended if constitutionally guaranteed rights are surrendered by mistake or because the unwary
consumer (or defendant) did not comprehend their importance.
Whether personal or property rights be forfeited as a result of the waiver
should be immaterial.
Voluntariness. Recent criminal cases culminating in Miranda v.
Arizona" stress the necessity to protect individual dignity as well as
freedom by refusing to countenance compelled confessions (i.e., involuntary waivers of the right to silence). Criminal courts are thus alert to
invalidate forced waivers on grounds of psychological as well as physical
compulsion. The specific impetus for this development has been a fear
of the potential for compulsion
inherent in police confrontations against
24
criminal defendants.
The cognovit debtor, it might be said, confronts not an arm of
government power but his creditor, a private citizen who cannot in
theory assert any compulsion over a customer in a free market. Since a
creditor cannot force assent to a cognovit note in the same way the
police can force confessions, it might be argued that the strict standard
of voluntariness in criminal cases is unwarranted in the civil context.
However, the preservation of individual freedom demands that we
protect property rights as jealously as we do personal liberty.25 The
(1908); Cowenhoven v. Ball, 118 N.Y. 231, 23 N.E. 470 (1890); 28 AmI. & ENG. ENC. LAW
Waiver §§ I, III (1896); M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ESTOPPEL 506 (1st ed. 1872).
"Darnley v. London, C. & D. Ry., L.R. 2 H.L. 43 (1867).
2
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1751 (4th ed. 1951).
22See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
-384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
"Id. at 448-58.
2See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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power of commercial interests in consumer markets where adhesion
contracts are common, threatens to abridge individual freedoms just as
government power may. When the courts attach property on the basis
of confessed judgments, commercial power is impossible to distinguish
from governmental power."
Furthermore, there is great potential for compulsion in dealings
between parties with disparate bargaining power. A consumer confronted with a "take-it-or-leave-it" adhesion contract in a market in
which all creditors require the same cognovit waivers before extending
credit has no choice but to adhere to the creditor's terms if he must buy
on credit. Thus a strict standard of voluntariness, the equal of that
utilized in criminal cases, should be enforced by courts considering the
validity of cognovit clauses if the rights of the debtor are to be adequately protected.
APPLYING STRICT STANDARDS OF WAIVER TO COGNOVIT NOTES

If the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waivers,
under what circumstances will creditors be able to demonstrate valid
cognovit waivers by the strict criminal standards? Can closing procedures be devised which will satisfy these standards and preserve the
commercial utility of cognovit notes?
Knowledge. Lower federal courts have invalidated cognovit provisions on the failure by creditors to demonstrate a knowing waiver in two
recent cases.2 Both courts, however, indicated that acceptable procedures for demonstrating a knowledgeable waiver could be devised. 21 A
briefing procedure similar to that required by the Truth in Lending Act 9
26

See generally Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1969);
Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (1953); Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629
(1943); Reich, supra note 14,
2Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091
(E.D. Pa. 1970).
2
Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (D. Del. 1971); Swarb v.Lennox, 314 F. Supp.
1081, 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See also id. at 1098, in which the court apparently condones closing

procedures utilized in connection with execution of mortgages. Notice cannot be waived in those
cases, however.

"Consumer Credit Protection Act
act requires:
(a)

§§ 121-31, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-1641 (1970). Essentially the

Disclosure, to make the consumer aware of the consequences of his act;

(b) Acknowledgment-the consumer must sign a separate document attesting his understanding; and
(c) Period of rescission, during which the consumer may renege on his contract.
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or a requirement for an examination by a notary could rebut the presumption against a knowing waiver in ordinary cases without destroying
the commercial utility of cognovit procedures.30
Voluntariness. Proof of voluntariness by the strict standards presents a much more difficult problem that the courts have yet to face. A
mere briefing procedure would be ineffective to dispel doubts about the
effect of economic compulsion on a cognovit debtor.
If there is disparate bargaining power between debtor and creditor,
under what conditions will adherance by the debtor to the terms of an
adhesion contract be considered voluntary? In such a situation, an impecunious consumer dealing with a large creditor who offers a form contract containing a cognovit clause demonstrably adheres voluntarily if
reasonable alternative choices were open to the consumer but were refused by him. Thus, if the creditor is offering substantially the same
terms as a competitor who does not require assent to a cognovit provision, it would appear that the consumer has a realistic choice between
sellers so that his waiver could be considered voluntary. The reasonableness of the choice would be determined in view of the particular circumstances of individual cases and the extent of the burden on the consumer
to know of other creditors' terms. This sort of case-to-case factual
determination might make cognovit clauses commercially unfeasible in
consumer transactions.
But what of the small consumer in a market in which all creditors
impose cognovit clauses in installment contracts for the purchase of a
given item? At the outset the consumer's choice is whether to make his
purchase at all-to take it or leave it. This choice might be sufficient to
render a waiver voluntary for the purchase of luxury items but not for
the purchase of necessities. It seems manifestly unrealistic to argue that
a person purchasing necessities on an installment contract voluntarily
assents to a cognovit provision when such provisions are required by all
creditors in the market. The consumer has no reasonable option to
refuse to buy necessities at all, and, if he is poor, he may have no choice
other than to buy on credit. He must make his credit purchase, and he
cannot do so without waiving his rights in assent to a cognovit provision.
The choice to buy even luxury items should not hinge on waiving constitutional rights; the presumption against waiver should not be overcome
by judicial evaluations of a consumer's prudence in his purchases. The
"But see Note, Confessions of Judgment in Pennsylvania:Halway to Oblivion?, 32 U. PITT.
L. REv. 236, 244-49 (1971).
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would be nearly impossible to
distinction between luxury and essential
3
define for contemporary consumers. 1
Recent federal cases dealing with distraint procedures imposed in
adhesion leases have determined without hesitation that assent to such
provisions in a crowded housing market cannot be considered voluntary." "There is no freedom of contract-there is merely a freedom to
adhere . . . -33 In the cognovit area, however, the Osmond court
refused (without any discussion) to find involuntariness on such
grounds. 4
Even so, if the courts continue "to indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver," cognovit clauses utilized in situations of disparate bargaining power and adhesion .contracts should routinely be
presumed involuntary.
Closing Procedures. In adhesion markets, then, how might creditors defeat a presumption against voluntary waivers yet retain a commercially feasible cognovit procedure? Clearly the simple signing of a
contract containing a cognovit provision would not establish a valid
waiver. Separate affidavits attesting the waiver and signed by the consumer might suffice to establish that a waiver was knowing, but it is
difficult to see how they could guarantee voluntariness since the nature
of the choices open to the consumer would not be altered by an affidavit,
and a ruling on such a fact situation would likely require a decision by
a judge.35
A possible solution may be suggested by the Court's implied criticism in Overmyer of the situation in which "the debtor receives nothing
for the cognovit provision."'" The cognovit procedure is commercially
useful to creditors because it eliminates the expense of notice and hearing in the case of defaulting debtors. Perhaps creditors could specifically
determine the worth of confessions of judgment and could offer debtors
the option of including or excluding cognovit provisions with corresponding differences in price. The choice between prices would have to be
reasonable and the burden of demonstrating knowledge or understanding would remain. In such a case, the parties would have bargained for
"See Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1998-99 (1972).
"Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy. 319 F. Supp.
284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
"1327 F. Supp. at 1358.
"Note, 32 U. Pirrr. L. REV., supra note 30, at 244-49.
1192 S. Ct. at 783.
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the cognovit provision, the debtor would have a choice between reasonable alternatives, and, if he waived his rights, he would receive an identifiable value for his waiver.
CONCLUSION

Cognovit procedures are not unconstitutional per se because the
due process rights to notice and hearing prior to judgment may be
validly waived. If a strict standard of waiver is applied and if a presumption against waiver is maintained, the heavy burden on creditors to
establish a valid waiver may well destroy the commercial utility of
cognovit notes in small consumer transactions. If the burden is placed
on the creditor to demonstrate a valid waiver in a hearing to reopen
judgment, a confession of judgment would be of less use to the creditor
than ordinary judgment procedures, in which he can rely on default
judgments to keep his legal expenses down. The cognovit creditor would
be forced to gamble that the facts of the particular case could establish
the validity of the waiver in order to be certain of a valid judgment. This
would be an equitable burden on the creditor. Cognovit procedures are
undeniably legitimate and useful commercial devices in arm's length
dealings between corporate parties. In disparate bargaining situations
there is a great potential for unfairness and exploitation. If a heavy
burded is placed on creditors to demonstrate the efficacy of the debtor's
waiver, commercial expediency will determine that creditors only employ cognovit provisions in appropriate circumstances. A creditor simply could not afford to execute a confessed judgment not validly obtained if the debtor, armed with strict standards of waiver, can so easily
reopen the judgment.
EDWARD C. WINSLOW

III

Constitutional Law-Evidence-No Testimonial Privilege For Newsmen
From the time the issue of a newsman's first amendment right to
withhold information was first raised,' attorneys and newsmen eagerly
awaited a ruling on the question by the United States Supreme Court.
'Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). All previous
attempts were based on common law claims. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff, 269 N.Y.
291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911).
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Numerous articles were written prescribing and predicting what the

Court should or would decide;2 but that decision was long in coming as
the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in case after case.3 Finally, in

1971, certiorari was granted in three cases: Branzburg v. Pound,4 In re

Pappas,5 and Caldwell v. United States.' In a five-to-four decision 7 the

Court held that the first amendment does not grant to newsmen a
testimonial privilege that other citizens do not enjoy. The purpose of this
note is to analyze this decision, to compare it with the prior development

of the law, and to evaluate the significance of the holding.
The fact situations in the three cases reviewed by the Court were

similar in that they all involved challenges by newsmen to subpoenas
requiring their appearances before grand juries. Staff reporter Branzburg was subpoenaed to testify as to his knowledge of drug law violations.' The subpoena was based on a news story under Branzburg's byline describing his observations of two persons synthesizing hashish
from marijuana. The subpoenas involving television newsman Pappas
and black reporter Caldwell arose from grand jury investigations of the
Black Panther Party. Both Branzburg and Pappas appeared before the
grand juries but refused to answer certain questions that they believed
called for information given to them in confidence. Branzburg refused
to identify the two hashish makers on the ground that his promise not

to reveal their identities was a condition to his gaining the information."0
Pappas refused to answer questions about what took place inside Black

Panther headquarters during a particular civil disorder because he had
'See, e.g., Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege:An EmpiricalStudy, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229 (1971)
(hereinafter cited as Blasi); Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, CriminalProsecutionsand PrivateLitigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198 (1970);
Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The ConstitutionalRight to a Confidential Relationship, 80
YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
3E.g., Buchanan v. Oregon, 392 U.S. 905, denying cert. to State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244,
436 P.2d 729 (1968); Murphy v. Colorado, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Torre v. Garland, 358 U.S. 910,
denying cert. to 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
1461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), cert. grantedsubnom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
s.. Mass. _ 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
'434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
'Branzburg v. Hayes, 92 S. Ct. 2646 (1972) (reporting the disposition of all three cases). Justice
White wrote the opinion for the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun,
Powell, and Rehnquist joined. Justice Douglas dissented in a separate opinion, and Justice Stewart
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
'Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Ky. 1970).
'Id. at 345.
"Id. at 346.
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agreed as a condition of entry not to disclose anything he saw or heard
there." Caldwell was the only reporter of the three who refused to
appear at all before the grand jury. He justified his refusal on the ground
that his working relationship with the Black Panther Party would be
destroyed should he be forced to appear in secret before the grand jury,"
for his informants, unable to attend the proceeding or to gain access to
a report of it, would be unlikely to accept his word that their confidence
had not been breached.
All three reporters argued that freedom of the press necessarily
includes the right to gather news; that to gather news it is often necessary to agree either not to identify the source of information published
or to publish only part of the facts revealed; and that if the reporter is
forced to reveal confidences to a grand jury, the source so identified and
other confidential sources of other reporters will be measurably deterred
from furnishing publishable information.1 3 In short, refusal to recognize a testimonial privilege for newsmen results in suppression of the
free flow of information to the public protected by the first amendment.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Pappasdenied the existence
of a newsman's privilege on the grounds that "[tlhe principle that the
public 'has a right to every man's evidence' "14 had been preferred in
their jurisdiction,that any effect of grand jury subpoenas on free dissemination of news was "indirect, theoretical, and uncertain,"' 5 and that to
hold otherwise would be to disregard the interests of the federal government and the states in the enforcement of the criminal law. 6 The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Branzburg v. Pound recognized a newsman's
privilege against disclosing a source of information but not against
disclosing the information itself. 7 In Caldwell, however, the Ninth Circuit, considering Caldwell's appeal from a contempt order issued by the
District Court as a result of his refusal to appear before a federal grand
jury, granted a qualified newsman's privilege covering sources and information on a "'clear showing [by the government] of a compelling and
overriding national interest that cannot be served by any alternative
means.' ",s The court's viewpoint is well stated:
"In re Pappas,

Mass....._... ,

-

266 N.E.2d 297, 298 (1971).

"Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 1970).
"Branzburg v. Hayes, 92 S. Ct. 2646, 2655 (1972).

._._ Mass. at

_

266 N.E.2d at 299, quoting 8 J.

WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70

(McNaughton rev. 1961).
._._Mass. at _ 266 N.E.2d at 302.
"Isd.

"461 S.W.2d at 347.
"1434 F.2d at 1086, quoting Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
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The very concept of a free press requires that the news media be
accorded a measure of autonomy; that they should be -free to pursue

their own investigations to their own ends without fear of governmental interference; and that they should be able to protect their investiga-

tive processes. To convert news gatherers into Department of Justice
investigators is to invade the autonomy of the press by imposing a

governmental function upon them. To do so where the result is to
diminish their future capacity as news gatherers is destructive of their

public function.' 9
The relief sought by petitioners Branzburg and Pappas and respondent
Caldwell in the Supreme Court was the recognition of a qualified newsman's privilege similar to that granted by the Ninth Circuit:
[T]he reporter should not be forced either to appear or to testify before
a grand jury or at trial until and unless sufficient grounds are shown
for believing that the reporter possesses information relevant to a
crime the grand jury is investigating, that the information the reporter

has is unavailable from other sources, and that the need for the information is sufficiently compelling to override the claimed invasion of
First Amendment interests occasioned by the disclosure."
A survey of past Supreme Court decisions involving infringement
of first amendment rights discloses that petitioners in Branzburg v.
Hayes had ample reason to hope for a favorable decision, for the Court
has constructed a labyrinth of protective devices around the sensitive
areas of freedom of speech, press, and association. 2 The decisions most
"1434 F.2d at 1086.
1192 S. Ct. at 2655.
"In 1919 Justice Holmes first enunciated the "clear and present danger" test, Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), which was refined in subsequent cases to include only
advocacy of destructive action, not ideas, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957), and
only such advocacy as was likely to incite or produce such action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969).
The overbreadth doctrine involves the striking down of statutes having the possibility of
unnecessarily deterring the free exercise of first amendment rights. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
The balancing test is a device used to evaluate the necessity of governmental encroachment
upon individual rights and has been applied to legislative investigating committees. E.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539 (1963); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Barenblatt v.United States, 360 U.S.
109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). It has also been applied to bar
admissions. E.g., In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971); Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971). See
generally NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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pertinent to determining the extent of a newsman's privilege to refuse
to testify before a grand jury are the cases concerning the investigative
powers of federal and state legislative committees. The Supreme Court
has restricted those powers in several22 cases to avoid unnecessary infringement of first amendment rights.
One of the first cases to require such restriction was Watkins v.
United States.2 The petitioner in that case was summoned to testify
before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on
Un-American Activities. He testified freely as to his own activities but
refused to answer questions as to his knowledge of membership by other
persons in the Communist Party. He was convicted of a violation of 2
U.S.C. § 192, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person summoned as a witness by either House of Congress to refuse to answer any
question "pertinent to the question under inquiry." After granting a writ
of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Recognizing
that the power of Congress to investigate is necessary and broad, 4 the
Court nevertheless proceeded to place limitations on it to assure protection of first amendment rights of association. In the words of Chief
Justice Warren, "The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to
all forms of governmental action. Witnesses cannot be compelled to give
evidence against themselves. They cannot be subjected to unreasonable
search and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech,
press, religion, or political belief and association be abridged."2 The
Court placed on such congressional investigations the requirement that
the inquiry be justified by a specific legislative need," and that the
jurisdiction of the investigating committee be spelled out with sufficient
particularity to insure that compulsory process is used only in furtherance of that legislative purpose.2 The Court endorsed use of a balancing
test to determine the validity of a stated legislative purpose:
Finally, the Court has afforded specific safeguards to the press by extending protection to

distribution, Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), and receipt of information, Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965). The need for self-censorship from fear of libel suits has
been reduced by the imposition of a heavier burden of proof upon public officials, public figures,
and private individuals involved in matters of legitimate public interest. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2Cases cited note 21 supra.
-354 U.S. 178 (1957).
24
1d. at 187.

2Id. at 188.
211d. at 205.
DId. at 201.
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It is manifest that despite the adverse effects which follow upon com-

pelled disclosure of private matters, not all such -inquiries are
barred. . . .The critical element is the existence of, and the weight
to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures

from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that
every congressional investigation is justified by a public need that

2
overbalances any private rights affected. 1
This balancing test was repeated in various forms in subsequent
cases29 until it became phrased in terms of an "overriding and compelling state interest."3 One of the most recent cases to apply this test was

DeGregory v. Attorney General.3 The appellant in that case refused

to answer questions put to him by the Attorney General32 concerning
his connection with the Communist Party ten years earlier. The Supreme Court reversed his contempt conviction because there was no
showing 33of "overriding and compelling state interest" for lack of a
"nexus" between the witness and the subject under investigation.
Believing a grand jury investigation to be analogous to a legislative
committee investigation, petitioners in Branzburg asked for protection
of their constitutional rights similar to that granted witnesses before
legislative committees: that a nexus be shown between the reporter and
the crime under investigation and that the need be sufficiently compelling to override the invasion of first amendment interests occasioned by
the disclosure.34 The Ninth Circuit had accepted the analogy, but the
Supreme Court did not.
Four major factors influenced the Court to distinguish between
grand jury and legislative committee investigations. Perhaps the most
consequential was the lack of empirical proof that forced disclosures of
111d. at 198.
a"Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution
of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests
at stake in the particular circumstances shown." Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126

(1959). "[W]e have for decision the federal question of whether the public interests overbalance
these conflicting private ones." Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 78 (1959).

"°Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
31383 U.S. 825 (1966).
'rThe Attorney General is authorized under N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 588:8-a (Supp. 1971)
to investigate any of the violations provided in § 588:2 of that chapter. Such violations cover a
wide range of "subversive" activities, including "any act intended to overthrow, destroy or alter
. . . the constitutional form of the United States, or of the state of New Hampshire. ...
Id. § 588:2 (1955).

"383 U.S. at 829-30, quoting Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79 (1959).
1192 S. Ct. at 2655.
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sources can obstruct the free flow of information to the public.35 While
conceding that newsgathering should and does qualify for first amendment protection," the Court refused to make the requisite factual assumptions necessary to imply from the right to gather news a right to
protect informational sources." The Court was simply unconvinced
that use of the subpoena power would deter potential sources from
divulging information:"8 "[W]e remain unclear [sic] how often and to
what extent informers are actually deterred from furnishing information
when newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury."39 Consequently, the potential loss of news sources caused by even an unbridled
use of the subpoena power by the grand jury was characterized by the
Court as an "incidental burdening of the press" 4 that may be upheld
as a necessary adjunct to the enforcement of valid laws.4 The Court
seemed to demand a higher burden of proof of infringement of freedom
of the press than it has demanded in other first amendment cases. As
Justice Stewart said in his dissenting opinion:
[W]e have never before demanded that First Amendment rights rest
on elaborate empirical studies demonstrating beyond any conceivable
doubt that deterrent effects exist; we have never before required proof
of the exact number of people potentially affected by governmental
31Id. at 2662-63.
lId. at 2656.
37The right to gather news implies the right to protect news sources when four factual assumptions are accepted: 1) newsmen require informants to gather news; 2) confidentiality is essential to
establishment of relationships with many informers; 3) use of an unbridled subpoena power will
deter potential sources from divulging information; 4) use of an unbridled subpoena power will
deter reporters from gathering or publishing information which might lead to a demand for
complete compulsory disclosure. Note, 80 YALE L.J., supra note 2, at 329.
3SIn spite of numerous briefs filed by the news media as amici curiae in Caldwell v. United
States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 1970), and an empirical study, Blasi, supra note 2, at 246-47
(the average newsman relies on "regular" confidential sources in 22% of his stories and on firsttime confidential sources in 12.2% of his stories, and the news coverage of 8%of the 887 newsmen
questionedhad been adversely affected in the last eighteen months by the possibilityof subpoena),
the Court said, "[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction
of the flow of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common law and constitutional
rule regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen." 92 S. Ct. at 2662.
'-92 S. Ct. at 2662.
111d. at 2657.
"The Court cites numerous cases to illustrate: Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) (a
newsman has no right of special access to information not available to the public generally);
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937) (a newsman has no privilege to invade
the rights and liberties of others); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (a
newspaper may be subjected to nondiscriminatory forms of general taxation).
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action, who would 42actually be dissuaded from engaging in First
Amendment activity.
This strict proof requirement is a definite departure from the rule applied in legislative investigation cases, where the Court has been willing
to speculate on the damage causd by unnecessary and overly broad
questioning:
Abuses of the investigatory process may imperceptibly lead to abridgment of protected freedoms. . . .Nor does the witness alone suffer
the consequences. Those who are identified by witnesses and thereby
placed in the same glare of publicity are equally subject to public
stigma, scorn and obloquy. Beyond that, there is the more subtle and
immeasurableeffect upon those who tend to adhere to the most orthoassociations in order to avoid a
dox and uncontroversial views and
43
similar fate at some future time.
The Court's characterization of the burden on newsgathering that
results when reporters must disclose confidential information as an
"incidental" one was instrumental in its consideration of the second
factor: the public interest in law enforcement. As in other first amendment cases, the Court employed a balancing test to determine whether
the public interest involved was so "overriding and compelling" as to
condone infringement of a first amendment right. 44 Normally the scales
in such a test are weighted in favor of a right guaranteed by the Constitution, but a predetermination that the infringement of that right is only
"incidental" shifts the weight. The imbalance is blatant in the Court's
reading of the scales: "[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public
interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden
on newsgathering which is said to result from insisting that, reporters,
like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put to them in the
course of a valid grand jury investigation or criminal trial. '"4' 5
The imbalance is augmented by the Court's consideration of the
third factor: the nature of the grand jury. Though a grand jury investigation, like a legislative committee investigation, is a form of governmental action, the Court refused to limit the grand jury's investigatory
powers as strictly as those of investigting committees. One reason was
492 S. Ct. at 2676.
3

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957) (emphasis added).
"Cases cited note 21 supra.
1192 S. Ct. at 2661.
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the historical role of the grand jury" as a protective device for citizens
against unfounded criminal prosecutions.47 Because of its dual function,
the grand jury's investigative powers have always been necessarily
broad, and its authority to subpoena witnesses, essential.48 The Court
had previously determined in Watkins that a legislative committee's
power of inquiry is also broad, but had held that it is "not unlimited.
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals
without justification in terms of the functions of the Congress." 49 The
Court refused to recognize any such limitation upon the grand jury's
power of investigation; consequently, it found no abuse by the grand
jury of its proper function in the case before them: no "expos[ing] for
the sake of exposure" as in Watkins" and no "probing at will and
without relation to existing need" as in DeGregory. 1 By defining the
grand jury as "an instrument of justice"52 and its purpose as "[flair and
effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and
property of the individual," 53 the Court concluded that "ensuring effective grand jury proceedings" 54 is an interest compelling enough to justify
an indirect burden on first amendment rights. The Court deemed the
common law principle that "the public

. . .

has a right to every man's

evidence" 55 essential to effective grand jury proceedings. This duty to
testify was recognized earlier in connection with legislative committee
proceedings, but was subordinated to first amendment freedoms." Obviously, the Court accords to the grand jury a status superior to that of
legislative committees. The basis for this hierarchy seems to be that
grand jury proceedings are "constitutionally mandated for the institution of federal criminal prosecutions for capital or other serious
'lId. at 2659.
"7Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). See also Note, The GrandJury As An Investiga.
tory Body, 74 HARV. L. REV. 590 (1961).

"192 S.Ct. at 2660.
11354 U.S. at 187.
mId. at 200.
"1383 U.S. at 829.
5292 S.Ct. at 2659, quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
"92 S.Ct. at 2659.
"Id. at 2661.
"8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2192.
""It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to
obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It is their unremitting obligation to respond
to subpoenas . .

.

.This, of course, assumes that the constitutional rights of witnesses will be

respected by the Congress as they are in a court of justice." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 187-88 (1957).
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crimes"57 and that "the adoption of the grand jury 'in our Constitution
as the sole method of preferring charges in serious criminal cases shows
the high place it held as an instrument of justice.' "58
The fourth factor that in the Court's opinion militates against the
granting of a newsman's testimonial privilege is that such a system
would be unaccountable to the public.59 The individual newsman would
have the privilege of deciding when and how much to divulge. The Court
distinguishes the police-informant privilege" on this basis; that is, the
public, through its law enforcement officers, may decide whether or not
to assert a privilege against disclosing the identity of its informers. 1 The
privilege belongs to the law enforcer who represents the public, rather
than to a newsman who does not represent the public. But this reasoning
is fallacious. Does not the newsman represent the public in his quest to
keep them informed?
The police-informant privilege is justified on the ground that it2
encourages the flow of information to law enforcement agencies.1
Agreements to conceal information concerning the commission of
crimes have never been viewed favorably in the law,6" and the Court is
reluctant to offer any protective device to newsmen or their sources that
would shield them from an obligation to report any knowledge of criminal activities to law enforcement agencies. 4 The Court does not acknowledge a paradox in their position which the Ninth Circuit noted in
Caldwell:5 that newsmen will be unlikely to possess information relevant to the commission of crimes if informants cease taking them into
their confidence. Consequently, journalists will be unable to serve any
public function either as news gatherers or as prosecution witnesses.
Encouragement of the flow of information to law enforcement agencies
as well as to the public would seem therefore a sufficient justification
for a newsman-informant privilege.
The Court asserts that police-informers are actually unprotected66
'192 S. Ct. at 2659.
-1Id., quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).

"192 S. Ct. at 2664.
148 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 2374(0.
1192 S. Ct. at 2664.
621d.
"Misprison of a felony was a common law crime. 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
Congress has also recognized such a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
1192 S. Ct. at 2664.
"434 F.2d at 1086 n.5.
019 2 S. Ct. at 2664.

COMMENTARIES

*121.
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since their identity cannot be concealed when critical to a defendant's
case." Under the qualified privilege requested by petitioners, would not
a showing of compelling need accomplish the same result? The Court
answered this contention by asserting that the qualified privilege sought
by petitioners would not accomplish their own purpose of protecting
their confidential news sources, for such informants would still face the
prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determined it was necessary.6" This conclusion is logical, yet even a contingent privilege would
improve the present situation according to Professor Blasi:
What really matters, in the judgment of many newsmen, is the basic
recognition in principle of a newsman's privilege; the precise wording
is not so important. The [Ninth Circuit's] Caldwell decision, for example, has had a remarkable effect in "clearing the air," despite the fact
that the court's holding was sharply qualified."9
Blasi concludes that "[n]othing, in the opinion of every reporter with
whom I discussed the matter, would be more damaging to source relationships than a Supreme Court reversal of the Ninth Circuit's Caldwell
holding."70
Branzburg represents a significant step backwards for the Supreme
Court. The case presented a challenge to the Court either to fit the issues
into an existing legal framework or to devise new first amendment
standards for resolving the dispute." The Court did neither. Instead of
using existing law or developing new standards, the Court looked to the
past, basing its decision on common law theories72 and historical reasoning." Present-day overuse of the subpoena power against the press by
governmental investigative bodies74 demands a solution if the critical
role of an independent press in our society is to be preserved. Justice
Powell, in his concurring opinion, gives some hope of a more responsive
decision in the future by stating that the balancing of this vital constitutional issue against the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct will be done on a case-by-case
basis.75 Perhaps if more empirical data is amassed, Justice Powell will
uRoviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
"92 S. Ct. at 2667.
"Blasi, supra note 2, at 281.

"Id. at 283.
"Id. at 234.
n92 S. Ct. at 2663-64.

"Id. at 2659.
"Note, 58 CALIF. L. REV., supra note 2, at 1199-1202.

"192 S. Ct. at 2671.
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cast a deciding vote in favor of the preservation of a free and independent press.
CHAN POYNER PIKE

Constitutional Law-Municipal Boundary Changes and the Fifteenth
Amendment

The struggle of blacks in this country to obtain and preserve the
franchise has been a difficult and continuing one. They have had to
overcome many obstructions along the path to the voting booth. The
fifteenth amendment' to the Constitution has served throughout this
struggle as the legal standard by which alleged infringements of the right
to vote have been judged. In Holt v. City of Richmond,2 black residents
of the city utilized the fifteenth amendment to challenge the city's annexation of a portion of a suburban county immediately prior to a city
council election at which black voters were expected to elect a majority
of the members. The Fourth Circuit held in Holt that the annexation
was constitutional on its face and that possible illicit motivations of
those individuals responsible for the annexation were, under the circumstances of the case, too remote from the fact of the annexation to taint
3
its constitutional validity.
The problem in Holt had its origins in 1962 when the City of
Richmond initiated judicial proceedings to annex portions of two adjacent counties, Henrico and Chesterfield. The city first concentrated on
the Henrico area, but upon receiving an unsatisfactory annexation
award from the state annexation court,4 the city diverted its attention
to Chesterfield County. Before a judicial determination was rendered,5
Richmond and Chesterfield County reached a compromise agreement
specifying the new boundaries of Richmond, the price to be paid for the
annexed area, and the county's agreement not to appeal the annexation
'U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, orprevious
condition of servitude."
2459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1972).
11d. at 1094.
11d. at 1095. The annexation court had decided that Richmond ought to pay Henrico County
55 million dollars for 16.16 square miles of land. Richmond thought this price too high.
'the formal trial had first begun in September of 1968, but a mistrial was declared in January
of 1969 when one of the judges disqualified himself. Id.
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decree.' The annexed area included 47,262 people of whom only three
percent were black. The addition of this predominantly white bloc of
voters reduced the percentage of black citizens in Richmond from 51.5
percent to 42 percent of the total population, an important decrease in
a city that elects its councilmen at large.
Black voters filed a class action in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia after the annexation.' They alleged
that their fifteenth amendment rights had been violated by the annexation, which had diluted their strength and had thereby prevented them
from electing a majority of the city council. The district court found that
although Richmond's desire for boundary expansion was not for the sole
purpose of obstructing the voting power of black citizens, the annexation compromise, especially the County's agreement not to appeal, "was
conceived and operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination by way of diluting the vote of the Negroes, and [that] this [was]
constitutionally impermissible."'
While stating that Richmond's motivation for executing the compromise agreement was relevant to its decision, the district court emphasized that the boundary expansion violated the fifteenth amendment as
the result of the combination of the unlawful motivation and the actual
effects of the annexation compromise. However, the court permitted
the annexation and ordered new council elections under a court-imposed
districting scheme which restored the preannexation voting power of the
black citizens. This scheme negated the effects of the dilution by restricting the number of councilmen for whom the newly annexed white people
could vote.'0 This remedy would have been effective because it attacked
the heart of the constitutional violation, an annexation timed to occur
just prior to an important election.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court decision.' Concentrating on the issue of the unconstitu6
The judges of the annexation court were obviously influenced by the compromise agreement
and. at the close of the proceedings, issued an annexation decree in conformity with the agreement.
The decree became effective on January I. 1970, and the new citizens were able to vote in the
councilmanic elections of that year. id.
7Holt v. City of Richmond, 334 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Va. 1971).
Id. at 236.
'Id. at 237.
"Id. at 240. One district, composed of most of the original area of Richmond, was to elect
seven councilmen, and a second district, composed mainly of the newly annexed area, was to elect
t%%o
councilmen.
"Holt v. City of Richmond, 459 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1972).
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tional motivation of the city officials, the court explained that "[w]hen
the legislative purpose is not both obvious and constitutionally impermissible. . . the cases uniformly hold that facially constitutional legis12
lation may not be stricken because of suspect legislative motivation.'
The court then overruled the district court on its findings of fact in
Holt. 3 The court of appeals concluded that the sole or dominant purpose of the annexation, as evidenced by the compromise agreement, was
not to deprive black voters of their fifteenth amendment rights." Constitutionally valid reasons for the annexation existed in 1962 when the
judicial proceedings began. The city was suffering from a declining tax
base and required land for industrial and commercial expansion. In
1962, black citizens were a definite minority, and political control was
not an issue. In addition, valid reasons existed for the timing of the
annexation compromise. 5 The existing council feared that if the annexation were not completed before the imminent city council elections, the
new council majority, supported by an organization of black voters
known to oppose any annexation, would defeat the proposed annexation. The court characterized this fear as concerning not the possibility
of a black political takeover per se but the possible frustration of years
of effort to achive annexation." If discriminatory motives existed in the
minds of some members of the Richmond City Council, these motives
were not allowed to negate the validity of these dominant, compelling
reasons for the annexation.
The overruling of the district court's findings of fact indicates two
things. First, it gauges how strongly the court of appeals felt about the
case and the issues it presented. Secondly, it reflects upon the nature of
the appeals court's legal analysis of the problem. The main question
presented by the Holt decision is what standards of law should be invoked to determine whether an annexation of land, with a consequent
dilution of racial voting power, is in violation of the Constitution.
1d. at 1098.
1Id. at 1099. The court did not explicitly overrule the district court but did so by implication.
.Judge Butner. dissenting, reviewed the evidence which indicated that the principal concern of the
Mayor of Richmond during the annexation negotiations was the exact number of white people who
lived within the area to be annexed. The amount of commercial and industrial land within this area
was hardly discussed. When the annexation agreement was reached, the Mayor received the informal approval of six members of the City Council but did not even consult the three members known
to oppose annexation. Id. at 1103. 1106.
"1d.at 1099.
11d. at 1096.
Id.
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The first decision which sheds light on this question is Gomillion
v. Lightfoot. 7 In 1960 Gomillion clearly established that the power of
state and municipal authorities to alter municipal boundaries is limited
by the fifteenth amendment. The Alabama State Legislature had redrawn the boundaries of Tuskegee from a perfect square to an irregular
twenty-eight-sided figure. The change excluded all but four or five of
Tuskegee's black citizens from the city limits and thus prevented them
from voting in municipal elections. The state and city advanced no
reasons justifying the necessity of such a change in the city boundaries.
The Supreme Court held that "[a] statute which is alleged to have
worked unconstitutional deprivations of petitioners' rights is not immune to attack simply because the mechanism employed by the legislature is a redefinition of municipal boundaries." 8
Gomillion applied a fifteenth amendment standard to an exclusion
of black voters through the alteration of municipal boundaries. Reynolds v. Sims 9 examined the constitutional effect of the dilution of
voting power. The court declared in Reynolds that Alabama's reapportionment plans for its state legislature violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. "[T]he right of suffrage can be
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just
as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." 0 The condemned apportionment plans diluted voting power of
both blacks and whites by creating and maintaining legislative districts
of grossly unequal size. Large districts were not accorded a proportionally greater number of representatives.
While Reynolds condemned the deliberate dilution of voting power,
it did so under a fourteenth amendment equal protection test. The dilution of votes produced by a Holt-type annexation is probably best analyzed under a fifteenth amendment standard, however. The nature of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection test involves a numerical balancing. One voting district or school system is compared to other districts or systems under a quantitative as well as a qualitative standard.
U.S. 339 (1960).
"Id. at 347.
"9377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17364

11Id. at 555.

1'1 d. at 545. The Court relied on Gomiillion to justify the power of federal courts to review
the use of state powers when they are used to cirvumvent a right protected by the Constituton. Id.
at 566. See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), in which the Court held that plaintiffs
failed to show that congressional district lines in Manhattan had been drawn with either the effect
or the intent to produce racial imbalance.
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In Reynolds, legislative districts with large populations elected the same
number of representatives as did districts with much smaller populations. 22 This relative inequality of voting power between districts made
a fourteenth amendment standard applicable. Such a comparison was
not possible in Gomillion or Holt. In each of these cases, the voting
power of black citizens was affected by an electoral change which altered the nature of the entire voting population and not just the size of
one district in relation to that of another. Thus the more absolute standard of the fifteenth amendment was applied. The dilution of black
votes in Holt should have been examined to see if it constituted an
"abridgement" of the right to vote as prohibited by the amendment. 3
In Fairley v. Patterson24 and Perkins v. Matthews,25 the Supreme
Court analyzed the dilution of racial voting power resulting from municipal boundary changes in terms of its fifteenth amendment effects. Both
Fairley and Perkins involved section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 . 21 Fairley was a federal suit to determine whether a switch by a
county from single-member-district voting to at-large voting for the
election of county supervisors was a change in voting procedure requiring a section 5 determination of the possible impact on fifteenth amendment rights. Perkins presented a section 5 question concerning the annexation of land by a municipality. The change in boundaries in each
case 27 diluted the power of black voters by adding white voters to the
election unit. The Court held in both cases that a change in voting
procedure had occurred and that the resultant dilution of the black
voting strength increased the potential for a fifteenth amendment violation. Therefore, these changes were held to be subject to prior judicial
review under the act.28 Richmond failed to follow the section 5 procedure before annexing the county land. The Attorney General filed an
objection just before Holt was argued in the Fourth Circuit. However,
2377 U.S. at 545.
"See note I supra.
'1393 U.S. 544 (1969).
5400 U.S. 379 (1971).
-'Voting Rights Act § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1970). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was
passed by Congress to aid in the protection of fifteenth amendment rights. Section 1973c provides
that no changes in state or local voting methods and procedures may be put into effect until they
have been submitted to either the District Court for the District of Columbia or to the Attorney
General of the United States for a determination of possible violations of the fifteenth amendment.
*Fairley v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), involved the elimination of internal boundaries
and Perkins v. Matthews. 400 U.S. 379 (1971), the expansion of external ones.
"The Court did not rule on the substantive issues of alleged constitutional infringements,
leaving that decision to the proper lower courts. 393 U.S. at 550; 400 U.S. at 382.
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at the request of the parties, the court proceeded to hear the case without
considering the section 5 question. 29 The court did, however, employ a
fifteenth amendment analysis in making its decision.3"
Although it is relatively clear that the fifteenth amendment should
serve as the legal standard for the analysis of the problem presented by
Holt, it is not clear what factors may be considered in determining
whether a violation of the fifteenth amendment has indeed occurred.
Annexation of land by a municipality is not in itself unconstitutional.
To prove a particular annexation unconstitutional, courts must look
beyond the fact of the annexation. More specifically, the question in
Holt was whether a court should review the motivation behind a legislative act.
Gomillion was read in one Holt dissent 31 as justifying the conclusion that a facially constitutional law may be declared void because of
the unconstitutional motivation of the man who enacted it. Judge Butzner argued that the evidence compelled such an application of
Gomillion: "'Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to
accomplish an unlawful end . . . "32 The deliberate use of a facially
valid annexation scheme to effect the dilution of racial voting blocs is a
violation of the fifteenth amendment, he said, and the determination of
such a violation may rest on an analysis of motivational evidence.33
The Holt majority, however, rejected this application of Gomillion
and relied instead on other Supreme Court decisions which specifically
limited the Gomillion decision. Eight years subsequent to Gomillion the
Court, in United States v. O'Brien,34 declared that it is a well established principle of constitutional law that the Court will not invalidate
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged unconstitutional motive.35 The O'Brien court characterized the Gomillion decision as standing "not for the proposition that legislative motive is a
proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional. 3 6
The Court upheld this interpretation in Palmer v. Thompson."
-1459 F.2d at I100.
1

3 d.
31

1d. at 1101 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
12Id. at 1100. quoting, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
1459 F.2d at 1100-01 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
'391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'71d. at 384-85.
31ld. at 384.
403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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It is true there is language in some of our cases interpreting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments which may suggest that the motive
or purpose behind a law is relevant to its constitutionality. .

.

. But

the focus in those cases was on the actual effect of the enactments, not
upon the motivation which led the States to behave as they did ...
And in Gomillion the Alabama Legislature's gerrymander of the
boundaries
of Tuskegee excluded all Negroes from voting in town
38
elections.
Although they expressly relied on O'Brien and Palmer, the Holt
majority only partially adopted the resoning of those Supreme Court
decisions. The Holt court declared that O'Brien and Palmer stated the
general rule for the judicial analysis of legislative motivation, 39 but then
failed to consider the Supreme Court reasoning which distinguishes
Gomillion. Gomillion, as subsequently interpreted by O'Brien" and
Palmer,1 at least compels a determination of the effect of the enactment. However, the Holt court relegated Gomillion to exceptional cases
in which the legislative motive is subject to judicial review but only when
the motive is clear, singular, and dominant.4 2 Unjustly limiting the effectiveness of Gomillion in this manner, the court distinguished Holt from
Gomillion on the facts. In Holt, valid reasons existed for the annexation.
Therefore, the motivations of the responsible city oflicials were, at
worst, only partially illicit. The Holt court would not consider these
illicit motivations as a basis for granting relief when the legislation
under attack was facially constitutional and supported by some valid
motives.4 By deciding the case on the facts, the court of appeals, as
mentioned previously,"4 was forced to reverse the lower court on its
findings as well as its law. The court ignored evidence of the Mayor's
overwhelming concern during the compromise negotiations for the number of white people in the area to be annexed and his lack of concern
for the amount of available industrial and commercial land." A reversal
on the facts helped the court fit Holt into its all-or-none interpretation
of Gomillion and judicial review of motivation.
The majority also ignored the implications of the Palmer case,
111d. at 225.
11459 F.2d at
"1391 U.S. at
"403 U.S. at
"-459 F.2d at
"'Id. at 1099.
"See note 13
"See note 13

1098-99.
384.
225.
1097-98.
and accompanying text supra.
and accompanying text supra.
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which, as Judge Winter's dissent suggested, may allow motivational
analysis when the effects of the act make a prima facie showing of
unconstitutionality. 6 Judge Winter argued that the annexation, timed
as it was to occur just prior to the election, made a prima facie case of
unconstitutional effect. Once established, the prima facie case could
then, according to Palmer, be supported by evidence of legislative motivation. 7 This view was consistent with the legal position and findings
of fact of the lower court in Holt."s The annexation had a prima facie
unconstitutional effect because it diluted black voting power precisely
at the moment electoral gain might have been reaped from that power.
The timing of the annexation to occur at that moment with the consequent dilution of black votes was the essence of the prima facie case.
The court should have then examined the motives of the Richmond
officials to determine if the timing of the annexation was for the deliberate purpose of abridging black voting power.
The Holt majority, however, was apparently unwilling to assign
any weight to the effects of the timely dilution of votes absent conclusive
proof that the sole or dominant purpose of the annexation was to thwart
a constitutional right.49 A more reasonable approach was indicated by
the Supreme Court in the recent fourteenth amendment school desegregation case, Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia.0 The city desired
to remove its schools from the county school system which had been
recently ordered to desegregate. 1 The Fourth Circuit found the dominant purpose behind the proposed change to be nonracial and refused
to enjoin the separation.52 The Court reversed, holding that the " 'dominant purpose' test finds no precedent in our decisions."53 Palmer was
said to require the Court to focus on "the effect-not the purpose or
motivation-of a school board's action .

.

. ."" However, once the

effects of a proposed change make a prima facie showing of unconstitutionality, a "heavy burden" is placed on the approving authority to
justify its proposal.55 Demonstrated racial purpose may then be taken
"459 F.2d at 1109 n.3.
'11d. at 1109-10 n.3.
"334 F. Supp. at 237.
"1459 F.2d at 1097-1100.
5192 S. Ct. 2196 (1972).
3'See VA. CODE ANN. § 22-43 (1950). Under Virginia law, a city must provide for the education of its children and can choose to create its own school district.
12Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 442 F.2d 570, 573-74 (4th Cir. 1971).
3192 S. Ct. at 2203.
51d.
11d. at 2206.
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into consideration in weighing these justifications."
The Supreme Court then would go one step further than Judge
Winter's interpretation of Palmer. Not only would it allow motivational
factors to be considered once a prima facie case has been established,
but it would shift the burden of persuasion to the party responsible for
the challenged activity. In Holt a prima facie case of unconstitutional
effect had been made with the proof of the timing of the dilution of black
votes. The City of Richmond should then have been forced to justify its
actions, and motivational factors should have been considered in determining whether the city has met its burden of proof.
The Court formulated the Emporia analytical rules in a fourteenth
amendment school desegregation decision. It should logically apply
them to the fifteenth amendment voting rights problem in Holt. Motivation is perhaps even more relevant to fifteenth amendment problems
where numerical comparisons of equality are not possible as they are
in fourteenth amendment questions. In the meantime, the Holt court
seems to have seized on a hybrid rule of law to avoid rectifying a subtle
infringement on rights guaranteed by the fifteenth amendment. In any
event, the court in its Holt decision has perpetrated the injustice done
by the Richmond annexation and has further confused the issue of when
legislative motivation may be considered by the court in determining the
existence of a violation of the fifteenth amendment.
ALLEN

H.

OLSON

Constitutional Law-The First Amendment and Advertising: The Effect
of the "Commercial Activity" Doctrine on Media Regulation
Mitchell Family Planning,Inc. v. City of Royal Oak' presented the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan with
a novel first amendment issue framed in the context of media regulation.
Plaintiff Mitchell Family Planning, Inc., a non-profit 2 corporation, was
6
Id. at 2205. Emporia had had since 1967 to establish its own school system. It began to show
interest in doing so only after the county system was ordered to integrate. The effect of the city's
withdrawal from the county system would have been to increase the number of white students in
city schools and decrease their numbers in the county schools.

'335 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
While the non-profit nature of plaintiff corporation was accepted here, in S.P.S. Consultants,
Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 333 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), plaintiff Martin S. Mitchell was identified
as president of Mitchell Referral Service, Inc., a profit-making enterprise engaged in the referral
of pregnant out-of-state women to New York physicians for the purpose of abortion procurement.
2

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

engaged in the dissemination of information concerning family planning, contraception, sterilization and abortion. Mitchell leased an outdoor billboard to display the following message: "Abortion Information. Male and Female Sterilization Information. MITCHELL FAMILY PLANNING INCORPORATED, Niagara Falls, New York.
Phone No. 716-285-9133. Local Phone No. 358-4672."1 After the sign
had been erected, the defendant city adopted an ordinance4 which proscribed willful advertising of any information concerning abortion and
further prohibited billboard owners from allowing such information on
their signs. After the city attorney informed the plaintiffs that the sign
would have to be removed to avoid imminent prosecution, the plaintiffs
sued for a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional and for
a permanent injunction against its enforcement.5
The court employed the "clear and present danger" doctrine6 in
holding that the billboard did not create a clear danger of the commission of illegal abortions. The offer of information concerning abortion
over the telephone did not indicate any probability that the laws of
Michigan would be transgressed, for the court could not know the content of the message which would be given to a caller.7 Additionally, there
was no reason to suspect that an illegal abortion, if indeed that was the
3335 F. Supp. at 739.
'Section 32A. ILLEGAL ADVERTISING. Any person who willfully advertises on

a sign, in his own name or the name of another person, firm or pretended firm, association, corporation or pretended corporation, any means whatever whereby a miscarriage
or abortion may be produced or procured, or any information concerning the producing

or procuring of an abortion, or who offers his services by such advertisement to assist
in the accomplishment of any such purpose, and also any person engaged in the outdoor

advertising business who suffers or permits any such advertisement to be displayed upon
any sign owned by him or under his control, shall be guilty of a violation of this
ordinance.
335 F. Supp. at 744.

5The court concluded that the ordinance was overly broad for the following reasons: First, the
ordinance did not discriminate between legal and illegal abortions. Consequently, plaintiffs were
not only prohibited from advertising an activity which the state had a compelling interest to outlaw,

illegal abortions, but also from dispensing information concerning legal activities. This flaw in
statutory draftmanship violated the constitutional mandate of specificity and narrowness. Secondly, the court examined the breadth of the ordinance in relation to the other possible state

interest, protection against "immoral advertising." The ordinance prohibited "any information
concerning the producing or procuring of an abortion," while the Michigan "immoral advertising"
statute merely covered "means" of producing an abortion. Therefore, the ordinance prohibited
both activity which the state has the requisite compelling interest in outlawing and that in which it
does not. Id. at 741-42.
'See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
7335 F. Supp. at 742-43.
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subject of the information to be volunteered, would occur immediately.
Noting that the newly liberalized abortion laws of the state of New York
would probably be part of the information dispensed by plaintiffs, the
court held that defendant did not have the necessary compelling state

interest in an abortion committed in New York to warrant the limitation of free speech.

Upon an initial reading of the opinion, the court's reasoning appears clear and persuasive. However, the court's use of the "clear and

present danger" test is in apparent conflict with the method of resolution adopted by the Supreme Court when dealing with issues like those
presented by Mitchell.
Not all speech is protected by the first amendment. 8 The Supreme
Court unequivocally identified commercial advertising as one of those

unprotected classes of speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen.9 The purely
commercial nature of the message distinguished Valentine from earlier

cases which had held that protected activities included pamphleting,

°

handbilling to advertise a political rally at which admission was

charged," and picketing.' 2 This commercial exception to first amendment coverage has been described as a "general negative attitude towards commercial speech which was . . . formulated with a limited

amount of reasoned analysis.'

3

A variety of difficulties have surfaced as the Court has attempted

to deal with the cases which have arisen concerning the scope of the

"commercial activity" exception. It is important to note that the initial

approval of the regulation of commercial speech in Valentine involved
the manner of distribution and not the substance of the communica-

tion." However, judicial confusion sometimes reigned in the wake of
'Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
9316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942); see Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971): "The Court
[in Valentine] felt that commercial advertising was merely ancillary to the proper performance of
a business, and accordingly could be regulated by legislative action in the public interest. Thus...
the Court effectively read commercial speech out of the first amendment." Compare the favorable
arguments in Professor Redish's article with the policy reasons for not extending first amendment
protection to purely commercial speech. Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context,
78 HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1965).
'0Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
"Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
12Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.88 (1939).
13Redish, supra note 8, at 472.
"The controversy in Valentine was precipitated by plaintiff's transportation of his submarine
to New York for a commercial exhibition. The New York City Police informed him of § 318 of
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Valentine so that occasionally courts would regulate purely commercial
speech distributed in an unobjectionable manner and non-commercial
speech which would otherwise be protected but for its dissemination for
a profit-making purpose.15 After Valentine, the Court had to clarify its
seemingly contradictory position between cases involving purely commercial speech"6 and those in which the speech merely had commercial
6 in which
overtones.' 7 The first of these was Murdock v. Pennsylvania,"
Jehovah's Witnesses were restrained from distributing their religious
materials. The Court dismissed the state's contention that because donations were sought in return for the pamphlets, the Jehovah's Witnesses' conduct was removed from the area of protected speech. Two
subsequent cases, Thomas v. Collins1" and Follett v. McCormick,"0 reaffirmed the Murdock decision by holding that the distribution of communicative material does not necessarily fall outside of the zone of protected speech merely because money is procured by the solicitor.
The degree of commercial nature the advertising must have in order
to fall within the "commercial activity" exception is unspecified. In
1951 the Court addressed the unresolved conflict between Valentine and
the Lovell-Murdock-Thomas line of cases. In Breard v. Alexandria,"'
the defendant was arrested for violating an ordinance which prohibited
door-to-door solicitation on private property for sales purposes without
prior invitation. While agreeing that the selling of the periodicals did
not put them beyond the first amendment's protection, the Court conthe Sanitary Code which forbade distribution of business advertising in the streets. Police Commissioner Valentine told Chrestensen that handbills solely devoted to "information or a public protest"
could be dispensed lawfully. Plaintiff had a double-faced handbill printed with his advertisement
on one side and a protest against city policy on the other. Disregarding defendant's warning,

plaintiff distributed his handbills and was restrained. The Supreme Court reversed the decision
granting injunctive relief to plaintiff. 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see Kaufman, The Medium, the Message
and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U.L.

REV.

761, 763-64 (1970). See also Redish, supra note 8,

at 458.
"See Redish, supra note 8, at 472: "The summary dismissal of the value of commercial speech
has reached into areas of traditionally protected communication. Thus the courts have often
confused pure commercial speech with the classical expression of ideas and information when the
dissemination is for profit-making purposes .

. .

. [or] on the basis of the use of the advertising

form."
"E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
"E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (handbilling to advertise a political rally at
which admission was charged held protected).
"9319 U.S. 105 (1943).
"323 U.S. 516 (1945).
-0321 U.S. 573 (1944).
21341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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cluded that it brought a commercial feature into the transaction. 22 With

this commercial feature thus cited as a major consideration, the Court
balanced the interests of the defendant and Alexandria's residents and
held that the latters' "desire for privacy" was of greater significance.2

The Court resolved the issue in Breard by reasserting the primary
purpose test, obliquely enunciated in Valentine,24 to establish whether

the commercial activity exception applied. The primary purpose test
examines the motive of the advertiser to discover if his reason for adver-

tising was primarily economic or whether the commercial nature of the
medium was subordinate to the dissemination of constitutionally protected expression? The primary purpose test has fallen into disuse since

the Valentine and Breard decisions.2" Now the nature of the material
and the method of communication are relevant criteria.

7

The status of the commercial activity exception has been thoroughly altered by these recent developments. Instead of automatically

removing commercial messages from the category of speech protected
by the first amendment, the doctrine now serves as an adjunct to the
12d. at 642.
at 644.
"We need not indulge nice appraisals based upon subtle distinctions in the present instance
....
It is enough for the present purpose that the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the
affixing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising circular was with the intent, and
for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance." 316 U.S. at 55. See also Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1944).
2The primary purpose test can be used to resolve the apparent contradictions between the
Valentine-type cases and those in the Lovell-Murdock-Thomas line of decisions. The primary
purpose test must be applied to the content of the material being distributed and the nature of the
organization sponsoring the canvassing. The availability of alternative means of dissemination
provides an analytical tool which measures the full effect of the disputed regulation on the speaker's
ability to communicate. See Note, 78 HARV. L. REv., supra note 8, at 1202-03.
"See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (a libel action in which the Court
rejected plaintiffs contention that defendant's message was not protected by the first amendment
because it was a paid commercial advertisement); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (concluding that it is of no consequence that the dissemination takes place under commercial auspices);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (rejecting the contention that "motion pictures
do not fall within the First Amendment's aegis because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business conducted for private profit," id. at 501). See also Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (expanding the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan rule to
cover matters of "public or general concern"); Julian Messner, Inc. v. Spahn, 387 U.S. 239 (1967)
(per curiam) (broadening the scope of the Times rule to include "public figures"); Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (including newsworthy items within the aegis of the Times rule).
2ln Mitchell, the commercial nature of the transactions coupled with the use of billboard
display, usually an instrumentality of business advertising, justify the application of the "commercial activity" doctrine.
223d.
4
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balancing test28 utilized by the Court 29 to determine the extent of constitutional protection in a specific controversy. The commercial nature of
a message and the chosen medium reduces the weight assigned to the
individual and social interest in its free expression. This weight is balanced against the public interest in the regulation. The balancing test
can only be employed as an analytical tool when the governmental
control of speech is0 directed at the medium of communication and not
3
the message itself.
Before progressing to an examination of the potential consequences
of an application of the balancing test to the considerations present in
Mitchell, it is necessary to illustrate the possible conflict with the analytical methodology of the Supreme Court incurred by the use of the "clear
and present danger" test by the Mitchell court. Although the "clear and
present" doctrine is a type of balancing test, 31 it is not applicable to
the situation presented in Mitchell. The "clear and present danger" test
is administered only when the statute in question attempts to limit
directly the content and not just the method of speech.32 What the
speaker says must present the danger of causing a substantive evil which
the legislature has a compelling interest in preventing. The manner is
relevant only in determining if the danger is indeed "imminent" and
"likely to incite or produce such action. '33 When the balancing test is
employed, the clear and convincing state interest which must support
media regulation is balanced against the speaker's interest in adopting
that particular method of communication. 34 If the regulation meets this
2'Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
Professor Emerson, a critic of the balancing formula, has defined it: "The formula is that the court

must, in each case, balance the individual and social interest in freedom of expression against the
social interest sought by the regulation which restricts expression." Id. at 912.
2
But see Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (Black, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Black
strongly opposed the balancing test which he described as a "Constitution-ignoring-and-destroying
technique." Id. at 399.
"See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment." 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 216.
3'Loewy, Free Speech: The "'MissingLink" in the Law of Obscenity, 16 J. Pun. L. 81, 83
(1967).

32The stringent restraints on governmental control of freedom of speech do not ipso .facto
apply to media regulation. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1964) ("[tlhe examples are

many of the application by this Court of the principle that certain forms of conduct mixed with
speech may be regulated or prohibited"); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949).

"Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 262 (1941); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
31Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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test, it is constitutional even if the restricted speech presented no clear

and present danger of any further substantive evil.
The method of distribution of ideas is balanced with the state's

interest in regulating the manner of dissemination. 5 The vestigal concept of the primary purpose test, availability of alternative means of

communication, is still useful in assessing the protected status of a
particular method of dissemination.3 6 The commercial nature of either
the content or method of a particular message will have the effect of

reducing the emphasis placed on the chosen mode of communication if
there are other more reasonable means available.

Thus the commercial nature of the message involved in Mitchell
could have the effect of balancing the scales of constitutionality on the

side of regulation. If that is indeed the case, it is necessary to examine
the scope of permissible regulation and the competing interests to deter-

mine whether the ordinance in Mitchell was constitutionally infirm.37
Four general rules limit the extent to which government may regulate
media use: (1) the interest of the state in its regulatory effort must be

at least substantial;" (2) the regulation cannot be designed to restrain

content; 9 (3) any "incidental" regulation of speech must be limited to

the smallest scope possible consistent with the purpose of the restraint;40
and (4) the restriction must be so narrowly constructed as to prevent

unequal application.4
One of the first examples of media-use regulation was Kovacs v.

Cooper." There the Court sustained an ordinance prohibiting the use
of vehicles and equipment which emitted "loud and raucous" noises. 3
"5See Kaufman, supra note 13, at 771.
3
1Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
wSee Kaufman, supra note 13, at 765.
"NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958). In addition, see Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("paramount"); id. at 408 ("strong"); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("compelling"); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)
("cogent", "subordinating"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (holding that
all of the above mentioned words are synonymous with "substantial").
3
An important distinction, which is extremely material to the case under consideration, must
be noted here. Banning certain types of content entirely from one type of medium is not equivalent
to restraint of that message. Only if the ordinance in question attempted to ban all speech dealing
with abortion procurement would it violate the prohibition on content restraint. See Capital
Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
"NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
"Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967).
42336 U.S. 77 (1949).
13 1d. at 78. But cf. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). The difference in results in these
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The serenity and privacy of the neighborhoods in which the sound trucks
ventured was deemed to be of greater importance than the use of the
loudspeaker systems as a medium. In Banzhaf v. FCC44 the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the cigarette advertising regulation adopted
by the FCC requiring a health warning in all broadcast cigarette commercials was not violative of the first amendment. The court cited
Valentine and many of its successors in support of its statement that
"product advertising is at least less rigorously protected than other
forms of speech." 4 The regulation was upheld as being properly narrow46 and adequately supported by the compelling state interest in public
health," so that the incidental and minor "chilling effect" on the broadcasters which might result was deemed to be "overbalanced." 4
Three years later in CapitalBroadcastingCo. v. Mitchell," a threejudge panel denied injunctive relief against the enforcement of section
6 of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. 0 Also denied
was a declaratory judgment holding section 6 unconstitutional. The
court noted that strong governmental and public interest in public health
was the basis of the regulation, 51 and that the petitioners were not prohibited from publicizing information about cigarettes. They merely lost
the privilege of collecting revenue from broadcasting tobacco manufacturers' messages.
There is little question that billboards as an advertising medium
itself can be regulated with respect to size and height. 3 A state law, 4
banning most roadside signs and all purely commercial advertisements
from interstate highways,55 withstood a first amendment attack in
two cases is due to contrary resolution of the issue of vagueness. See text accompanying note 40
supra.
"405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
"ld. at I101.
"Id.
11Id. at 1096-97.
1Id. at 1101-02.
"1333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affdsub nora. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 92
S. Ct. 1289 (1972).
-15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
51333 F. Supp. at 583-84.
111d. at 584.
OE.g., State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967).
"Highway Advertising Control Act of 1961, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§47.42.010-.910
(1970), and the Regulations adopted thereunder by the Highway Commission on May 18, 1961, 3
WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 252-40, cited in Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405,
408, 439 P.2d 248, 251 (1968).
"Highway Advertising Control Act of 1961, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.42.020(b) (1970)
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Markham Advertising Co. v. State. 6 The court observed the secondary
position of purely commercial speech in the constitutional heirarchy,57
citing Valentine. It gave sympathetic consideration to the public interest
in prohibiting the "dangerous, obtrusive, and unsolicited presence of
advertising structures,"58 as well as the public interest n citizens' comfort and convenience on the basis of Kovacs v. Cooper.55
These examples of permissible regulation of media portend the
necessity of examining the possible state or public interests which could
support a contrary ruling in Mitchell,
The first public interest that could justify the ordinance involves a
combination of public health and morality. 1 However, the nexus between these social needs and the regulation is quite tenuous.12 Additionally, the state's interest in enforcing morality may not be compelling
since the first amendment's penumbra protects privacy of certain sexual
activity from governmental intrusion. 3 The second public interest justification that can be proposed is protection of the fetus. This issue was
decided in cases in which the constitutionality of abortion statutes was
challenged. In Babbitz v. McCann,64 the district court held the statute65
unconstitutional, striking a balance in favor of a woman's right to refuse
(no sign not specifically exempt could be placed within 660 feet of the right-of-way of interstate
system highways).
5173 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1948), appealdismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969) (per curiam).
5
11d. at 428, 439 P.2d at 262.

"Id.
111d. at 429, 439 P.2d at 263.
"0 The goal and the duty of such an investigation was stated in Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943): "In considering legislation which thus limits the dissemination of knowledge, we must 'be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation' and must 'weigh the
circumstances and . . . appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation.'"
"See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Comm. v. Maricopa County, 92 Ariz. 231, 375 P.2d 719
(1962) (upholding ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-213 (1956) which prohibited advertising to produce
abortion or prevent conception). The public interest served by the statute, either moral consideratins or the venereal disease problem, was held substantial and predominant when compared with
the private interest in free speech through advertising.
"Trhe widespread availability of a variety of inexpensive contraceptive devices as well as the
almost universal familiarity with these methods undermines the credibility of the assertion that the
dissemination of information concerning expensive and painful abortions will materially reduce the
incidence of venereal disease or promiscuity.
OGriswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
61310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1(1970); accord, e.g. Roe v.
Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970),jurisdictionalissue postponed, 402 U.S. 941 (1971),
scheduledfor reargument,92 S.Ct. 2476 (1972).
5
" WIs. STAT. ANN., §§940.04(1), (5) (1958).
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to carry an embryo during the early months of pregnancy. This right
may not be restricted by the state without a more compelling public
necessity than protection of the embryo. 6 The United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina in Corkey v.
Edwards," however, arrived at a diametrically opposed conclusion. The
contention that the state has a cogent interest both in protecting public

health by controlling the venereal disease epidemic and in preserving the
life of a fetus is not relevant, regardless of the final resolution of the
controversy aired in Babbitz and Corkey, because there are other direct
criminal sanctions by which the state can assert these interests without
venturing into the first amendment area.
The final public interest which could justify the regulation is a
mixture of highway safety and aesthetics. This was the basis for the
restrictions in Markham Advertising Co. v. State.68 It is quite conceivable that the very word "abortion" would be shocking or at least disconcerting to a segment of the motoring public." The dangerous conse11310 F. Supp. at 301.
67322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971). Judicial acceptance of the position asserted by the
plaintiffs in this class action, that the state has no substantial interest in interfering with a woman's
right to choose between childbirth and abortion, was held to involve a value judgment beyond the
proper capacity of the court. Id. at 1250. The evaluative process which the court refused to
undertake was deemed to be within the province of the legislature. Id. Finally, the North Carolina
General Assembly's determination that protection of the embryo was an adequate public interest
to support the statutory invasion of a woman's protected zone of privacy was approved as a valid
exercise of the legislative function. Id. at 1254. Accord, e.g. Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D. La. 1970); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741
(N.D. Ohio 1970).
073 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968); see text accompanying note 75 infra.
6
But cf Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing a conviction for disturbing the
peace by offensive conduct based on defendant's wearing a jacket on which was inscribed "Fuck
the Draft" while he was walking along a corridor of a county courthouse). This case can easily be
distinguished from Mitchell because of the different state interests advanced as justification for
the two ordinances. In Cohen, the Court held that neither the interest in prohibiting speech that
would incite violent reaction nor that of protecting public morality would suffice as a compelling
rationale for the application of the ordinance to the actions of the defendant. Id. at 20-21. As only
this particular enforcement of the ordinance was deemed violative of constitutional rights, the
setting in which the protected activity transpired becomes all important. Cohen was walking in a
corridor. He was surrounded by persons walking or sitting. Someone disturbed by the content of
his message could easily avert his or her eyes. Id. at 21. And even if some person were so upset by
the word "Fuck" that he or she became physically disoriented, the worst that could happen would
be a minor collision with another pedestrian or a wall. The extremely limited adverse consequences
of being upset by Cohen's message is completely different from the possibilities inherent in the
Mitchell situation. The driver who's sensibilities are assaulted by the sight of the word "abortion"
on the billboard could easily cause a serious accident involving major property damage, physical
injury or death, if the shock was serious enough to destroy his or her concentration on the highway
and traffic. The interest of the state in preventing this type of consequence is more compelling than
that present in Cohen.
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quences of such an effect are obvious when one considers the inherent
dangers of high speed automobile travel and the omnipresent nature of
billboard advertising which is seen without the exercise of choice or
volition.
The Supreme Court decision in Railway Express, Inc. v. New

York 0 lends support to the contention that highway safety is a compelling state interest which legitimates the ordinance questioned in
Mitchell. Although appellant did not raise the first amendment issue71
and instead relied upon the due process and equal protection clauses in
attacking the constitutionality of a New York City traffic regulation
which forbade the operation of any advertising vehicle, except those
engaged in normal business which carried the commercial message of
the owner, 72 the conclusion of the Court of Special Sessions 73 that the
prohibited advertising on the side of defendant's trucks constituted a
distraction and safety hazard to pedestrians and motorists was accepted
by the Court.74
Applying the principles and criteria previously discussed, a persuasive case can be made that the Mitchell decision is not in harmony with
the probable resolution of the issues indicated by prior adjudication.
First, the "commercial activity" doctrine applies to Mitchell. The billboard advertised information, but the actual service to be provided was
75
referral to New York physicians as observed in the court's "inference."
This introduced "into the transaction a commercial feature. ' 70 Also, the
medium Mitchell employed to communicate his information was commercial in nature.77 Second, the balancing test as affected by the "commercial activity" doctrine, employed in lieu of the court's questionable
application of the "clear and present danger" test, could easily be resolved in favor of the state. Mitchell's right was to disseminate his
information. This must be balanced against the public ifiterest in highway safety which is strong and compelling and has been cited as suffi70336 U.S. 106 (1949).
"Presumably on account of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
72336 U.S. at 107-08.
73People v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 188 Misc. 342, 67 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1947), affd, 297
N.Y. 703, 77 N.E.2d 13 (1947), affd sub nom. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949).
7"336 U.S. at 109. See also Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911) (sustaining
the predecessor ordinance against due process and equal protection attacks); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149, 168, 193 N.E. 799, 808 (1935).
5335 F. Supp. at 743. See also note 2 supra.
7"Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951).
"See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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cient justification for prohibiting almost all roadway advertising." In
Mitchell there is the added factor of shock to some drivers caused by
the word "abortion."
The Mitchell court's objection to the breadth of the regulation was
also debatable. Instead of judging the ordinance by the type of abortion
information proscribed,79 the court should have noted that the only
medium regulated was the billboard. This introduces the final consideration which demonstrates the probable constitutionality of the ordinance.
As billboard advertising was the only medium the plaintiff was prohibited from using, he had many alternative means of communicating his
information. The newspaper appears to be the most suitable, although
radio and television are plausible. Mr. Mitchell might even be able to
follow in the illustrious, and apparently immortal, footsteps of F.J.
Chrestensen and disseminate his message by handbill.
JOHN MICHAEL

KoPs

Consumer Protection-Truth-In-Lending Disclosures Not Timely at
Closing
Recognizing that the American consumer was faced with inconsistent and noncomparable credit disclosure practices which were causing
confusion about credit,' Congress enacted Title I (Truth in Lending) of
the Consumer Credit Protection Act (the Act),2 which became effective
July 1, 1969. 3 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(the Board) was granted the power of prescribing regulations4 for the
Act. The implementing regulation, known as Regulation Z,5 became
7

See Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 415-16, 439 P.2d 248, 254-55

(1968) (summary of expert testimony concerning the effect of billboards on highway safety).
79335 F. Supp. at 741-42.
IS. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1967).
'Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-81 (1970).
'Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 504(b), 82 Stat. 167.
'Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970):
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this subchapter.
These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or other provisions,
and may provide for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of transactions, as
in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this
subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to facilitate compliance
therewith.
512 C.F.R. § 226 (1971).
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effective on the same date. The major thrust of the Act is in the direction

of disclosure. So that meaningful disclosures might be made at the
critical stages in credit fransactions, the Act and Regulation Z seek to
require appropriate disclosure with attention to the procedural and me-

chanical differences in the types of credit in use today.
The Act initially divides credit between "open-end credit"' and

"credit other than open-end." Regulation Z further divides "credit other
than open-end" into "credit sales" and "loans and other nonsale

credit." 7 These categories are critical to the requirements of the Act, for
the extent to which disclosures must be made depends upon the classification of the transaction.' In the disclosure requirements for home financing, the classification "loans and other non-sale credit" encompasses the majority of home financing transactions which involve a seller,
and a mortgagee. The mortgagee qualifies as a
a buyer-mortgagor,
"creditor" 9 and thereby becomes subject to the provisions of the Act.
Regulation Z sets out in great detail the disclosures required with first
mortgage loans for residential dwellings. 0
Since the most significant stage of a consumer loan is the point at
which the consumer becomes obligated to the lender, the Act requires
disclosures before the purchaser of credit enters into an obligation."
Section 1639(b) of the Act states that "disclosure shall be made before
-12 C.F.R. § 226.2(r) (1971).
"Open end credit" means consumer credit extended on an account pursuant to a
plan under which (1) the creditor may permit the customer to make purchases or obtain
loans, from time to time, directly from the creditor or indirectly by use of a credit card,
check, or other device, as the plan may provide; (2) the customer has the privilege of
paying the balance in full or in installments; and (3) a finance charge may be computed
by the creditor from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance. The term does not
include negotiated advances under an open end real estate mortgage or a letter of credit.
7
Jensen, Effect of Federal Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z on Real Estate, 4 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 11, 21 (1969).
'Kintner, Henneberger, & Neill, A Primeron Truth-in-Lending, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501,527
(1969).
'12 C.F.R. § 226.2(m) (1971).
1012 C.F.R. 4§ 226.8(b)(l)-(7), (d)(l)-(3) (1971) contain all the disclosures that must be made
in a mortgage loan transaction. Some of the more important items are: (1) date at which finance
charge begins to accrue, (2) total finance charge as an annual percentage rate (12
C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1971) points out that the finance charge includes all charges payable as an
"incident tn or a condition of the extension of credit" such as interest, service charges, points, loan
fee, credit reports, appraisal fees), (3) number, amount, and due dates of payments, (4) amount of
any charges for lateness, (5) description of security interest, and (6) amount of credit. It is noteworthy that in 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.8(b)(3), (d)(3) (1971) the lender is exempted from two important
disclosures: the total sum of the payments and the total amount of the finance charge.
"Kintner, Henneberger, & Neill, supra note 8, at 516.

NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 51

the credit is extended."'" Regulation Z extends this provision by specifying that disclosure "shall be made before the transaction is consummated."' 3 While the Board has advised lenders and creditors on the
proper interpretation of the disclosure time provision under the "loan
and other non-sale credit" section," the courts have had no opportunity
until Bissette v. ColonialMortgage Corp. 5 to consider this provision of
the Act or to review the interpretation of it rendered by the Board in
Regulation Z. This note will examine Bissette on two levels. First, the
court's interpretation of the Act will be analyzed with reference to
accepted doctrines of statutory construction. The note will conclude by
considering the wisdom of the Bissette decision in terms of the policies
it seeks to promote in the area of financial consumer protection.
In Bissette plaintiffs entered into an agreement with a seller to
purchase a family dwelling, the agreement being contingent upon their
obtaining satisfactory financing. Plaintiffs then met with defendant,
Colonial Mortgage Corporation, to file an application for Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) financing. At a later time plaintiffs
were informed by defendant that FHA approval had been obtained, but
defendant made none of the required disclosures until closing, one
month later." The Bissettes brought suit for damages under section 1640
of the Act claiming that disclosure of the credit information at closing
is not timely because it comes too late to satisfy the purposes of the
Act. 7 Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held that
"Truth in Lending disclosures made only at closing frustrate the Con"2Truth in Lending Act § 129(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970).
1312 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1971).

"In Letter from Milton W. Schober, Assistant Director of FRB, Feb. 1I, 1970, in 4 CCH
30,281 (1972), the Board informed lenders that consummation refers
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
to a contractual relationship and that disclosure only need be made prior to consummation.
"340 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1972). This case has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit.
"$The fact that plaintiffs entered into a pre-possession agreement with the seller after notification of FHA approval, and moved into the house 21 days before closing should be noted, as it
seems to be significant in the court's resolution of the case. 340 F. Supp. at 1192.
"Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970):
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension
of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed
use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose
of this subehapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit.

TRUTH-IN-LENDING DISCLOSURES
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gressional intent and basic purpose of the Act, and as such, constitute
a violation thereof."' 8
Defendant argued that the language in the first subsection of section 1639(b) of the Act, that disclosure "shall be made before the credit
is extended," 9 should be read to mean "any time" before credit is
extended. 2 The court discarded this first contention by referring to the
legislative intent of providing information in time to compare alternatives." In citing this legislative goal as the reason for denying acceptance
of defendant's interpretation, the court assumed that disclosure at "any
time" before credit is extended would negate the possibility of credit
comparison. In addition to relying upon this debatable assumption, the
court deviated from many accepted doctrines of statutory construction
in interpreting section 1639(b).
As early as 1854, Lord Coke formulated rules of legislative interpretation which today remain as the most reliable guide to proper judicial use of statutes.22 In Heydon's Case,2 after enumerating four factors to be considered in gaining a true interpretation of statutes, Lord
Coke suggested that statutes be given such "construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and . . . suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the michief . . . and...

add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent
of the makers of the Act. ...."24 While Bissette strives to suppress the
mischief of the "uninformed use of credit," 25 the decision fails to advance the remedy which the legislature "resolved and appointed to cure
8
the disease. 21
11340 F. Supp. at 1194.
'Truth in Lending Act § 129(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970).
2340 F. Supp. at 1193.
21

1d.

212 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4501 (3d ed. F. Horack

1943).
23 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584) (footnotes omitted):
And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in
general

. . .

four things are to be discerned and considered:-

1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common la"N did not
provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the commonwealth.
And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy. . ..

241d.

21Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970); 12 C.F.R. 226.1(a)(2) (1971); see
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 18 (1967).
2
Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584).
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To overcome the problem of the uninformed use of credit, Congress
provided a remedy of disclosure. The court's reading of section 1639(b),
however, overlooks the legislative intent as to how the remedy should
be applied. Congress has made it clear that the Act and its remedy of
disclosure should be carried out according to the dictates of the Board"7
as related through Regulation Z. In making an interpretation of section
1639(b) contrary to that urged by defendant, the court shunned the
interpretation of the body which Congress clearly appointed to direct
the implementation of the Act. 8 The Board has spoken unmistakably
on the meaning of the words in section 1639(b). In addition to the use
of the phrase "before the transaction is consummated" in Regulation
Z,29 the Board has also given assurance that "consummation" refers to
a contractual relationship between the extender of credit and the customer. 0 More specific to the contention of defendant, the Board has
implied that disclosure any time before consummation is acceptable by
stating that the only requirement is that the disclosure be made prior
to the contractual relationship." In Bissette, the court's decision probably resulted from an opinion that less preference should be given the
interpretations of a regulatory agency than the court's own determination of legislative intent. Recognizing that application of law according
to the spirit of the legislative body must always be the foremost objective,32 the court was faced with a dilemma as to which spirit to honor:
the one calling for authority in the regulatory body or the broader
congressional spirit of meaningful disclosure?
Colonial Mortgage also argued that the last subsection of section
1639(b), which permits disclosure to "be made by disclosing the infor71Truth in Lending Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).

2l'he weight which Congress intended the interpretations of the Board to carry can be seen in
the following House Report:

All substantive regulations in connection with the full disclosure of the terms and conditions of finance charges in credit transactions . . . shall be issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. No one can deny their experience and exper-

tise in these matters. Accordingly, it is the view of your committee that, for uniformity
of application to all affected segments of the industries concerned, a single set of comprehensive regulations should be issued.
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1,18 (1967); see 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970).
-12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1971).
"Letters from Milton W. Schober, Assistant Director of FRB, Aug. 27, 1969, in 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
3

30,146-47, at 66,060-61 (1972).

Letter from Milton W. Schober, Assistant Director of FRB, Feb. 11, 1970, in 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 30,281, at 66,132 (1972).
122 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 22, § 4501.
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mation in the note or other evidence of indebtedness to be signed by the

obligor," should be read as allowing disclosure as late as the signing of
the note at closing.3 3 Basing its conclusion on "logic and the relevant

legislative history,"34 the court decreed that "the language relied upon
merely states how Truth in Lending information may be disclosed and

says nothing about when." 35 As support for its interpretation, the court

cited the House Report36 accompanying the Act and deduced from the

report that the subsection of 1939(b) in question was intended "to facilitate compliance by making disclosure possible in a single instrument,
to a single obligor. '3 7 Legislative history and logic could have also led

the court toward defendant's point of view. Further inquiry into the
legislative history reveals the Senate Report on section 1639(b) which

discusses the last subsection under the heading Time of disclosure."8
This heading39 alone disproves the court's theory that the section of the

Act in question is not relevant to the time of disclosure. Furthermore,
the court's reply to defendant's contention is illogical. A provision which
permits disclosure in certain specific documents inevitably affects the

time for such disclosure. The time will be the time that the specified
document is routinely used. It is hard to imagine that Congress would

speak of documents upon which disclosure could be made, every document mentioned being of a type that appears at the end of a credit

transaction, without intending to have some effect on time of disclosure.
The words of the statute, "evidence of indebtedness to be signed
by the obligor," 40 refer to a document giving rise to a contractual com-

mitment. The fact that Congress drafted section 1639(b) with words
dealing with the time of contractual commitment suggests that Congress
13340 F. Supp. at 1193.
31
d.
5Id.
38

H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 25 (1967).
37340 F. Supp. at 1193.
'S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 15 (1967): "Section 4(b)-The original of S. 5
required disclosure 'prior to the consummation of the transaction.' The committee bill substitutes
'before the credit is extended' with a stipulation that the disclosure can be made on the contract
or other document to be signed by the consumer. This obviates the need for a separate piece of
paper showing the disclosure items."
"It is recognized that only slight value is usually given section headings in construing the
words of a statute because of the possibility that they were inserted by a clerk only for reference
and because they are not essential parts of the act. E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF
STATUTES § 207 (1940). The same reasoning should hold true with congressional reports. While
headings might deserve little reliance when the question is legislative intent or the meaning of a
word, they obviously hold more value in revealing the subject area being discussed.
"°Truth in Lending Act § 129(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1639(b) (1970).
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felt this particular time to be crucial to the mortgage loan context. By
carefully providing for disclosure in a document which a consumer must
see before he becomes legally obligated, Congress communicated its
desire that disclosure be made before a contractual commitment is undertaken. Consequently, defendant's disclosure at closing should have
been permissible as long as it preceded the borrower's signing of the
note. In refuting this second argument by defendant, the court overlooked the Senate Report" and the Act's continual reference to points
of finality in the loan process.
Defendant also attempted to defend on the grounds of impracticality of compliance with a pre-closing disclosure, arguing that all of the
information relative to closing costs would not then be available." The
court disposed of this argument by referring to provision 226.6(D of
Regulation Z, which allows for an estimate of unknown or unavailable
items when disclosure is made.43 The court's treatment of defendant's
argument" suffers because of the slight importance it attaches to the
plea of impracticality of compliance. The court seemed to adopt the
attitude that no court should be burdened with weighing the real problems of compliance. When section 226.6(D is applied, the resulting use
of estimates may lead to difficulties. Just as there are situations in which
the information is not available for an exact disclosure, there will also
be situations where the information upon which to base an estimate is
unavailable. This possibility would be greater if disclosure is required
near the beginning of a loan negotiation.
In many instances, the purposes of the Act45 will not be promoted
by the use of estimates because an estimate would not be "meaningful
disclosure" to a consumer. One percentage point difference in the rate
of interest can mean a great deal of money, so an estimate would often
be of little value. The widespread use of estimates would also provide
unscrupulous lenders the opportunity to take advantage of borrowers
who might depend heavily on an estimate only to be told the higher
percentage rate or dollar amount at closing.
41
S. Rep. No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1, 15 (1967).
11340 F. Supp. at 1193-94.
'312 C.F.R. § 226.6(f) (1971).
"Defendant's chances of impressing the court with the impracticality of requiring disclosure

prior to closing were lessened by the fact that evidence was presented with the complaint showing
that the required information was available to Colonial Mortgage well in advance of closing. 340
F. Supp. at 1194.
"Truth in Lending Act § 102, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
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Finally, defendant urged that the ambiguity of the language, "before the credit is extended," in section 1639(b) does not lend itself to
any absolute rule as to time of disclosure. The court in essence agreed
with defendant and found it unnecessary to adopt an absolute rule as
to disclosure time. It simply said that disclosures made only at closing
are a violation of the Act. After declaring that the "sole issue presented
for determination is when such disclosure must be made,"4 the court
was unable to determine a point in time antecedent to closing as the
exact time when disclosure must be made. The administration of mortgage transactions varies among individual lenders4 7 so that determining
a precise pre-closing event as the legally correct time for disclosure is a
challenging task. In reaching its conclusion, the court found itself unsuited to resolve the central issue before it, because it lacked the expertise and everyday experience" in the field of mortgage finance.
In considering whether the Bissette decision actually promoted the
policy of meaningful disclosure,49 one must remember that the court
decided that disclosure at closing would be of no effective use to the
consumer." Bissette assumed that a borrower is committed when he
attends closing even though he may not have signed the contract.-1 In
assessing the wisdom of the assumption upon which Bissette rests, scrutiny of the practical setting of a loan closing is necessary. In Bissette,
plaintiffs had been living in their new home for three weeks,5 2 a fact
showing a commitment of time and money, such that they were unlikely
to rescind the transaction even if the credit terms varied from their
expectations. Such a situation has a possibility of abuse to the borrower.
Since the practice of occupying a home before a loan is closed is not
prevalent, the Bissette decision and its assumption of commitment prior
1340 F. Supp. at 1192.
"The techniques used to process a loan in the period between the initial meeting with the
borrower and the closing vary from lender to lender. Some lenders do not see the borrower until
closing. Some extend verbal loan approval. Some mail written commitments. The time period
between the first meeting and closing also varies, depending upon the urgency of the loan, the type
of institution the lender is, the type of security interest involved, etc.
"See H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 18 (1967).
"By referring to the legislative history, the court showed that "meaningful disclosure" is a
primary purpose of the Act. 340 F. Supp. at 1193.
0'340 F. Supp. at 1193.
"The court assumed that even though a contractual relationship might not yet exist, disclosure
at closing was too late for effective use by the consumer and left him no viable choice if he did not
like the terms revealed at closing. The court saw a practical commitment before a legal commitment. See 340 F. Supp. at 1193.
5"Note 16 supra.
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to closing should be evaluated in the context of the typical approach to
closing where a contract has not yet been signed. In the typical situation
where the borrower does not occupy the dwelling prior to closing, the
borrower is not absolutely committed, but still lacks any real alternative. Often the borrower has invested time, effort, and money in bringing
the transaction to the point of closing. Even if faced with higher costs
at closing than expected, he is likely to be more anxious to secure the
loan and move into the new home than to begin the process anew.
The reaction of lenders to Bissette53 has been one of knowing what
the court said but not knowing its full impact. Lenders know that they
cannot disclose at closing but are not sure at what time prior to closing
disclosure must be made in order to be "meaningful." Lenders are
adopting various approaches to comply with Bissette. Many mortgage
bankers have begun using a ten-day rule, calling for the expiration of
ten business days between disclosure and closing. Other lenders routinely send disclosures along with written confirmation of loan approval
prior to closing. Whatever the particular practice adopted, lenders seem
apprehensive about making disclosure at any time close to closing.
While it would seem that the court's decision would impose a hardship
on the lenders because of the unavailability of some information prior
to closing, this has not been the case. Costs such as appraisal fees,
origination fee, FHA insurance premium, and title search fees are standard in most situations and are not likely to change in the interim
between disclosure and closing. A possible hardship to mortgage bankers could occur in a situation where discount points54 are quoted during
a season of rapid fluctuation in interest rates in the national money
market. Discount points could change overnight, leaving the lender
"boxed in" at the lower yield with a resulting difficulty in marketing
his loan. Concern is also felt over the question of whether a borrower
can waive the undefined period which Bissette seems to demand between
disclosure and closing. There are occasions when a borrower desires to
close a loan as soon as possible. Those lenders who have adopted a tenday rule are wary of quick closings and look forward to a conclusive
answer.
The Bissette decision makes disclosure requirements more strin5'The author has interviewed various lenders to assess their reaction to and understanding of
Bissette and to examine the steps they have taken to comply with its ruling.
"'Discount points are charged by lenders and deducted in advance from a loan so that the
loan's yield will equal the present interest rate in the money market. This practice is prevalent
among mortgage bankers who finance FHA and VA loans which carry an interest ceiling.
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gent for residential mortgage transactions. It should be noted that the
other types of credit under the Act, particularly "open-end credit
plans," "credit sales," and loans not secured by a first lien on a dwelling,
are still ruled as to time of disclosure by reference to the time at which
a contract is consummated. Different treatment of residential mortgages can be justified because homes are more of a necessity than the
majority of items financed and also represent perhaps the largest investment a family will make. Whether in the future the time of contractual
obligation will be abandoned as a reference point for those types of
credit unaffected by Bissette depends upon whether a consumer is obligated as a matter of fact prior to signing a contract. If he is, the logic
of Bissettel5 would compel a finding that disclosure at the time of execution of the contract was not meaningful. Such a finding would be unlikely, though, as the procedures and formalities unique to mortgage
loan transactions which call for investments of time and money by a
borrower before an obligation is undertaken do not exist with other
kinds of credit such as car loans, revolving charge plans, and appliance
financing. In these situations it is unlikely that a consumer would become so committed prior to entering into a contract that he has no
meaningful opportunity to reject the contract.
The court in Bissette strived to reach a just decision on the facts
before it. While straining accepted rules of statutory interpretation and
brushing aside the opinions of the regulating authority, the decision in
Bissette reflects the efforts of a court to assure consumers of disclosure
of credit terms at a time when they still have a choice of accepting or
rejecting the credit. The decision rests on an assumption of commitment
prior to contract, an assumption which may not be universal in its
application. The value of the holding can be questioned because of its
failure to provide a definitive answer to the question of when disclosure
must be made. The Federal Reserve Board has acted to fill this gap by
proposing an amendment to Regulation Z11 calling for disclosure ten
business days before closing. This proposed amendment goes far to
effectuate the goals of meaningful disclosure as discussed by the court."
MICHAEL

H.

GODWIN

"See note 51 supra; 340 F. Supp. at 1193.
,'Proposed Truth in Lending Reg. § 226.8(a), (q), 37 Fed. Reg. 15522 (1972). The Federal
Reserve Board proposed an amendment to Regulation Z which would require disclosure 10 business days before closing in any transaction involving the purchase of a dwelling.
51340 F. Supp. at 1194: "so they can decide for themselves whether the charges are reasonable
and have the opportunity, if they wish, to compare that cost with other available credit arrangements."
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Criminal Law-Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreements
The term "plea bargaining" suggests a give-and-take process
whereby a plea is bargained for between the accused and the prosecuting
attorney, both making concessions. Generally the accused will plead
guilty as charged or guilty to a lesser included offense in return for a
promise by the prosecution to make sentence concessions, to ignore
recidivism, or to drop other pending charges.'
The typical plea bargaining agreement arises after a plea of not
guilty. After negotiations with the prosecutor, the defendant withdraws
his previously entered plea of not guilty and enters a guilty plea pursuant
to a plea bargaining agreement. Entry of the guilty plea has fulfilled the
defendant's part of the bargain. Does the prosecuting attorney have to
perform as agreed? Is anyone other than the promisor-the prosecuting
attorney or the judge who makes the promise on behalf of the
state-bound by the agreement? In Santobello v. New York, 2 the
United States Supreme Court held that a promise made by an assistant
district attorney must be honored if it was a material inducement to the
petitioner's guilty plea. In ordering enforcement of the promise, the
Court bound a prosecutor who neither participated in nor had knowledge of the plea bargaining agreement. The opinion did not order any
specific relief. Instead, a choice of alternative remedies-withdrawal of
the guilty plea or specific performance of the promise-was left for state
court determination.'
In 1969 Santobello was indicted in New York for two first degree
gambling offenses. 4 After negotiations with the assistant district attorney, Santobello withdrew a not-guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the
lesser included offense of possession of gambling records in the second
degree. The assistant district attorney agreed to make no recommendation as to the sentence. Before sentencing and after obtaining new defense counsel, Santobello moved to withdraw the guilty plea on grounds
of newly discovered evidence.5 The motion was subsequently denied but
'Comment, Constitutional Law-Plea Bargaining-NewJersey Statute Allowing A Defendant to Avoid the Death Penalty by Pleading Non Vult or Nola Contendere Held Valid, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 612, 617-618 (1969).
292 S. Ct. 495 (1971).
1Id. at 499.

'The offenses charged were promoting gambling in the first degree and possession of gambling
records in the first degree. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 225.10, .20 (McKinney 1967).
'Upon discovery of the new evidence-possible illegal search-the petitioner moved to withdraw the guilty plea, to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the "illegal search," and to
inspect the grand jury minutes. All three motions were denied by the trial court. 92 S. Ct. at 497.
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only after a series of delays. At length Santobello was sentenced, but
not before a new prosecuting attorney had been appointed. The new
prosecutor presented petitioner's criminal record to the court and recommended the maximum sentence of one year. Defense counsel immediately objected that during plea negotiations the assistant district attorney had agreed not to make any sentence recommendations to the trial
judge, but the presiding trial judge overruled defense counsel's objections, stating that he was "not at all influenced by what the District
Attorney says" and that his imposition of the maximum sentence was
entirely justified and mandated by evidence from other sources.' The
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed.7
On certiorari the Supreme Court held that where a promise is "part
of the inducement or consideration" 8 for the guilty plea, fulfillment of
the promise is necessary. The burden of informing all those concerned
is on the prosecuting official making the promise; anyone who later
takes up the prosecution is bound by the agreement?
Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the
importance of maintaining a functional plea bargaining system. The
Court spoke of plea negotiations as "not only an essential part of the
process but a highly desirablepart for many reasons."' 10 Underlying the
decision, however, are due process considerations: the circumstances
surrounding plea negotiations "presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor,"" and in order that fairness
may be achieved and the integrity of the system preserved, plea negotiations "must be attended by safeguardsto insure the defendant what is
reasonably due. .. .*"I The Court carefully pointed out that although

a promise must be a material inducement to the entry of the plea, the
materiality of the breach is not a proper subject of inquiry. 3 Thus, the
fact that the trial judge would have imposed the maximum sentence of
one year regardless of the sentencing recommendation made by the
prosecutor was deemed to be of no relevance to the enforceability of the
promise. 4 The inquiry is a subjective one-did the accused plead guilty
11d. at 497-98.
'Santobello v. New York, 35 App. Div. 2d 1084, 316 N.Y.S.2d 194 (mem.).
'92 S. Ct. at 499.
'Id.
JId. at 498 (emphasis added).
"Id. (emphasis added).
1id. at 499 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 501.
"Id. at 499.
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in reliance on the prosecution's promise? The court was brief in its
treatment of the issue of who is bound by the promise of a prosecuting
official: 5 if the accused is to be assured of "safeguards," the sovereign
must be found; otherwise the Court's mandate would be rendered meaningless.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas was even more inclined
to justify enforcement of the agreement on constitutional grounds. After
pointing out the close scrutiny given by the Court in past cases concerning guilty pleas, Justice Douglas concluded that enforcement of plea
bargains should be a "constitutional rule," with the remedy, whether it
be withdrawal of the plea or specific performance of the promise, left
to state court determination in accordance with due process. 6 He indicated that the petitioner's preference as to the remedy applicable in a
given case should be given due weight. Justice Marshall, with whom
Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart joined, concurred in part and dissented in part. 7
It has been estimated that ninety to ninety-five percent of all criminal convictions and seventy to eighty-five percent of felony convictions
are obtained by guilty pleas. 8 There can be little doubt that plea bargains have been instrumental in a majority of these guilty pleas. Many
policy reasons support the use of plea bargains, including relief for the
already overburdened courts and reduction of the expenses involved in
trials and in the individualized administration of justice. 9 On the other
hand, a number of Supreme Court decisions, as Justice Douglas indicated in Santobello,21 have established that a guilty plea involves the
151d.

"Id. at 501. The majority opinion made no specific reference to a "constitutional rule."

"Justice Marshall expressed the opinion that the petitioner's preference of relief should be
given priority because the basis of the waiver of substantial constitutional rights had been removed
when the prosecutor reneged on the promise. Id. at 501-02.
TRIAL
18D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT

3 & n.l (1966).
t9Id. at 4; see Note, The Role of Plea Negotiations In Modern Criminal Law, 46 CHi.-KENT
L. REV. 116 (1969). For a brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of plea negotiations
see Note, Plea Bargaining-JusticeOff the Record, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 430, 433 (1970). For an indepth discussion see Alshuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50
(1968). Alshuler sees the bargaining prosecutor as an administrator, advocate, judge, and legislator.
292 S. Ct. at 500. Justice Douglas cites the following cases: In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
(right to be convicted of proof beyond all reasonable doubt); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to present defense
witnesses); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront one's accusers); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (right to remain silent).
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waiver of a number of fundamental constitutional rights, such as the
right to a jury trial and the right to confront one's accusers. For this
reason, a line of decisions has established requirements for the acceptance and withdrawal of guilty pleas for both state and federal courts.
Beginning in 1927 with the landmark case of Kercheval v. United
States,'2 1 the Court held that federal courts could not accept guilty pleas
unless the pleas were voluntarily made upon proper advice and with full
understanding of the consequences. A guilty plea should be vacated if
unfairly obtained or if entered through ignorance, fear, or inadvertence.12 Following Kercheval, the Court, in cases involving federal prosecutions, established that due process is offended where prosecutorial
misrepresentations lead to the guilty plea 3 and that promises or threats
could deprive a guilty plea of its voluntariness. 4 In 1970 the Supreme
Court, in Brady v. United States, recognized the legitimacy of plea
bargains by holding that the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit judges
and prosecutors from accepting guilty pleas to lesser included offenses
or reducing charges in return for a guilty plea.u
In 1969 the Supreme Court held in Boykin v. Alabama2 1 that it was
error for the state trial judge not to disclose on the record whether the
defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his guilty plea. The
language of the opinion indicated that since a guilty plea was a waiver
of fundamental constitutonal rights, federal due process standards must
come into play. 7 The impact of Boykin appears at least to provide
better safeguards and standards for the acceptance of guilty pleas. This
constitutional reading of Boykin accords with the general trend during
the last decade toward "enlargement of the constitutionally protected
'28
rights of a defendant.
One of the safeguards governing acceptance of guilty pleas has been
judicial circumscription of the freedom of the prosecuting officials and
judges to ignore plea bargaining agreements. The judicial approach,
however, has not been uniform. The nature of the promise given by the
21274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
221d. at 224.
"Walter v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
I'Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
-397 U.S. 742, 751-55 (1970).
26395 U.S. 238 (1969).
2Id. at 243.
"Comment, The Guilty Plea and Bargaining, 17 LOYOLA L. REV. 703, 713 (1971); accord,
Note, Criminal Procedure-Requirementsfor Acceptance of Guilty Pleas, 48 N.C.L. REv. 352
(1970).
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prosecution has in the past made a difference. Promises of immunity to
prosecution have generally received a treatment different from promises
to reduce sentences or to substitute a lesser included offense for that
initially charged. Possibly this different treatment is due to the Whiskey
Cases2 in which promises of complete immunity and of leniency were
made to certain defendants and accomplices in return for testimony
implicating their co-defendants. While recognizing that such promises
were generally fulfilled, the Court held that they were no defense to
subsequent indictment and that they constituted, at most, only an "equitable claim" to immunity. 3 A number of lower federal and state courts
have followed the language of the Whiskey Cases,31 basing the denial
of enforcement on the lack of authority on the part of the prosecutor
to grant such immunity.
A substantial number of promise-of-immunity cases have refused
to follow the Whiskey Cases.3 For example, in United States v.
Paiva, 1 the defendant agreed to plead guilty to four specified felonies
in return for the assistant district attorney's agreement to drop other
charges. In a well-reasoned opinion, the district court held in Paiva that
later indictments in violation of the plea bargaining agreement must be
dismissed. Although the Paiva court clearly did not consider the
Whiskey Cases to be sound judicial authority, it distinguished them on
the grounds that they involved promises of leniency made to codefendants and accomplices.34 In the recent case of United States V.
Carter," the Fourth Circuit, relying heavily on Paiva, indicated that it
would not only enforce an immunity-of-prosecution promise made by
the U.S. assistant district attorney for the District of Columbia but also
bind the U.S. District Attorney's Office in Virginia to the same promise.
Where prosecutorial promises have not involved immunity of pros-99 U.S. 594 (1878).
22

The only relief available to the accused was hope of an executive pardon. Id. at 595-96.

" 1Hunter v. United States, 405 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1969); Huerta v. United States, 322 F.2d
1 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 (1964); District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942); People v. Groves, 63 Cal. App. 709, 219 P. 1033
(1923); State v. Crow, 367 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1963); Tullis v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 87, 52 S.W. 83
(1899).
32
Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 281, 288 (1972) suggests that the deciding factor has been whether the
lower court approved the agreement in the first instance.

13294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969).

111d. at 744-46. The court relied heavily on Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), to conclude that the separation of powers doctrine was no bar to enforcement because
of the general powers of the court to supervise the administration of criminal justice.
2454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972); see note 41 infra.
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ecution, federal courts have been more willing to enforce the plea bargaining agreements. For example, in Dillon v. United States" the assistant district attorney promised that if he were asked by the court to
make a sentencing recommendation, he would recommend a sentence
of ten years. Relying on this promise, the petitioner pleaded guilty. It
appeared from the record that the sentencing judge rarely asked for the
prosecution's recommendation at sentencing. The Ninth Circuit held
that the prosecutor's promise was illusory if he knew that the judge was
unlikely to request a sentence recommendation and that the deception
violated due process if the illusory promise had acted as an inducement
37
to the petitioner's plea of guilty.
There are a substantial number of state decisions retreating from
the Whiskey Cases. In Austin v. State'38 the Wisconsin court expressly
refused to follow the line of decisions holding promises of immunity
unenforceable. The court did not base the enforcement merely on the
usual grounds of public policy and good faith.3 9 The Austin court said,
"We consider that the facts constituting good public policy require the
application of the doctrine of due process . . . ."I' State courts have
frequently stated that a guilty plea induced by coercion, promise, and
deceit on the part of the prosecuting attorney is invalid as violative of
due process." In State v. Rose,42 the Missouri Supreme Court sanctioned a subjective test of voluntariness and held that a guilty plea may
well be involuntary even where defense counsel was responsible for the
defendant's mistaken belief that a sentence concession had been
granted. These decisions lack any mention of the Whiskey Cases; such
a retreat supports the observation in United States v. Paiva that the
3
Whiskey Cases are not considered to be sound judicial authority.
Apparent from the history of plea bargaining is the need for a rule
of enforcement of plea bargaining agreements which is not dependent
11307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962).
3Id. at 449; see United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
where the court held that a breach of a material promise results in an "unfairly obtained" plea,
violating the fourteenth amendment.
1149 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N.W.2d 56 (1971).
"Such grounds were the basis for the holdings in the following cases: State v. Davis, 188 So.
2d 24 (Fla. App. 1966); State v. Hingle, 242 La. 844, 139 So. 2d 205 (1962); State v. Ward, 112
W. Va. 552, 165 S.E. 803 (1932).
4049 Wis. 2d at 736, 183 N.W.2d at 61 (emphasis added).
"E.g., Maloney v. Coiner, 152 W. Va. 437, 164 S.E.2d 205 (1968).
2440 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1969). The court in Rose relied heavily on the reasoning found in
United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
"See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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on the type of prosecutorial promise made. Santobello marks the first
time the Supreme Court has spoken in favor of enforcement of plea
bargaining agreements and is the first case to bind a third person to the
agreement. One result of the decision will be that "material" promises
of sentence recommendations will be uniformly honored in both federal
and state courts. Also, the prosecutor who makes the promise will bind
all within his prosecutorial office. While the Court did not deal with the
question whether another prosecutorial office would be bound to the
promise, the result logically follows. However, the extent that nonparticipating prosecutors may be bound is still not known, although a
permissive if not mandatory extension of Santobello may sanction cases
like United States v. Carter," which bound two federal districts by a
single prosecutorial promise.45
Does Santobello dictate that all "material" promises be honored,
including promises of immunity from prosecution? The answer depends
upon the basis for the Court's decision. Close scrutiny of the history of
guilty pleas and of the evasive language used by the Court reveals that
the Court must have considered its determination to be constitutionally
required. There is no doubt that Chief Justice Burger's decision was
motivated by the importance of plea bargaining in the administration
of criminal justice and by the Court's notions of justice and fair play.
If prosecutorial promises were not enforced, the number of guilty pleas
would surely decline and the judiciary would soon feel the impact. Also,
reneging on prosecutorial promises outrages common American notions
of courtroom justice. However, interpreting Santobello exclusively in
terms of justice and convenience of administration attributes to the
Court a non-constitutonal and perhaps unconstitutional interference
with state criminal proceedings."
Significant in the Santobello opinion is the absence of any description of Santobello's plea as "involuntary." In this respect the decision
"454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).

"'The court in Carter bound the District Attorney's office in the District of Columbia Circuit.
The opinion was written but not printed before the decision in Santobello. Subsequently, the Carter

court filed an Addendum stating that Santobello was "additional support for the result we reach."
Id. at 428-29. Query if Santobello would support the enforcement of a plea bargaining promise as

between two sovereigns. Cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). But cf. Bartkus
v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
4

While Chief Justice Burger failed to use the term "constitutional" in his opinion, it is unlikely
that he intended to overrule a line of decisions beginning with Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(I Wheat.) 304 (1816), in which the Supreme Court has refused to exercise supervisory powers over

state courts.
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does not line up with prior plea bargaining and voluntariness decisions.
Does the question of whether the plea was entered voluntarily have any
bearing on the enforcement of plea bargaining agreements? In a sense,
any guilty plea induced by a prosecutorial promise renders such a plea
involuntary. As in the theory of entrapment,47 the crucial question is
whether the defendant would have pleaded guilty without the participation of the prosecutor. If not, then the plea is involuntary. Such a guilty
plea becomes voluntary, if at all, when the promise is fulfilled. However,
the voluntariness issue can be examined from a different perspective.
Arguably, after a guilty plea is entered, subsequent events have no
bearing on voluntariness-plea bargaining agreements are totally divorced from the voluntariness issue. Whichever perspective is correct,
the opinion in Santobello did focus on the promise as an inducement to
the guilty plea, but other factors were also important to the decision,
indicating that both the "voluntariness" issue and other factors are
necessary in determining the enforceability of plea bargains. Hence, it
would be more correct to say that because of all the factors involved in
such a guilty plea-the convenience to the administration of criminal
justice, justice and fair play, the waiver of constitutional rights-due
process requires either that the promise which induced the guilty plea
be fulfilled or that withdrawal of the plea be permitted.
While Santobello could have been more explicitly reasoned and
more specific upon the question of its applicability to all plea bargaining
promises, the opinion supports the theory that due process requires
fulfillment of plea bargaining promises whenever "material" promises
are involved. Furthermore, the language is broad enough to include all
plea bargaining promises, for nowhere did the majority opinion limit
enforcement to promises of sentence concessions. As a result, more
uniformity of proscutorial conduct will result from Santobello, and accused persons will be able to more confidently rely upon prosecutorial
promises.
Perhaps the Santobello decision will bring about a uniform state
and federal requirement of disclosure and recordation of every accepted
plea bargain. Such a courtroom procedure has been widely advocated.48
4R. Perkins,

"5ABA

CRIMINAL LAW

1033 (2d ed. 1969).

PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO

§§ 1.5, .7 (1967); D. NEWMAN, supranote 17, at 218 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATON OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 136 (1967); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 69 (1963); Gentile, Fair
PLEAS OF GUILTY

BargainsAnd AccuratePleas, 49 B.U.L. REV. 514, 518 (1969); Thompson, The Judge'sResponsibility on a Plea of Guilty, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 221 (1960).
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Only in the past few years has any case law appeared which specifically
addressed the problem. In People v. West49 the California Supreme
Court held that court room disclosure and recordation of plea bargaining agreements would be required in California. To avoid the needless
waste of courtroom time and expense which would occur every time a
defendant alleged a breach of a plea bargaining agreement, courts will
necessarily have to begin disclosing and recording these agreements.
Otherwise, false allegations of plea bargains will surely occur. Disclosure and recordation of plea bargains would also provide further protection for defendants by eliminating the almost impossible task of
proving a plea bargain.
RICHARD L. VANORE

Criminal Procedure-Fourth Amendment Protection and Handwriting
Exemplars-Is Probable Cause Unreasonable?
After the Supreme Court decision in Gilbert v. California,' which
specifically rejected any constitutional objection to the compulsion of
handwriting exemplars grounded on either the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the sixth amendment right to counsel,
defendants have redoubled their efforts to bring handwriting exemplars
within the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable search
and seizure. 2 They have argued that courts should deny any governmental request for handwriting exemplars that, if granted, would violate the
defendant's fourth amendment rights and that the exclusionary rule
should be available to enforce that requirement.'
493 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970); see United States v. Williams, 407
F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1969); State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner, W. Va. -,
179 S.E.2d 726 (1971).

1388 U.S. 263 (1967).
'The fourth amendment provides that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. This protection is guaranteed by the judicially imposed exclusionary rule. In Weeks v.

United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Supreme Court barred, in a federal prosecution, the use
of evidence secured through an illegal search or seizure. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),

extended this protection to criminal trials in state courts.
'See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 453 F.2d 1317 (8th Cir. 1972), where the court applied
the exclusionary rule to suppress handwriting exemplars taken from one defendant, finding that
the defendant was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure.
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Davis v. Mississippi,4 decided by the Supreme Court in 1969, has

been the leading case in the area of fourth amendment protection for
such nontestimonial evidence as fingerprints and voice or handwriting

exemplars. In Davis the Supreme Court invoked the exclusionary rule
to reverse the defendant's conviction on the ground that the fingerprint

evidence used at his trial was the product of an unlawful detention and
therefore should have been excluded. 5 Stressing the need for judicial
scrutiny, the Court held that the fourth amendment protection applies
to the "investigatory stage" and to "detentions for the sole purpose of
obtaining fingerprints." 6 However, Davis did not conclusively desig-

nate probable cause as the required fourth amendment standard.7
Apparently Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, realized the burden

that the decision in Davis could place on police investigatory practices,
for he suggested that "because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting

process, such detentions [for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints]
might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with
the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the
traditional sense."" This dictum has given rise to varying responses.
Recently, courts have considered fourth amendment claims with
respect to handwriting exemplars not only in the factual context of a
request for exemplars by the prosecution but also in the context of a

request by a grand jury. Two main questions are presented by these
fourth amendment claims: does the taking of handwriting exemplars

constitute a search or seizure protected by the fourth amendment and,
if so, what showing must the government make in order to satisfy the

reasonbleness standards of the fourth amendment? The decisions reflect
different answers to both questions.' Three of these decisions present the
4394 U.S. 721 (1969).
Vd. at 722-23. In an investigation concerning the rape of an elderly white woman, the defendant was fingerprinted along with at least twenty-four other Negro youths. After being investigated
at several other times, the defendant was driven ninety miles, jailed overnight, returned and again
fingerprinted.
'Id. at 727.
'Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), stated the traditional probable cause test: "[w]hether
at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the police officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense."
1394 U.S. at 727.
'Compare In re September 1971 Grand Jury, 454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub
noant. United States v. In re September 1971 Grand Jury, 92 S. Ct. 2058 (1972) (No. 71-850); In
re Riccardi, 337 F. Supp. 253 (D.N.J. 1972); and United States v. Bailey, 327 F. Supp. 802 (N.D.
III. 1971), with United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 92 S. Ct. 1243 (1972)
(No. A-926).
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extent of divergence in viewpoints. In United States v. Praigg,1' involving a police request for exemplars from a defendant who was free on
bail after an arrest for forgery, the court held that handwriting exemplars fall within the protection of the fourth amendment and can be
compelled only on a showing of probable cause. In In re September
1971 Grand Jury," presently before the Supreme Court, the Seventh
Circuit held that a grand jury request for handwriting exemplars constitutes a search and seizure within the protection of the fourth amendment and must be substantiated by a governmental showing of reasonableness not necessarily amounting to probable cause. On the other
hand, in United States v. Doe,12 the Second Circuit did not reach the
question of what showing the government must make since the court
held that the use of process to compel handwriting exemplars for a
grand jury does not constitute a search and seizure within the fourth
amendment. Since the Supreme Court has not specifically recognized
a constitutionally protected interest in nontestimonial evidence such as
fingerprints and voice or handwriting exemplars, this note will consider
the rationales in Praigg, Doe, and 1971 Grand Jury in an attempt to
determine the basis of such a fourth amendment interest. More specifically, this note will consider whether the approach taken by the 1971
Grand Jury court in the grand jury context should be applied to the
police-citizen encounter in Praigg.
In addition to Davis, the defendants in Praigg, Doe, and 1971
GrandJury also relied upon In re Dionisio,3 a per curiam decision by
the Seventh Circuit which is presently before the Supreme Court, being
argued in tandem with 1971 Grand Jury. Dionisio reversed a lower
court order committing the defendants for contempt for their refusal
to furnish voice exemplars as requested by a grand jury. The court in
Dionisio cited Davis for the proposition that, under the fourth amendment, "law enforcement officials may not compel the production of
physical evidence absent a showing of the reasonableness of the seizure."' 4 Reasoning from Hale v. Henkel,'5 in which the Supreme Court
struck down grand jury subpoenas as overbroad because of the inherent
1*336 F. Supp. 480 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
11454

F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. In re September 1971

Grand Jury, 92 S. Ct. 2058 (1972) (No. 71-850).
12457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 92 S.Ct. 1243 (1972) (No. A-926).
13442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. grantedsub nom. United States v. Dionisio,
92 S. Ct. 2056 (1972) (No. 71-229).
"Id. at 280.
5201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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unreasonableness of general fishing expeditions, the court in Dionisio
concluded that voice exemplars were as much within the scope of the
reasonableness requirement as were the books and papers subpoenaed
in Hale v. Henkel." With respect to requests by a grand jury, the court
in Dionisio went on to state that "[t]he fourth amendment bans 'wholesale intrusions' upon personal security whether such intrusions stem
from illegal arrests or from grand jury subpoenas ostensibly issued only
bald statement that the witnesses are
because of the Government's
'7
defendants."'
potential
But in United States v. Doe,'" the Second Circuit affirmed an order
adjudging the defendant in contempt for her refusal to furnish handwriting exemplars to a grand jury. The court held that where a grand jury
had not engaged in either a search or a seizure, there is no justification
for a court's imposing even so moderate a requirement as a showing of
reasonableness." In an attempt to determine exactly what fourth
amendment interest, if any, the defendant had in her handwriting exemplars, the court distinguished Davis by differentiating between a
detention to take the handwriting exemplars and the taking of the exemplars themselves. The court characterized the Davis fact pattern as a
"police-citizen encounter which amounted to a 'seizure' of the person. '"20
Since no preliminary showing of need or relevancy is required to subpoena a person before a grand jury, the court concluded that compulsory appearance before a grand jury cannot constitute a seizure of the
person. 2' This distinction left the court free to determine whether the
defendant had a valid fourth amendment claim to her handwriting exemplars themselves. The court held that she did not, since a grand jury
request for exemplars did not violate the defendant's "reasonable expectation of privacy. ' 22 To underscore the position that the defendant had
no reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated by compulsion
of her handwriting exemplars, the opinion incorporated a quotation
from Davis, stating that "fingerprinting, surely more nearly private than
exemplars of the voice or handwriting, 'involves none of the probing into
an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
"1442 F.2d at 279.
11d. at 281.
1"457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.), stay granted, 92 S. Ct. 1243 (1972) (No. A-926).

"Id. at 900.
"Id.at 898.
2"/d.

11d. at 898-99.
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search.' ",23 Thus, because of the difference in the extent of the intrusions involved in the two cases, the Doe court read Davis as authority
for a grand jury dispensing with a showing of probable cause to obtain
handwriting exemplars.
Other courts have declined to distinguish a detention for taking
exemplars from any interest the defendant might have in the exemplar
itself. The courts generally have held that the interposition of the grand
jury between the witnesses and the government does not eliminate the
fourth amendment protection which would otherwise bar the government from obtaining the evidence.24 For example, the court in United
States v. Bailey, 5 rather than recognizing different standards for the
police and the grand jury, concluded that the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Dionisio announced a new constitutional principle that equated the
grand jury with the police so far as the fourth amendment is concerned.
It would seem that the court in Doe did not require the grand jury
to make the same showing of reasonableness as it would require of the
police because of a misconception of the actual function of the grand
jury. Recognizing the grand jury's investigative power to compel handwriting exemplars without even a showing of reasonableness, the Second
Circuit referred to the grand jury's function as a "protective buffer
between the accused and the prosecutor" included in the fifth amendment to safeguard the defendant against unfounded prosecution. 6 However, other courts, recognizing that the grand jury frequently functions
under the direction of the prosecutor as an arm of the prosecution, have
refused to exempt the grand jury from making a showing of reasonableness.2 Therefore, a decision such as Doe that would require a showing
of reasonableness by the police but not by the grand jury could eventually undermine Davis and completely subvert any "protective buffer"
function of the grand jury. If the grand jury were not required to show
the reasonableness of its requests for exemplars, the police could accom3Id. at 899.
11n re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. grantedsub non. United
States v;.Dionisio, 92 S. Ct. 2056 (1972) (No: 71-229); United States v. Bailey, 332 F. Supp. 1351
(N.D. I11. 1971); In re Riccardi, 337 F. Supp. 253 (D.N.J. 1972).
21332 F. Supp. 1351 (N.D. III. 1971).
2457 F.2d at 899. The court found sufficient procedural protections, without reliance on the
2

fourth amendment, in the grand jury requirements of enforced secrecy and the use of court process
rather than the "constable's intruding hand" as a means of gathering evidence.
"See, e.g., note 24 supra. Also, 1971 Grand Jury, recognizing that the grand jury has frequently been used as a tool of the prosecution, held that governmental use of the grand jury to
perform investigative work formerly done by regular investigative agencies constitutes an abuse of
the grand jury process. 454 F.2d at 585.
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plish their investigations by empaneling a grand jury and having it direct
law enforcement officers to round up all possible suspects and compel
each of them to provide the appropriate exemplars.
Since evidence seized in an unconstitutional search is ordinarily just
as reliable as evidence seized under a valid warrant, the defendant's
objection is not to the trustworthiness of the evidence or to the adequacy
of the trial procedure. Rather the objection under the fourth amendment
is to the manner in which the evidence was acquired. 2 The taking of
handwriting exemplars is certainly a type of search; the police take
evidence from the person of the defendant to be used in determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether the defendant is
guilty. Since the fourth amendment would protect a defendant's home
from a warrantless search for exemplars, an intrusion into his personal
privacy to compel similar exemplars should also be protected. Where
the police or the grand jury seek to obtain handwriting exemplars, the
defendant should be able to invoke the protection of the fourth amendment to insure that the search and seizure is not accomplished in an
unreasonable manner.
The extent of the fourth amendment protection is necessarily contingent upon the degree of reasonableness required by the court's interpretation of the required standard. The court in Praigg applied the
standard of probable cause, as required by the warrant clause of the
fourth amendment; 29 the court in 1971 Grand Jury applied a less stringent standard of reasonableness. 3 An examination of the rationale behind each decision and the logical implications of each decision would
seem to suggest that if the courts do recognize a fourth amendment
interest in handwriting exemplars, the same standard of reasonableness
applied in the grand jury context might also be applicable to the policecitizen encounter.
Having determined that the taking of the defendant's handwriting
exemplars is within the fourth amendment, the court in Praigg stated
the premise that "'a search is "unreasonable" unless a warrant authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity.' "31 Then
finding that handwriting exemplars do not fall within the "limited exceptions to the rule that searches and seizures must be based upon
"2J.LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 14 (1966).
29336 F. Supp. at 484.

3"454 F.2d at 584-85.
11336 F. Supp. at 483-84, quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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probable cause, ' 32 the court imposed the warrant clause requirements
of probable cause and specificity:
[A]t the least. . . the government must demonstrate in its motion that
probable cause exists to believe the defendant was involved in a substantive violation of the law in which his handwriting played a part. It
would not be sufficient, on the other hand, to show merely that a
handwriting exemplar would be helpful to the preparation of the government's case or that it might be relevant to the investigation of other
crimes in which the defendant's involvement is suspected.33
The Praiggcourt's analysis leads to an automotic application of the
same probable cause and specificity requirements that have traditionally
been required when the police seek warrants for the search and seizure
of property. Although probable cause is usually an essential requirement
for a lawful search and seizure,34 there is some authority for a limited
intrusion based on less than probable cause. 5 Also, since the intrusion
in Praiggwas to obtain nontestimonial evidence similar in nature to
fingerprints, Justice Brennan's dictum in Davis concerning the taking
of fingerprints without probable cause becomes all the more relevant.
The analytical approach used by the Supreme Court in Schmerber
36 is also relevant to the taking of handwriting exemplars.
v. California
Schmerber, decided before Davis, involved a defendant's constitutional
objections to police compulsion of samples of his blood. After determining that the defendant had no valid fifth or sixth amendment objection
to the compulsion of the blood sample, the court considered his fourth
amendment claim. Noting that "[s]uch testing procedures [taking blood
samples] plainly constitute searches of 'persons' and depend antecedently upon seizures of 'persons,' within the meaning of that Amendment," the court stated:
[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against
all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in
the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other
words, the questions we must decide in this case are whether the police
were justified in requiring petitioner to submit [to the taking of the
3

"Id. at 484.
3Id.

"Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
"See text accompanying notes 52-56 infra.
3-384 U.S. 757 (1966).

"Id. at 767.
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blood sample] and whether the means and procedures employed [in
taking the blood sample] respected relevant Fourth Amendment stan-

dards of reasonableness."
Because alcohol dissipates from the bloodstream with the passage of
time and because the sample was taken incident to arrest, the Court in
Schmerber found an exception to the warrant requirement. Therefore,
in analyzing any fourth amendment claim, especially any claim not
subject to the warrant requirement, it is necessary to examine the facts
of each case in order to determine just what would respect "relevant
Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness."
Since the court in In re September 1971 GrandJury was concerned
with a request for handwriting exemplars by a grand jury, the court used
"reasonableness" rather than warrant clause probable cause as the standard. In 1971 Grand Jury, the Seventh Circuit fleshed out its decision
in Dionisio and defined the "content" of the "reasonableness" that the
government is required to show to compel handwriting exemplars for a
grand jury. After concluding that the government "must affirmatively
show that the grand jury process is not being abused," the court continued: "[I]t would be an abuse of the grand jury process for the Government to conduct a general fishing expedition under grand jury sponsorship with the mere explanation that the witnesses are potential defendants." 9 While there must be "a sufficiently explicit connection between the identification evidence sought and the purpose to be served,"
the connection, the Seventh Circuit is careful to point out, need not
amount to probable cause."
The Praiggsolution requiring probable cause has the advantage of
easy judicial determination and certainly protects the defendant from
police harassment or overbroad searches. However, the government is
in the position of needing probable cause to indict but at the same time
also needing to show probable cause to obtain sufficient evidence to
indict." Thus, in cases like Praiggwhere the police have a forged document and seek the handwriting exemplars of a suspect in order to obtain
probable cause to arrest or indict, they must first show probable cause
to believe that the suspect was involved in a substantive crime in which
111d. at 768.
"Id. at 585.
401d.
"This is,
of course, the same situation encountered by the police in obtaining fingerprints when
they work in a jurisdiction which requires a strict showing of probable cause under Davis. See
Carrington, Speaking for the Police, 61 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 244, 255-56 (1970).
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his handwriting played a part. Obvously it would be extremely difficult
to make this showing of probable cause at the investigatory stage; therefore, without the exemplars, often there would be no way to connect the
forgeries with the suspects.
In an attempt to protect the interests of both society in law enforcement and of the individual in the security of his person, one obvious
solution, consistent with the suggestion in Davis, would be to allow a
judicially supervised detention for the purpose of taking handwriting
exemplars on a governmental showing of reasonableness not necessarily
amounting to probable cause to arrest.
One result of the suggestion in Davis has been the proposal to add
a Rule 41.142 to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to define the
procedure for the police to follow in obtaining nontestimonial evidence. 3 The proposed rule would allow a magistrate to issue an order
for nontestimonial personal identification evidence (including handwriting exemplars) only on the basis of a sworn affidavit establishing:
1) that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed;
2) that there are reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable
cause to arrest, to suspect that the person named or described in the
affidavit committed the offense; and
3) that the results of specific nontestimonial identification procedures will be of material aid in determining whether the person
named in the affidavit committed the offense.4
Rule 41.1 would incorporate several provisions to protect the rights
of the individual: the time and place for the taking of the evidence can
be suited to the individual's convenience;45 the order, on its face, would
give the individual full information as to the purpose and extent of the
evidence to be taken;" and detention would be no "longer than is reasonably necessary to conduct the specified nontestimonial procedures. 47 The rule further requires that the products of the identification
F.R.D. 462 (1971).
"Proposed Rule 41.1 is noted in Note, Proposed FederalRule of CriminalProcedure 41,1,
56 MINN. L. REV. 667 (1972), which concluded that the Supreme Court would probably adopt the
4252

proposed rule if submitted for their consideration. But see Note, Detention to Obtain Physical
Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure,72 COLUM. L. REV. 712 (1972), concluding that the proposed rule should not be adopted

since it erodes constitutional protections.
"Proposed
"Proposed
"Proposed
"Proposed

Rule 41.1(c), 52 F.R.D. at 463.
Rule 41.1(e), 52 F.R.D. at 464.
Rule 41.1(h), 52 F.R.D. at 464-65.
Rule 41.1(i), 52 F.R.D. at 465.
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procedure be returned to the issuing magistrate within forty-five days.
If at the end of this forty-five day period the evidence does not amount
to probable cause to believe that the individual has committed an offense, the individual is entitled to an order compelling the destruction
of the products of the investigation. However, the rule further provides
that the destruction order will not be granted if the government makes
a showing of "good cause." '
The reasoning that led Justice Brennan to conclude that
"[d]etention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and
detentions" is also applicable to the taking of handwriting exemplars.
Since a suspect cannot destroy his handwriting ability, the "limited
detention need not come unexpectedly or at an inconvenient time."5
Also, there would be no reason for the police to fail to obtain prior
judicial authorization. Like fingerprinting, the process of taking handwriting exemplars does not involve probing into an individual's thoughts
51
as an interrogation does.
Proposed Rule 41.1 is founded upon more authority than just the
dictum in Davis. In several different situations the Supreme Court has
categorized an intrusion as within the fourth amendment but has nevertheless allowed the intrusion on a showing that did not amount to probable cause. In Camarav. MunicipalCourt'52 the Supreme Court held that
administrative inspections for the purpose of enforcing housing codes
must meet warrant clause requirements. However, the applicable standard was reasonableness, not probable cause, thereby giving "full recognition to the competing public and private interests . . . at stake. ' 53
In Terry v. Ohio,54 the Court used this balancing approach in the context
of a criminal prosecution to allow a police officer to make a selfprotective search for weapons without probable cauge. The limited
search was reasonable since society's interest in the protection of its
police officers outweighed the individual's right to be secure in his person from the limited search involved. In Wyman v. James,55 the Court
"Proposed Rule 41.1(0), 52 F.R.D. at 465-66.
"Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
50
1d.
"See id.
52387 U.S. 523 (1967).

-"Id.at 539.
5"392 U.S. I (1968).
"400 U.S. 309 (1971).
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rejected the claim of a state welfare beneficiary who contended that a
home visit, when not consented to or supported by probable cause,
violated her fourth amendment rights. Here the Court balanced society's interest in the proper administration of the welfare program
against the proposed limited intrusion into the security of the defendant's home. Although the Court held that the authorized home visit
was not a search, the opinion went further to state that even if it were,
it would not be unreasonable under the fourth amendment.56
The taking of handwriting exemplars presents a situation in which
individual rights must be carefully balanced against societal rights. If
the police were to have uncontrolled discretionary power to compel
exemplars, any investigation could turn into a dragnet in which anyone
could be forced to compromise the security and privacy of his person.
On the other hand, if the police were to be initially required to show
traditional probable cause as a prerequisite to obtaining exemplars,
police effectiveness would be lost to an unproductive merry-go-round
standard requiring probable cause in order to obtain sufficient evidence
to show probable cause to arrest. Since the taking of handwriting exemplars does involve obtaining evidence from the person of a suspect and
since this taking is so intimately tied to a detention restricting the freedom of the person, the taking should first be judicially scrutinized.
In an attempt to resolve the question of whether a court should
distinguish between nontestimonial identification evidence and the more
usual forms of criminal evidence that are objects of police searches,
application of the 1971 GrandJury standard of reasonableness probably
does not provide a standard that will safeguard both the public and the
private interests. The adoption of a strictly limited statutory procedure
similar to proposed Rule 41.1 could possibly protect both public and
private interests. The requirement of a judicial determination of the
reasonableness of the requests of both the grand jury and the police
would insure due process in that an individual would not be subject to
arbitrary contempt citations for noncompliance. This same requirement
of a showing of reasonableness should also be sufficient to prevent any
investigatory dragnet fishing expeditions. Of course if a magistrate
erred, defendants could appeal that decision in the same manner as they
would the issuance of a warrant on less than probable cause. Nevertheless, to effectively safeguard the interests involved, courts should apply
a rule such as proposed Rule 41.1 very carefully, realizing that any
-11d. at 318.
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investigation on a showing of less than probable cause approaches the
outer limit of a permissible governmental intrusion.
KENNETH

R.

KELLER

Criminal Procedure-Free Transcripts for Indigents
In Britt v. North Carolina' the United States Supreme Court, for
only the second time2 since the Griffin v. Illinois3 decision in 1956,
refused to grant an indigent state defendant a free transcript of a prior
proceeding. Following the landmark Griffin case, which held that an
indigent petitioner was entitled to a trdnscript of his trial for use on
direct appeal, the Court had consistently expanded the right of indigents
to free records to include use of a transcript in habeas corpus proceedings,4 appeal of habeas corpus proceedings, 5 and de novo habeas corpus
hearings.' The procedural relationship in Britt was entirely different
from any of the prior transcript cases the Court had heard, for it was a
request for a record of a mistrial for use during the second trial. The
distinctions in the procedures involved could have served as a basis for
the denial of the transcript, but the Court did not rest its decision on
the basis of the difference in procedural posture. Instead the Britt fact
pattern seems to have been forced into the Griffin line of cases in order
to make clear a new policy of more limited application of Griffin in the
future.
Britt had been indicted for first degree murder, and his first trial
had ended in a hung jury. Before the start of the second trial the defendant's attorney had requested a free transcript of the mistrial, but no
particular reason for the request was given other than the defendant's
indigency. The trial court denied the motion, and in a second trial in
the same town Britt was convicted. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding no error in the refusal to grant
192 S. Ct. 431 (1971).

'The only other decision which upheld the denial of a transcript was Norvell v. Illinois, 373
U.S. 420 (1963), where the court reporter for the defendant's trial had died and no one could read

his shorthand notes.
3351 U.S. 12 (1956).
4
Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282 (1970).
'Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (per curiam).
'Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

the transcript. 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to review
the conviction,' but the United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari.9
The Court stated that Griffin has established the principle that "the
State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior
proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective defense or
appeal," 0 and concluded that this principle applied to Britt." However,
the denial of Britt's request was no violation of the Griffin doctrine since
[t]he trial of this case took place in a small town where, according to
petitioner's counsel, the court reporter was a good friend of all the
local lawyers and was reporting the second trial. It appears that the
reporter would at any time have read back to counsel his notes of the
mistrial, well in advance of the second trial, if counsel had simply made
an informal request."2
Decided on the same day as Britt was another free transcript case,
Mayer v. City of Chicago.3 The defendant in Mayer was convicted on
nonfelony charges of disorderly conduct and interfering with a policeman and was fined five hundred dollars. His request for a transcript for
appeal was denied because Illinois provided records only for review of
felony convictions. The Supreme Court held that felony-nonfelony distinctions were "unreasoned" and impermissible, 4 but instead of ordering a transcript for him it remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme
Court to see if alternatives to a full record were available. Mayer is
consistent with Britt in that the disposition was based on the availability
of alternatives, but since the procedural relationship in Mayer was very
close to that in Griffin and since no specific alternative was found in
Mayer, the significant shift in policy by the Court is much less apparent
in Mayer than in Britt.
To understand fully the implications of Britt, it is necessary to look
'State v. Britt, 8 N.C. App. 262, 174 S.E.2d 69 (1970). The court of appeals based its decision
on the fact that the appellant made no showing of any specific errors and they felt that a denial of
this transcript was not a "deprivation of a basic essential of the defendant's defense." Id. at 265,
174 S.E.2d at 71. The United States Supreme Court opinion pointed out that a lack of particular-

ized need is no longer a valid reason for refusing the transcript. 92 S.Ct. at 434,
8277 N.C. 114 (1970) (mem.).

9401 U.S. 973 (1971).
"192 S. Ct. at 433.
"Id.
"Id. at 434-35.
392 S. Ct. 410 (1971).
"Id. at 415.
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briefly at Griffin and its progeny. In Illinois prior to Griffin, appellate
review was unobtainable without a stenographic transcript of the trial,
5 The Court
a fact conceded by the attorneys for the state in Griffin."
ruled that the denial to an indigent of access to the appellate process
because of inability to purchase a transcript, was a violation of due
process since "[p]lainly the ability to pay costs in advance . . could
not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial."1 Moreover, the refusal to grant the defendant a free record violated equal
protection: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must
be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have money
enough to buy transcripts." 7 The Court qualified its holding with an
important caveat: "We do not hold, however, that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot
buy it. The Supreme Court may find other means of affording adequate
and effective appellate review to indigent defendants. For example...
bystanders' bills of exceptions . . . could be used in some cases."'"
The important consideration to the Court in Griffin was that Illinois, by requiring presentation of a trial transcript to the appellate court
as a prerequisite to review, was in effect denying indigents access to the
appellate process entirely. The Court stated that a state was not constitutionally required to provide any appeal procedures, but where it does 9
the procedure could not be administered so as to discriminate against
the poor.2" The Court stressed the importance to a convicted defendant
of this state right to appeal by noting the number of reversals resulting
from the procedure.' The Court felt that a document potentially so
valuable to the defendant must be open to all convicts even if additional
state expenditures for transcripts and appellate tribunals are required.
Following Griffin was Eskridge v. Washington Stare Board of
Prison Terms andParoles22 in which the Court reviewed the 'Washington
appellate process, which required a trial transcript to be submitted as a
precondition for review but which denied a free transcript to an indigent
15351 U.S. at 16.
"Id. at 17-18.
'Iid. at 19.
'lId. at 20.
"Every state now does provide some means of appellate review. Id. at 18.
2Id.
21Id. at 18-19.
-357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam).
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unless the trial judge determined that "justice would be promoted"23
by furnishing it. They labeled free access to appellate review without
financial discriminations a constitutional right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment which Washington, like Illinois in Griffin, had denied the appellant. 4
The Court made a major extension of the free transcript doctrine
in Draperv. Washington 5 by holding that the Constitution requires the
state to furnish an indigent a transcript of his trial for use on appeal
even though appeal is available without it. The Court held that for a
state indigent to get the adequate appeal to which he is entitled the State
must furnish him a "'record of sufficient completeness' for adequate
consideration of the errors assigned." 2
In Long v. District Court" the Court held that an indigent convict
also has a right to sue for his liberty on equal terms with defendants
able to purchase transcripts and that a state infringed upon this right
when it refused to grant the request for a transcript of a habeas corpus
hearing for use in appealing that post-conviction proceeding. As in
Draper, the appellant would not have been denied access to the court
without the transcript; the court simply could not have afforded him as
complete a review without it.
The right to a transcript of a prior proceeding has been extended
to other procedural areas in recent years. In Roberts v. LaVallee,2" it
was held a constitutional violation to deny a defendant a record of a
preliminary hearing for use in preparing for his trial. A similar trans29 where a request for a copy
gression was cited in Gardnerv. California,
of the minutes of a habeas corpus hearing for use at a de novo postconviction proceeding was refused. Williams v. Oklahoma City"0 held
that the right to a transcript for a direct appeal included appeals for
petty offenses. In the last transcript case prior to Britt, Wade v.
Wilson,31 the Court implied that a trial transcript must be provided for
use in preparing a habeas corpus petition, although it reserved decision
on the question pending further lower court inquiries.
2

1d. at 215.
"ld. at 216.
-5372 U.S. 487 (1963).
251d. at 497.
-385 U.S. 192 (1966) (per curiam).
-389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam).
*393 U.S. 367 (1969).
-'395 U.S. 458 (1969) (per curiam).
31396 U.S. 282 (1970).
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While the fact patterns for all the transcript cases prior to Britt
differed, all possessed a common element: without the transcript the
petitioners in each case would effectively be denied a full and complete
judicial proceeding. On direct appeal from trial, for example, which was
the procedure involved in Griffin, Eskridge, and Draper,the appellant
is at a serious disadvantage, for he must overcome a presumption held
by the appellate court that his trial was free of prejudicial error. The
defendant certainly will desire and need a closer examination of the
details of the first proceeding when the presumption at the second proceeding operates to his disadvantage, rather than when the state carries
the burden of proof. In trying to raise and prove possible mistakes
without a record, he faces an almost hopeless task. No one's memory
is good enough to remember all that happened at a trial, especially when
much of the proceeding is beyond the understanding of laymen.
The petitioner for a trial transcript for use in a habeas corpus
proceeding faces a similar presumption that his imprisonment is just.
To free himself he must prove specific trial errors. More time has
usually elapsed between the trial and the post-conviction relief hearing
than between the trial and the direct appeal, so there is an even greater
likelihood that the petitioners will not be able without a record to remember and to present specific trial mistakes to the reviewing body.
The only two cases the Supreme Court has decided that did not
involve use of a transcript at a second proceeding that was a direct
review of a first proceeding were Roberts v. LaVallee,32 the preliminary
hearing case, and Gardner v. California,33 the de novo post-conviction
relief hearing. These two cases are the only ones that exhibit any parallels to the Britt procedural pattern, for the second trial in Britt was not
a review of the first trial. A close look at the similarities between Britt
and these two prior cases, however, reveals that the conduct and decisions of the first proceeding in both Roberts and Gardner were very
importarnt to the subsequent one, which is not the case in Britt. A
preliminary hearing is not a criminal prosecution but simply an inquiry
to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
a prima facie case against the accused. 4 No punishment is inflicted on
the defendant as a result of the findings of the hearing. It is not, how32389 U.S. 40 (1967) (per curiam).

-393
U.S. 367 (1969).
3
People v. Smith, 45 Misc. 2d 265, 256 N.Y.S.2d 422 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1965); People
v. Ehrlich, 14 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Magis. Ct. 1939).
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ever, a neutral proceeding which does not affect the nature of the trial,
for the very purpose of the inquest is to acquaint the accused with the
charges and evidence against him and to examine the weight and credibility of that evidence. Rulings concerning these matters are binding at
trial. The need for a transcript of a preliminary hearing then, is roughly
equivalent to the need for a trial transcript on appeal, especially where
the defendant plans to object to rulings of the hearing judge.
In Gardnerthe indigent, having lost his first habeas corpus hearing,
filed a similar petition in a higher state court for a proceeding de
novo.35 The Court treated the second hearing as an appeal process,
however, stating that the "petitioner carries the burden of convincing
the appellate court that the hearing before the lower court was either
inadequate or that the legal conclusions

. . .

were erroneous." 3 Again

the defendant in this situation is faced with trying to upset a prior
proceeding at a second proceeding, and it is highly improbable that he
can do so without the aid of some type of record. If it were a true de
novo hearing where the results of the first hearing would be irrelevant
at the second hearing, then it is unlikely the Court would find the need
for a transcript of the first proceeding. It is doubtful, however, if there
ever could be a second habeas corpus review which totally ignored the
first review.
The procedural relationship involved in Britt is quite different from
any of the prior cases, because a second trial following a mistrial is a
new trial entirely. The defendant is still entitled to the presumption of
innocence, and nothing that happened at the first trial is binding on the
subsequent proceeding. He is placed in no poorer position as a result of
the mistrial and, in fact, may be in a much better position since most
of the prosecution's case will have been revealed to him. Of course, the
entire defense of the accused may have been revealed to the state also,
but the advantage to the defendant is nonetheless greater. The prosecution still has to carry the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a result, often the prosecution will enter a nolle prosequi after a
mistrial. At any rate, all of the transcript cases prior to Britt involved
consideration by subsequent tribunals of questions raised in or by an
earlier proceeding. In Britt the two trials were independent. For this
reason, the defendant's interest in obtaining a transcript of his mistrial
is so minimal that the federal courts would almost certainly uphold a
11393 U.S. at 368.
uld. at 370.
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state law or ruling that refused to provide such a transcript even if the
defendant were able to pay for it. Although Griffin noted that there is
no absolute due process right to an appeal,3 it is questionable, despite
this dictum in Griffin, whether the Court would countenance the complete and uniform denial of appellate review of a state's criminal proceedings, which undeniably would be the effect of a refusal to provide a
transcript to a defendant for his use on appeal, even if the defendant
were willing to pay for it.
Instead of deciding Britt on the basis of these procedural distinctions and basing the refusal to grant the transcript on the grounds that
no interest of the defendant had been violated, the Court discussed the
case entirely in terms of Griffin and premised the denial on the availability of the adequate alternative. Despite the marked dissimilarity between Britt's request and those of the indigents in prior Supreme Court
cases, the Court seems to have chosen the case to reveal a new policy
in the transcript area. Without overruling Griffin, the Court38 apparently wanted to retard what it deemed to be the somewhat excessively
liberal trend the Court had been following in granting records to almost
anyone who asked, a burden that has become fairly material to the
states.39 The vehicle it used to impose the limitation was the concept
of an alternative. Implicit in the finding of an adequate alternative is a
recognition of the procedural differences.
It is doubtful that the Court was altogether unconscious of the fact
that Britt's need for the document he requested was less demonstrable
than that of prior defendants whose requests had been granted. Nevertheless, it is only by inference that one can interpret the decision as
saying that the alternative is adequate because of the limited nature of
the interest injured by refusing a transcript. Nowhere does the Court
express any relation between the doubtful utility of a transcript to Britt
and the adequacy of the alternative. Rather, the Court seems content
to permit a more disturbing inference: that the alternative is found
adequate because of its essential virtues. In other words, it is possible
to interpret the case as authority for the proposition that where
similar circumstances prevail-where the community is small and
"351 U.S. at 18.
'Britt was a five-to-two decision, Justices Powell and Rehnquist had not taken the oath at
the time of the decision. Justice Marshall wrote the opinion, with Justices Douglas and Brennan

dissenting.
"'In North Carolina it is already approximately $75,000 annually. Brief for Respondent at 8,

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
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there is sufficient familiarity between defense counsel and the court
reporter-the alternative would do service for any transcript, including a transcript to be used to prepare a case for direct appeal.
This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the decision was
rendered in company with Mayer, which was remanded with instructions to determine whether there was an alternative.
After Griffin had established the principle that a state did not have
to buy a transcript in every case if the courts could find equivalent
alternatives," Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles41 and Draper v. Washington 2 reiterated the idea and enumerated a few more possible substitutes-a statement of facts agreed on by
both sides or a full narrative statement prepared from the judge's minutes.43 The court in Long possibly diminished the alternative principle
by saying "[w]e need not consider a possible situation where a transcript
cannot reasonably be made available

. . .

by the State."4 4 Since Long

was a per curiam opinion, arguably this statement should not be given
as much credence and should be confined to the facts of the case. However, the policy of ignoring the possibility of an alternative was continued in Roberts v. LaVallee,45 the preliminary hearing case, which did
not even mention that possibility. The dissenting opinion revealed that
the transcript of the grand jury proceeding was available, but the majority did not even note that fact. In Gardnerv. California" no alternatives
were suggested by the Court other than the memories of the defendant
and his lawyer, and they were held insufficient. One of the most recent
cases, Wade v. Wilson,47 similarly mentioned no alternatives to a transcript.
Britt and Mayer then seem to be major reversals of the trend the
Court had been following. These two cases not only gave lip service to
the idea of alternatives, but actually applied the doctrine. Even in the
pre-Long decisions which had suggested alternatives," none were ever
found acceptable. It is not possible to distinguish the finding of the
4351 U.S. at 16.
41357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam).
42372 U.S. 487 (1963).

11372 U.S. at 495; 357 U.S. at 215.
11385 U.S. at 195.
-389 U.S. 40 (1967).
45393 U.S. 367 (1969).
47396 U.S. 282 (1970).

"Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Eskridge v. State Bd. of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (per curiam); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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alternative in Britt from the failure to find one in Long, Gardner,and
Wade on the basis that the attorneys in Britt pushed the concept: no
was mentioned in either of the briefs submitted in the Britt
substitute
9

case.4

The very tenuous nature of the alternative actually found enforces
idea
that the Court was using Britt to reveal a new policy. Two
the
federal courts of appeals had held that allowing the court reporter to
read to the defense counsel during the second trial any pertinent portions of the minutes of the first trial was a sufficient alternative to a full
transcript. The courts, however, began to realize that the transcript
was valuable not only for impeachment, but also as a discovery instrument. Consequently, the Second Circuit, in United States ex reL Wilson
v. McMann,51 rejected as an adequate alternative the reference to the
minutes of mistrial during the second trial, calling it "too little, too
late.""2 The court in Britt distinguished its holding from Wilson by
stating that the defense attorney could have asked the court reporter to
read the minutes prior to the trial, not during. 3 After Britt, courts may
be more likely to find adequate alternatives in all transcript cases, including those in which the documents are requested in anticipation of
direct appeals and habeas corpus petitions. If the adequacy of the substitute in Britt was a result of the procedural relationship involved, the
Court was certainly not at pains to say so. For this reason the cases may
presage a significant change in policy by the Court.
The nature of the decision in Britt has left open some questions.
The practical availability of this alternative is very questionable. Court
reporters' offices, especially in small towns where the opinion implies
that this alternative will be most relevant, do not have the staff to record
every case and read minutes of prior trials to any attorneys who "informally ask." Problems will arise as to how large the district must be
before it is no longer a valid substitute or how close the relationships
between the reporter and lawyer must be to qualify. Certainly discriminations between the reporter's friends and those whom he does not know
raise equal protection questions. How these questions will be answered
"Brief for Petitioner, Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (197 1); Brief for Respondent, Britt
v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
"'Forsberg v. United States, 351 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 950 (1966);

Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 905 (1964).
51408 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1969).

'lid. at 897.
u92 S. Ct. at 434-35.
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and what the full impact of Britt and Mayer will be, of course, are still
only matters of speculation. Analysis of the decisions does indicate,
however, that indigent defendants are likely to face more opposition
than they have faced in the past to their requests for transcripts for
whatever purpose the transcripts are desired.
E. GRAHAM McGOOGAN, JR.

Criminal Procedure-Restricting Right to Counsel at Lineups
In Kirby v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court confronted

the problem of whether identification evidence is admissible when the
accused was exhibited to identifying witnesses in the absence of counsel
before he had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with a crimi-

nal offense. A sharply divided Court 2 refused to extend the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel3 to preindictment identification confrontations. Thus Kirby considerably restricts the role of counsel in protection
of the pretrial rights of the accused.
A brief examination of the history of the right to counsel clause is
helpful in analyzing Kirby. Beginning with Powell v. Alabama,4 the

Supreme Court construed the sixth amendment guarantee to apply to
"critical stages" of proceedings against an accused.' In Powell, the
Court recognizes that the period from arraignment to trial was "perhaps
the most critical period of the proceedings." 6 Furthermore,in Hamilton
192 S. Ct. 1877 (1972).
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, announced the judgment of the Court. Id. at 1879. Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring statement
on the basis that right to counsel attaches as soon as the accused is formally indicted. Id. at 1883,
Justice Powell filed a statement concurring in the result as he would not extend the Wade-Gilbert
per se exclusionary rule. Id. Justice White dissented on the basis that United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), compelled a reversal. Id. at 1980.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas also dissented on the basis of Wade and
Gilbert. Id. at 1883.
3
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The guarantee states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
4287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
I[T]oday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these
realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment
guarantee to apply to "critical" stages of the proceedings.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
1287 U.S. at 57.
2
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v. Alabama the Court stated: "What happens [at arraignment] may
affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not
then and there asserted . . . . 7 This reasoning was subsequently expanded when the Court held that a defendant's sixth amendment rights
were violated by the use in evidence of incriminating statements, deliberately elicited from him by federal agents, after he had been indicted and
in the absence of his counsel.'
In Escobedo v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court extended
the right to counsel to an accused who had been secretly interrogated
before indictment despite his repeated requests to consult with his attorney. The Court reasoned:
The rule sought by the State here, however, would make the trial
no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the "right to use
counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very hollow thing [if], for all
practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination.".

.

. "One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them

have the most illustrious counsel, now. They can't escape the noose.
There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.' "10
Similarly, in Miranda v. Arizona," the right to counsel was applied to
custodial interrogations in order to protect the privilege against selfincrimination.
On the basis of these precedents and the rationale underlying them,
the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade" and Gilbert v.
California3 held that a postindictment pretrial lineup is a critical stage
7368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961). Hamilton was arraigned without counsel for a capital offense; he
pleaded not guilty but was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. The Court held that
the arraignment is a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings, and absence of counsel at this
critical stage was a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
'Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
9378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo the Court found that the police investigation was no longer
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect. When
that suspect was denied his requests to consult with his attorney and was not warned of his
constitutional right to remain silent, he was denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth
and fourteenth amendments; and no statements extracted by the police during the interrogation
could be used against him at a trial.
"Id. at 487-88.
1384 U.S. 436 (1966). While Escobedo and Miranda involved protection of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, those cases relied on the concept that the sixth amendment right to counsel could be required to safeguard that privilege and other specific guarantees
of the Bill of Rights in order to provide a meaningful defense for the accused. See text accompanying notes 51-52 infra.
12388 U.S. 218 (1967).
13388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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of the prosecution during which the accused is entitled to counsel. 4
Gilbert further held that any "in-court identifications" resulting from a
lineup which violated this constitutional standard were inadmissible
under a per se exclusionary rule. 15 Drawing principally upon the reasoning of Escobedo and Miranda,the Wade Court formulated the controlling principle for determining the necessity of counsel's presence at a
lineup or any other pretrial confrontation:
In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases
requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused
to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right
meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have
effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us to
analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to
help avoid that prejudice.' 6
The Wade Court distinguished lineup proceedings from mere preparatory stages in the gathering of evidence, 7 pointing out the "innumerable dangers and variables" riddling the lineup proceedings' The most
notable dangers cited were the well-known vagaries of eyewitness identi-

fication,19 the victim's possible vindictive motives"0 and the inherent
suggestion, whether intentional or unintentional in the manner in which
the prosecutor presents the suspect to the witness.2' The Court also
recognized that a victim is unlikely to retract a pretrial identification,
thus, in practical effect, determining the issue of identity before trial.22
As in Miranda,2 the Wade Court was concerned with the secrecy
surrounding the proceedings and the inability of the defense to "recon-

struct the manner and mode of lineup identification for judge or jury at
trial.

24

Almost certainly, defense counsel would be unable to expose

"Id. at 272.
01d. at 273.
"388 U.S. at 227 (emphasis by the Court).
"Id. at 227-28. Compare this finding with the Kirby plurality's characterization of the
"showup" as a part of a "routine police investigation." 92 S. Ct. at 1882.
1388 U.S. at 228.

"Id.

"Id.

1Id.

at 230.
at 229.

22d.

21"Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in
fact goes on.
... 384 U.S. at 448.
21388 U.S. at 230.
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possible prejudicial factors, thus depriving the accused of meaningful
cross-examination of those present at the lineup. 25 Applying the established principle to these factors, the Wade Court concluded that the

lineup was no less a critical stage of the prosecupostindictment pretrial L2
tion than the trial itself.

Wade and Gilbert were perhaps unexpected developments in the
pretrial rights of criminal defendants even though the years immediately

preceding those decisions had seen an expansion of those rights. 27 "The
cases. . engendered numerous academic discussions, at times passionate judicial reaction, Congressional legislation, and uncounted cases in
the state and federal courts. 28 In view of the numerous dangers which
were emphasized by the Wade Court, a number of commentators ex-

pected the lower courts to reject a preindictment-postindictment dichotomy when applying Wade and Gilbert.29 In the years following
Wade, the courts formulated a number of exceptions to a blanket imposition of the right to counsel at identification confrontations;30 but, as
predicted, the overwhelming majority of those courts facing the issue
rejected the contention that Wade and Gilbert were to be limited only
3Id. at 230-32.
1Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in
the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since
presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-indictment lineup was a
critical stage of the prosecution at which he was "as much entitled to such aid of counsel
. . . as at the trial itself."
Id. at 236-37 (footnote omitted).
"Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935, 939 (1968) (footnotes omitted):
It is an understatement, of course, to say that the rights of a criminal defendant in pretrial proceedings have expanded greatly in just the last few years. But in no area of the
law was the development quicker, more startling, and perhaps more unexpected than
the recent decisions regarding the right to counsel during pre-trial out-of-court identification procedures and confrontations between suspects and witnesses.
"Comment, The Right to Counsel at Lineups: Wade and Gilbert in the Lower Courts, 36 U.
CR1. L. Rav. 830-31 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
"See, e.g., Recent Developments, ConstitutionalLaw-CriminalProcedure-Applicationof
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel at PretrialIdentification Confrontations, 14 ViLL. L. REv.
535, 537 (1969) and materials cited at 537 n.12.
'See United State v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970) (right to counsel does not apply
to confrontations involving the use of photographs of the suspect); Russell v. United States, 408
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928 (1969) (right to counsel does not apply to onthe-scene confrontations occurring shortly after the crime); People v. Cezarz, 44 II1. 2d 180, 255
N.E.2d 1 (1969) (right to counsel does not apply when suspect is not in custody); State v. Turner,
81 N.M. 571, 469 P.2d 720 (N.M. App. 1970) (right to counsel dos not apply to accidental
confrontations, i.e., those not deliberately arranged by the police).
2

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

to postindictment confrontations." However, in Kirby v. Illinois,32 the
United States Supreme Court refused to apply Wade and Gilbert to a
preindictment identification confrontation.
Petitioner Kirby and a companion, Ralph Bean, were stopped on
a Chicago street by two police officers on February 22, 1968.11 When
asked for identification, Kirby produced a wallet containing traveler's
checks and a Social Security card, all bearing the name of Willie Shard.
Kirby and Bean were arrested and taken to the police station, where the
arresting officers learned from police records that one Willie Shard had
been robbed February 20, 1968. A police car was dispatched to bring
Shard to34 the station, where he identified Kirby and Bean at a
"showup" as his assailants. No attorney was present; Kirby and Bean
had not asked for counsel nor had they been advised of any such right.
Six weeks later, Kirby and Bean were indicted for the robbery and, upon
arraignment, counsel was appointed. A pretrial motion to suppress
Shard's identification testimony was denied. During his testimony,
3
'Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, and Virginia have rejected the application of the right
to counsel to preindictment cases. State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969); Perkins v.
State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969) (per curiam); People v. Palmer, 41 111. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173
(1969); State v. Crossman, 464 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. 1971); State v. Waters, 457 S.W.2d 817 (Mo.
1970); Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 664, 173 S.E.2d 792 (1970).
Thirteen states have applied Wade and Gilbert to preindictment confrontations. People v.
Fowler, I Cal. 3d 335, 461 P.2d 643, 82 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1969); State v. Singleton, 253 La. 18, 215
So. 2d 838 (1968); Palmer v. State, 5 Md. App. 691, 249 A.2d 482 (1969); Commonwealth v.
Guillory, 356 Mass. 591, 254 N.E.2d 427 (1970); People v. Hutton, 21 Mich. App. 312, 175 N.W.2d
860 (1970); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134,451 P.2d 704, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 893 (1969); State
v. Wright, 274 N.C. 84, 161 S.E.2d 581 (1968); State v. Isaacs, 24 Ohio App. 2d 115, 265 N.E.2d
327 (1970); Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970); In re Holley,-R.I.-,
268 A.2d 723 (1970); Martinez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); State v. Hicks,
76 Wash. 2d 80, 455 P.2d 943 (1969); Hayes v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 93, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970).
Every United States Court of Appeals confronting the issue has applied Wade and Gilbert to
preindictment confrontations. Wilson v. Gaffney, 454 F.2d 142 (10th Cir. 1972); Virgin Islands v.
Callwood, 440 F.2d 1206 (3rd Cir. 1971); United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Cooper v. Picard, 428 F.2d 1351 (Ist Cir. 1970); United States v. Phillips, 427 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Ayers, 426 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Broadhead, 413 ,F.2d
1351 (7th Cir. 1969); Rivers v. United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968).
3292 S. Ct. 1877 (1972).
"Petitioner and Bean were stopped because the police officers thought petitioner fit the
description of a man named "Hampton" wanted for an unrelated criminal offense. Id. at 1879 n.l.
"Petitioner and Bean, who were black (Brief for Petitioner at 5), were seated at a desk
between two white police officers in uniform when Shard entered the room. Shard had been asked
previously by the officer who brought him to the station if he had been robbed and if he could
make an identification. He answered affirmatively. When he entered the room Shard saw the two
defendants seated at the desk, and he pointed them out as his assailants. All of this took place
several hours after the arrest. Id. at 1883 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Shard described his identification of the two men at the police station
and identified them again in the courtroom. Both defendants were found
guilty and Kirby's conviction was affirmed on appeal. 5 In holding that
Shard's testimony was admissible, the Illinois Court of Appeals relied
upon an earlier decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, People v.
Palmer,6 which held that the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule
was not applicable to preindictment confrontations.
In affirming the decision of the Illinois Court of Appeals, the
United States Supreme Court reviewed the line of cases stemming from
Powell v. Alabama.37 From these cases, the plurality drew the rule that
"a person's Sixth and Fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches
only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him." 38 Although they recognized that the defendant's
right to counsel is not limited to assistance at trial,39 the plurality
pointed out that the cases reviewed "involved points of time at or after
the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings." 4 Escobedo
and Miranda were distinguished as cases primarily protecting the privilege against self-incrimination, not the right to counsel as such.4
According to the plurality, adversary judicial criminal proceedings
are initiated "by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment.

' 42

Only upon the initiation of such crimi-

nal proceedings does the government become an adversary committed
to prosecute. Not until then is the defendant "faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized. society, and immersed in the intricacies of
substantive and procedural criminal law." 43 The plurality emphasized
-"People v. Kirby, 121 Ill. App. 2d 323, 257 N.E.2d 589 (1970). Bean's conviction was
reversed. People v. Bean, 121 II1. App., 2d 332, 257 N.E.2d 562 (1970).
-41 Ill. 2d 571, 244 N.E.2d 173 (1969).
-287 U.S. 45 (1932).
3sKirby v. Illinois, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 1881 (1972).
'"[D]uring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial,
when consultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important,

the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as
much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself."
Id. at 1882 n.6, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
4092 S. Ct. at 1882.
1

'"[T]he 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel
as such, but, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against selfincrimination.'" Id.
421d.
431d
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that the situation in Kirby was only "a routine police investigation"
until the commencement of the "'criminal prosecutions' to which alone
the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.""
In reaching the decision in Kirby, the plurality asserted that they
declined to depart from the rationale of Wade and Gilbert that "an
accused is entitled to counsel at any 'critical stage of the prosecution,'
and that a postindictment lineup is such a 'critical stage.' "IsYet, as
noted above," a great majority of the lower courts found the reasoning
of Wade equally applicable to preindictment identification confrontations." A number of the opinions point out that the real concern of the
Wade Court was the danger of suggestiveness and the difficulty in recreating the facts of the confrontation at trial which would hamper
effective cross-examination." Particularly instructive are the statements
of the Tenth Circuit in Wilson v. Gaffney:"
Although the many potential ramifications of the Wade-Gilbert
rule remain to be judicially explored we consider it certain that the
rationale of the cases extends beyond the particular facts of those cases
... . [S]urely the assistance of counsel, now established as an absolute post-indictment right does not arise or attach because of the return
of an indictment. The confrontation of a lineup, said to be "peculiarly
riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might
seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial," cannot have a
constitutional distinction based upon the lodging of a formal charge.
Every reason set forth by the Supreme Court in Wade

. .

. for the

assistance of counsel post-indictment has equal or more impact when
projected against a pre-indictment atmosphere.
The Kirby plurality's attempt to distinguish Escobedo and Miranda
as cases primarily protecting the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is also difficult to reconcile with the reasoning
"Id.
11d. at 1883 (emphasis by the Court).
"See note 31 supra.
"7See, e.g., Long v. United States, 424 F.2d 799, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1969): "Although Wade arose
in the context of a formal post-indictment line-up, we find its requirement of counsel equally
applicable to the informal, pre-arrest confrontation of appellant which took place in the squad
room."

1s"We characterized in Long the Supreme Court's rationale in Wade to be that of the difficulty
attendant upon accurately reconstructing the exact circumstances of the pretrial confrontation and
the useful role which counsel can play not only in that process but in suggesting procedures which
might render the confrontation legally unassailable thereafter." United States v. Greene, 429 F.2d
193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

"454 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1972) (footnote omitted).
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of Wade. In Rivers v. United States, 0 the Fifth Circuit asserted that
"with Miranda on the books, it is indisputable that most, perhaps all,
confrontations occurring after arrest will fall within the rules announced
in Wade and Gilbert." The Wade Court recognized that "nothing decided or said in the opinions in the cited cases links the right to counsel
only to protection of Fifth Amendment rights."' 51 Instead, Wade declared, Escobedo and Miranda reaffirmed the principle "that in addition
to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not
stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or
informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from
5' 2
the accused's right to a fair trial.
The questionable logic of the plurality opinion in Kirby is further
underscored when one analyzes the particular confrontation involved. 3
A showup has been described as "the most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police,"54 yet the identification
confrontation in Kirby was characterized as no more than part of a
routine police investigation.
It should be logically apparent that those factors which make a
pretrial lineup a critical stage of the prosecution exist at a preindictment
as well as a postindictment identification confrontation. "5 The investigation in Kirby already had focused upon particular suspects in the custody of the police. The circumstances surrounding the confrontaton
would seem to indicate to the witness that the police believed that Kirby
and Bean were the guilty parties. Had counsel been present, he could
have at least requested that Kirby and Bean be exhibited to the witness
in an identification parade where the witness would have been required
to identify each man individually." As it was, the issue of identity was
"400 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1968).
"388 U.S. at 226.
52Id.
0For a description of the identification confrontation in Kirby see note 34 supra. "In the
setting of a police station squad room where all present except petitioner and Bean were police
officers, the danger was quite real that Shard's understandable resentment might lead him too
readily to agree with the police that the pair under arrest, and the only persons exhibited to him,

were indeed the robbers." 92 S. Ct. at 1887 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5"p. WALL, EYE-WvITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 28 (1965).
"In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378U.S. 478 (1964), the State argued that Escobedo had no right to
call his attorney prior to an in-custody interrogation since he was not formally indicted. The Court
stated: "It would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel, under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of the interrogation, the authorities had secured a formal
indictment." Id. at 486.
""The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and
not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned." Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
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determined before trial"7 without counsel's protective presence. 8
The Wade Court attempted to assure a meaningful defense for the
accused.5 1 In contrast, the plurality in Kirby emphasized "the interest
of society in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved
crime. '"" By limiting the right to counsel to postindictment confrontatons, the Kirby holding may considerably dampen further expansion of
the protection by counsel of the criminal defendant's pretrial rights.
Protection of those rights is now, for the most part, dependent on the
guarantees of procedural due process embodied in the fifth and fourteenth amendments.61 It would seem that the role of counsel, before the
initiation of formal judicial proceedings, is to be limited to the
Escobedo-Miranda situations where the privilege against selfincrimination is endangered."2 More importantly, the rationale underly57
On direct examination, Shard identified Kirby and Bean as the pair he saw in the police
station squad room, not as the alleged robbers on trial in the courtroom. 92 S. Ct. at 1888
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
uSome commentators have argued that counsel may serve no significant purpose at a lineup
other than that of a witness or observer; that the police, and not counsel, are in charge of the
identification procedure. See Read, Lawyers at Lineups: ConstitutionalNecessity or Avoidable
Extravagance?, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 339 (1969); Note, Right to Counsel at Pre-trialLineup, 63
Nw. U.L. REv. 251 (1968); Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE L.J. 390 (1967).
However, one can argue that there is no reason to assume that the police will be uncooperative
with counsel and ignore his suggestions as a general rule. His role and effectiveness may not be so
limited as some commentators suggest. See, e.g., Recent Developments, 14 VILL. L. REV., supra
note 29, at 541:
[H]is presence at the initial confrontation between the witness and the suspect does
afford him a greater capacity to effectively cross-examine the identifying witnesses at
trial. Since in-court identifications are normally the highpoint of a criminal trial, any
information obtained at a pretrial confrontati6n which can be used to shake the credibility of an identifying witness is invaluable to the defense. Moreover, if the suspect was
unaware of the unfairness of the initial identification procedure, or chooses not to testify
because of a prior criminal record, counsel is available to testify in his behalf.
59
1"The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel's assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful 'defence.'" 388 U.S. at 224-25.
'192 S. Ct. at 1883.
"What has been said is not to suggest that there may not be occasions during the
course of a criminal investigation when the police do abuse identification procedures.
Such abuses are not beyond the reach of the Constitution. . .. The Due Process Clause
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.
Id.
Whether or not there was a deprivation of due process in the particular circumstances of Kirby
was not considered in view of the limited grant of certiorari. That question was left open for inquiry
in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at 1883 n.8.
"Both Kirby and Wade held that the constitutional privilege against compulsory selfincrimination was in no way implicated in the particular identification proceedings before the
Court. Id. at 1881.
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ing Escobedo and Mirandawas not afforded even a cursory examination
by the plurality. Yet, Wade specifically relied upon those decisions in
establishing the controlling constitutional principle63 for the applicability of the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel at pretrial
confrontations. 4 Apparently that guiding principle has now been rejected. In its place, Kirby has established an illogical, inflexible formula
based on a preindictment-postindictment dichotomy, a formula severely
limiting counsel's role in pretrial proceedings in the future.
MICHAEL

E. KELLY

Federal Jurisdiction-Citizenship of the Beneficiary Controls in Wrongful Death Actions Requiring a Resident Administrator
Administrators have traditionally been viewed as the real party in
interest whose citizenship is determinative in diversity jurisdiction. In a
recent wrongful death action, Miller v. Perry,1 the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit sustained the validity of state statutes requiring such
actions to be brought by a resident administrator, but held that the
citizenship of the beneficiaries controls diversity.
In Miller, a minor citizen of Florida had died in North Carolina,
allegedly through the negligence of the Perrys, North Carolina citizens.
Since the minor died intestate, his father was appointed administrator
of his estate in Florida. Mr. Miller subsequently brought an action in
his representative capacity against the Perrys in a federal district court
in North Carolina under the state's wrongful death act. 2 This action was
dismissed because North Carolina law requires in-state assets to be
administered by a resident administrator.3 The state supreme court had
previously held that a wrongful death action was an asset of the deceased in the county where the death occurred. 4 The decedent's grandfather, a resident of North Carolina, was then appointed ancillary administrator, and a second action was brought by him in the district court
"See text accompanying note 16 supra.
61492
S. Ct. at 1884 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966). For the provision itself, see note 34 infra.
3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-8 (1966) provides in pertinent part: "The clerk shall not issue letters
of administration or letters testamentary to any person who, at the time of appearing to qualify-. . . (2) Is a nonresident of this State; but a nonresident may qualify as executor."
'Vance v. Southern Ry., 138 N.C. 460, 50 S.E. 860 (1905).
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with the father joining as principal administrator. This action was also
dismissed, on the ground that the resident administrator was the real
party in interest and thus, no diversity of citizenship was present. The
Fourth Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the citizenship of the
beneficiaries should be controlling.'
If the Supreme Court decision in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling
Co.' were no longer viable, then the Fourth Circuit reasoned that it was
free to determine for itself who was the real party in interest. In Mecom,
an Oklahoma administratrix, suing for the wrongful death of her husband against a Louisiana defendant, was unable to prevent removal to
the federal court but was allowed a voluntary dismissal. She then secured the appointment of a Louisiana citizen as administrator, who
promptly appointed her his Oklahoma delegate. She refiled the action
in his name in the Oklahoma state court. Defendant was again successful in having the action removed; a motion to remand was denied, and
after a trial on the merits, defendant received a judgment in his favor.,
The Supreme Court, however, held that the motion to remand had been
erroneously denied, since the citizenship of the administrator, the real
party in interest, was the same as that of defendant, and thus no diversity was present.'
Mecom rested on the assumption that the duties and responsibilities of an administrator are such as to always make him the real party
in interest:
[w]here an administrator is required to bring the suit under a statute
giving a right to recover for death by wrongful act, and is, as here,
charged with the responsibility for the conduct or settlement of such
suit and the distribution of its proceeds to the persons entitled under
the statute, and is liable upon his official bond for failure to act with
diligence and fidelity, he is the real party in interest and his citizenship,
rather than that of the beneficiaries, is determinative of federal jurisdiction
Furthermore, as a corollary to this rule, the Court implied that an
inquiry behind the appointment for the purpose of determining whether
in fact the duties and responsibilities of the administrator are such as
1456 F.2d at 68.
6284 U.S. 183 (1931).
'Id. at 184-85.
"Id.at 190.
1d. at 186.
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to make him the real party in interest would amount to a collateral
attack denigrating the state decree.' 0
Mecom dealt with the use of collusion in appointing an administrator to defeat diversity while Miller involved the reluctant appointment
of a resident administrator for the sole purpose of complying with state
law." The distinction is not controlling, however. The main thrust of the
Mecom decision is that where an administrator is validly appointed by
a state court and the state law clothes him with actual duties so that
his appointment is not just nominal, then for purposes of federal jurisdiction he is the real party, and there can be no inquiry into whether he
is actually exercising these duties.
The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity since its decision
in Mecom forty years ago to resolve the question of whether an administrator with such duties as those possessed in Miller is still to be considered the real party in interest. That it would still uphold that decision
seems highly doubtful in light of the trend of decisions since Kramer v.
Caribbean Mills, Inc." In Kramer, the Supreme Court had to decide
whether the validity under state law of an assignment made in an attempt to invoke diversity jurisdiction was determinative as to whether
federal jurisdiction was present. The Court held that the validity of the
assignment made no difference since "the existence of federal jurisdiction is a matter of federal, not state, law." 13 Whether a federal court
could look behind a state order of appointment was not decided by
Kramer; rather, it left the matter open for a later decision." Kramerdid,
however, note some possible distinctions between the use of assignments
and appointments that might make an inquiry into the appointment
impermissible as amounting to a collateral attack on the state decree:
Cases involving representatives vary in several respects from those in
which jurisdiction is based on assignments:. . . under state law, different kinds of guardians and administrators may possess discrete sorts
of powers; and . . . all such representatives owe their appointment to
111d.
at 189. In Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928), the Supreme Court, in holding that the dissolution and

reincorporation of a company in another state in order to obtain diversity jurisdiction was valid,
stated that "[t]he succession and transfer were actual, not feigned or merely colorable. In these

circumstances, courts will not inquire into motives when deciding concerning their jurisdiction."
"1456 F.2d at 66.
12394 U.S. 823 (1969).

"Id. at 829.
"Id. at 828 n.9.
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the decree of a state court rather than solely to an action of the par-

ties."5
Decisions reached by the lower courts have since shown that the
distinctions enumerated in Kramer were inconsequential. In McSparran
v. Weist,"6 the Third Circuit held collusive the appointment of a nonresident guardian to prosecute a personal injury action for a resident minor.
In doing so, the court stated that it was not collaterally attacking an
order of the state probate court by refusing recognition to the guardian's
citizenship. "Guardian he remains, but since he is acting in the capacity
of a straw party we refuse to recognize his citizenship for purposes of
determining diversity jurisdiction." 7
In Lester v. McFaddon,l8 the Fourth Circuit held collusive the
appointment of a nonresident administrator in a wrongful death action
where both the defendant and the statutory beneficiaries were residents
of the same state. In considering whether an inquiry behind the administrator's appointment would be a collateral attack on the state decree,
the court pointed out that the decree itself was not under attack since
there is no interference with the capacity of the administrator to maintain the action in the proper court. 9 Other courts have reached the same
20
result.
Paralleling the decisions in Kramer, McSparran, and Lester has
been the increased criticism of the basic foundation of Mecom that the
administrator possesses such responsibilities that the federal court must
consider him the real party in interest. The historical view has been that
although nominal or formal parties can be disregarded, 21 the party having the legal right to sue and to represent those having beneficial interests is the real party in interest whose citizenship is determinative for
purposes of diversity.22 Thus, it was early determined that diversity was
5

1d.

1"402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
11id. at 874.
1415 F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969).

11Id. at 1105.
"E.g., Green v. Hale, 433 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030
(2d Cir. 1969).
"See, e.g., Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U.S. 490, 491-92 (1884); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Phillips, 176 F. 663, 666-69 (9th Cir. 1910).
22See, e.g.. Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 421 (1823); Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306 (1808). This definition has led to some confusion and produced some
results which base their determination on capacity to sue. Eg., Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325 (3d
Cir. 1955); Meehan v. Central R.R., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See generally 3A J.
17.04, at 119-120 (2d ed. 1970).
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
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present in suits by or against administrators if they were citizens of
different states, although diversity would not have been present for their
intestate decedents.2 3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a), incorporating these holdings, expressly states that the action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest and lists administrators and
executors as examples 24 of those who may sue in their own name without
joining the beneficiaries in the action.
The impetus for the current criticism of the real party rule came
from the holding in Kramer that federal diversity jurisdiction is a question of federal law. As one court pointed out, "[w]hile a state may of
course define and encourage certain fiduciary relationships, the characterization and effect of those relationships for the purposes of federal
diversity jurisdiction is a federal question. ' 25 The Third Circuit in
McSparran, in dealing with the real party rule set down in Rule 17,
stated that "[t]he focus of the rule is on capacity to sue, and it does not
purport to establish standards for the determination of diversity of citizenship. Indeed, as Rule 82 expressly states, the rules do not affect the
jurisdiction of district courts. '2 On this same issue, the Fourth Circuit
in Lester stated:
Under Rule 17 . . .the administrator is expressly authorized to
bring suit in his own name without joining the beneficiaries. Procedurally he is the real party in interest. The rule is but a restatement of a
well established doctrine, for it was held very early that an administrator was the real party in interest in the sense of entitlement to proceed
in his own name. . . .It was in that sense that Mecom held that the
administrator was the real party . . . .
Similarly, it has been stated that Rule 17(a) concerns only "the proper
entitlement of an action. '28 Indeed, some commentators, have suggested
that it would be better to discard the rule since the rules dealing with
capacity to sue and joinder cover the situation just as well and less
29
confusingly.
2'Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642 (1823).
"See lED. R. Civ. P. 17(a), Advisory Committee Notes on the 1966 Amendment.
z'O'Brien v. Avco Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1034 (2d Cir. 1969).
28402 F.2d at 870. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in pertinent part: "These rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts .
"415 F.2d at 1105.
z'Allen v. Baker, 327 F. Supp. 706, 710 (N.D. Miss. 1968).
2
1See Kennedy, FederalRule 17(a): Will the Real Party in Interest PleaseStand?, 51 MINN.
L. REv. 675, 724 (1967). See also Atkinson, The Real Party in Interest Rule: A Plea for Its
Abolition, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 926 (1957).
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In Davis v. Carabo,0 a South Carolina district court went even
farther in its criticism of the historical rule. In this wrongful death
action, the decedent, the beneficiaries, and defendants were all citizens
of South Carolina, but plaintiff, the administrator for the decedent
appointed in South Carolina, was a resident of North Carolina. 3' The
court held that where the administrator had no direct financial interest
personal to him, his citizenship is not controlling; instead, the court
stated that it would look to the citizenship of the beneficiaries. 3 The
court pointed out, however, that if the administrator had been one of
the beneficiaries, then, as such, his citizenship would have been controlling.3 Thus, that court rejected the old rule that the duties and responsibilities of the administrator are enough in themselves to make him a
real party. To be a real party for purposes of diversity, he must have a
personal interest.
The cases since Mecom have demonstrated that the administrator
is not per se the real party in interest; instead, the courts have examined
his duties and responsibilities before making any determination as to
whose citizenship should determine diversity. In Miller, the minor had
died intestate; consequently, any property he had in Florida would have
been distributed in that state under the supervision of his father as
principal administrator. If there had been no recovery in the wrongful
death action, the resident administrator would never have anything to
do. If there had been a recovery, his only duty would have been to
receive the funds, pay from them only those claims of creditors for
funeral or medical expenses which occurred as a result of the fatal
injury, and disburse the rest according to the intestate succession statutes. 34 He, of course, would have had a fiduciary duty to press the
-50 F.R.D. 468 (D.S.C. 1970).
3
1ld.
32d.
331d. at 468-69. Compare Farrell v. Ducharme, 310 F. Supp. 254 (D. Vt. 1970) (appointment
of nonresident uncle as guardian not collusive), with Butler v. Colfelt, 313 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (appointment of nonresident aunt as guardian collusive).
31N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1966) provides in pertinent part:
When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act. . . such as would, if the injured
party had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the person or
corporation that would have been so liable, and his or their executors, administrators,
collectors or successors shall be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by the
executor, administrator or collector of the decedent. . . .The amount recovered in such
action is not liable to be applied as assets, in the payments of debts or legacies, except
as to burial expenses of the deceased, and reasonable hospital and medical expenses not
exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) incident to the injury resulting in death . ..
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litigation to a conclusion, but by the very nature of his appointment he
could hardly have been expected to exercise any effective supervision
over the conduct of the litigation by the principal administrator or his
lawyers. Consequently, the Miller court concluded that when an administrator is required by state law, but his duties are limited, the citizenship
of the beneficiaries controls diversity.35 At the same time, however, the
court upheld the North Carolina rule requiring a resident administrator
to prosecute a wrongful death action, recognizing a valid state interest
36
in such a statute.
In light of the problem created by the use of artificial devices to
create or defeat diversity, the American Law Institute has proposed a
statutory change that would severely curtail such action.3 7 Proposed
section 1301(b)(4) 31 "is designed to prevent either the creation or the
defeat of diversity jurisdiction by the appointment of a representative
having a different citizenship from the decedent, infant, or incompetent
he is appointed to represent."3 This proposal would attribute to the
representative the citizenship of the decedent. "Thus in an action where
a decedent and potential adversary are of different citizenship, it will
become impossible to defeat diversity jurisdiction by appointing an
administrator of the same citizenship as the adversary.""
This proposal has received praise from the courts.4 As Miller
stated:
It proposes a more satisfactory solution. . . . [The] proposal would
avoid problems which may arise if the beneficiaries are of diverse
citizenship or if their citizenship is different from that of their decedent
... . Its rule is one which may be simply
and economically adminis42
tered to reach a rational conclusion.
but [the amount recovered] shall be disposed of as provided in the Intestate Succession
Act.
2456 F.2d at 67.
3
*1d. at 68. For a general treatment of the problem of allowing a foreign representative to
sue in wrongful death actions see Kennedy, FederalCivil Rule 17(b) and (c): Qualifying to Litigate

in FederalCourt, 43
"ALI
(1969).

NOTRE DAME LAW.

273, 295-300 (1968).

STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

11Id. at I.

111d. at 117.
0
11d. at 119.

"E.g., Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763, 767 (5th Cir. 1970); O'Brien v. Avco
Corp., 425 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (2d Cir. 1969); Lester v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1106 (4th Cir.
1969). But see Frank, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 S.C.L. REV. 677
(1965).
42456 F.2d at 68.
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One commentator, however, has questioned whether proposed section
1301(b)(4) eliminates more diversity than it should. For example, in a
situation where the beneficiaries are all nonresidents and are prosecuting the action, but the decedent was a resident, the proposed statute
would deny the nonresidents federal jurisdiction.43
Diversity jurisdiction is meant to protect the out-of-state citizen
from local bias.44 However, this bias is still present when an action is
prosecuted by a resident personal representative. The parties that will
benefit from a recovery cannot be hidden from the court and jury.
Furthermore, the representative's duties and responsibilities are only
meant to insure that the administration of an estate is competently and
diligently completed. Such duties by themselves do not give the administrator any real economic interest other than that which arises from his
legal relationship with the estate. This legal relationship has led to the
rule that only the personal representative has capacity to sue or be sued.
This determination, however, should not be controlling as to the real
party in interest.
Since the duties of the administrator do not make him a real party,
only those persons who have a direct, personal interest in the outcome
should be considered the parties with the real interest. As was held in
Miller, the citizenship of the beneficiaries, rather than that of the administrator or of the decedent, should control diversity. Such a determination insures that federal jurisdiction will be invoked only when necessary
to protect the party whose personal interest in the suit might be prejudiced by the presence of local bias.
L. JAMES BLACKWOOD

Uniform Commercial Code-The Standard of Good Faith for Merchant
Buyers Under Section 9-307(1)
A new aspect to the continuing controversy over applying sections
of article 2 (Sales) of the Uniform Commercial Code to article 9 (Secured Transactions) has recently been examined by the Delaware Supreme Court in the case of Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp.' The
43

Kennedy, supra note 29, at 720.

'4This has been the historical view for why diversity jurisdiction originated. E.g., Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 67 (1809). See generally Frank, HistoricalBases
of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1948). But see Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928).
'290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972).
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issue faced by the court was whether or not to apply the article 2
definition of good faith for a merchant buyer to an article 9 transaction.
The court decided that there was no basis for a "crossover" between the
articles. This note will examine the effects of applying the general definition of good faith found in article 1 to merchant buyers involved in
article 9 transactions and will look at the significance of the above
decision on the continuing controversy over applying article 2 sections
2
to article 9 transactions.
The Sherrock case involved an action for wrongful seizure of two
automobiles by a secured creditor. Plaintiffs, Robert and Edward Sherrock, were partners in an automobile dealership. They purchased two
cars from a second dealer, Dover Motors, who sold the cars in violation
of a security agreement it had with defendant, Commercial Credit Corporation. Commercial Credit discovered that Dover Motors was selling
numerous cars "out of trust ' 3 and repossessed all of Dover's inventory,
including the two cars sold to the Sherrock brothers. Thereafter the
Sherrocks brought an action for wrongful seizure of the two cars by
Commercial Credit. The lower court found that the transaction was
governed by section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 4 which
protects a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" by allowing the
buyer to take free of a security interest created by his seller even though
the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of
its existence.5 A "buyer in the ordinary course of business" is defined
as a person who "in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to
him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third
party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business
of selling goods of that kind . ..

."I

In interpreting this definition, the lower court found that the Sherrocks had paid value for the automobiles and were without actual
knowledge that the sale to them was in violation of any security agreement. The only question left was whether they exercised good faith in
'For a discussion on the controversy dealing with the application of article 2 sections to article
9 transactions see Comment, UnconscionableSecurity Agreements: Application of Section 2-320
to Article 9, I1 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 128 (1969).
'Selling an item "out of trust" means that a seller who is under a security agreement has
failed to pay the inventory financier with the proceeds of the sale to the buyer.
'Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (opinion giving

judgment for defendant).
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 9-307(l),

Pamphlet 1970) [hereinafter cited as UCC].

GUCC § 1-201(9).

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 5A, § 9-307(1) (Spec. UCC
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the transaction. Since the Sherrocks were merchant buyers, the lower
court applied the sales definition of good faith, which not only includes
the requirement of "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned '7 found in article 1,but also includes "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."8 The lower
court reasoned that "[i]f the standard of good faith is to have meaning
in Article 9 with regard to merchants, it should not vary with that
applied to merchants under Article 2." 9 Expert testimony at the trial
indicated that payment by a dealer for new cars before actual receipt
of the cars was both an unusual and unreasonable procedure in the
automobile industry even where the dealers had dealt with each other
before, but that the practice in the instant case was even more unusual
and unreasonable because the dealers involved had not dealt with each
other in the past.'0 Also, the fact that the Sherrocks paid for the cars
without a firm delivery date was said to be unreasonable conduct in the
industry.'" In light of the Sherrocks' commercially unreasonable conduct, the trial court found for Commercial Credit."
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed,' 3 rejecting the "reasonable commercial standard of fair dealing" test of good faith under
article 2 in favor of the "honesty in fact" test found in article 1. The
court reasoned that there was no justification for a "crossover" between
article 2 and article 9 because there was no reference in section 9-307(1)
to article 2 for the definition of good faith. 4 In fact, the definitional
section of article 9 refers expressly to article 1 for general definitions
applicable throughout the article. 5 The court also noted that there was
a direct reference by section 9-307(1) to article 1 for the definition of
"buyer in the ordinary course of business." In addition, the "Definitional Cross References" in the Delaware Study Comment referred to
article 1 for definitions not found in section 9-307(1) and contained no
similar reference to article 2.16
7

UCC § 1-201(19).
RUCC § 2-103(I)(b).
'Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 269 A.2d 407, 409 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970) (opinion
denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment).
1277 A.2d at 712.
'Id. at 712-13.
"Id. at 713.
11290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972).
"Id. at 651.
"3UCC § 9-105(4).
lUCC § 9-307(1), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5A, § 9-307(l) (Spec. UCC Pamphlet 1970), Delaware Study Comment.
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The court noted that there was an express limitation in article 2 of
the definitions found therein including the sales definition of good
faith.17 Since section 2-102 delineates the scope of the sales article, it is
assumed that this is the express limitation to which the court was referring. Section 2-102 makes the sales article applicable to "transactions
in goods" and excludes any transactions which "although in the form
of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate
only as a security transaction .

. . ."

The court also referred to the

official Code comment explaining the definition of good faith in article
1, which indicated that the sales definition of good faith applies only to
article 2.18 The comment provides that whenever "good faith" is used
in the Code, it means at least "honesty in fact," but in certain articles,
such as the article on sales, additional standards are required. 9
The dissent in the Sherrock case avoided the issue of whether the
sales definition of good faith should be applied to an article 9 transaction by arguing that the Sherrocks did not come within the definition
of "buyer in the ordinary course of business" because they were merchant buyers. According to the dissent, a buyer in the ordinary course
of business under section 9-307(1) "must be a purchaser riot familiar
with usages of automobile dealers dealing with each other.120 The Sherrocks, as merchant buyers, could not qualify under section 9-307(1);
thus, their conduct should be governed by the standards for merchant
buyers set out in section 2-103(l)(b). 2 1 Analyzing the case as one between two innocent parties, the dissent found Commercial to be the
more innocent party due to the unreasonable conduct
of Sherrocks.
22
Consequently, the Sherrocks should bear the loss.
The Sherrock court cited a 1970 Texas case, Associates Discount
Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc.,23 as authority for its decision. 24 This
case had a fact pattern similar to the Sherrock case in that an automobile dealer purchased some cars from a second dealer who was under a
security agreement with a finance corporation and was selling the cars
"out of trust." The Texas Supreme Court held that an automobile
dealer who was a merchant buyer may be a "buyer in the ordinary
11290 A.2d at 651.
"1290 A.2d at 651 n.2, citing UCC § 1-201(19), Comment 19.

'PUCC § 1-201(19), Comment 19.
2290 A.2d at 652.
",d.
22d. at 651-52.
2462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970).
2290 A.2d at 651.
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course of business" under section 9-307(1). However, the court failed
to answer the question of how a merchant buyer becomes a buyer in the
even reach the issue of what
ordinary course and, therefore, did not 25
applied.
be
should
faith
good
of
standard
In two other cases, Hemstead Bank v. Andy's Car Rental System,
2
Inc.," and Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc.,2 it was held that a
merchant buyer could qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course under
section 9-307(1) and that the sales definition of good faith was applicable. In Hemstead, an automobile leasing and rental company sold thirteen cars to the defendant, an automobile wholesaler, in violation of a
security financing arrangement it had with the plaintiff bank. In discussing the standard of good faith for a buyer in the ordinary course under
section 9-307(1), the court stated that the sales definition of good faith
was controlling." In Bank of Utica, a defendant automobile dealer
purchased a car from a second dealer who sold the car in violation of a
security financing agreement it had with the plaintiff bank. Again, in
arriving at the decision, the court applied the standard of good faith
found in section 2-103(l)(b) of the sales article. In neither of the above
cases, however, did the court examine whether or not the Code could
be interpreted to allow "cross-over" between article 2 and article 9;
instead, each applied the sales definition of good faith as a matter of
course.
In determining whether the article 2 definition of good faith should
be applied to article 9, the court in Sherrock used an approach which
emphasizes strict interpretation of the Code. Since the court did not find
any express references in the definitional cross references or the comments to section 9-307(1) and because the language in section 2-102
seems to limit sales definitions to article 2, the court could not find any
justification for "crossover." To fully understand the significance of the
court's approach, it may be helpful to examine the method of interpretation which should be applied to the Code. The Code is said to be a
"true" code and therefore differs significantly from an ordinary statute
"3Note, Automobiles-Certificates of Title-Status of Vendee Who Purchases Used Car
Without a Certificate of Title, 2 TEX. TECH L. REv. 288, 289 & n.8 (1970). See generally Note,
The Uniform Commercial Code and Texas Certificateof Title Act Are in Pari Materla, 25 Sw.
L.J. 499 (1971).
235 App. Div. 2d 35, 312 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1970).

2136 App. Div. 2d 6, 317 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1971). This case was cited by the court in theSherrock
decision. 290 A.2d at 651.
2135 App. Div. 2d at _
236 App. Div. 2d at _,

312 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
317 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
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in terms of method of interpretation." Professor Hawkland, a widely
respected scholar in the area of commercial law, has stated:
A "code" is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment
of a whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other
law in its subject area save only that which the code excepts. It is
systematic in that all of its parts, arranged in an orderly fashion and
stated with a consistent terminology, form an interlocking, integrated
body, revealing its own plan and containing its own methodology. It
is comprehensive in that it is sufficiently inclusive and independent to
enable it to be administered in accordance with its own basic policies.
A mere statute, on the other hand, is neither pre-emptive, systematic, nor comprehensive, and therefore, its methodology is different
3
from that of a code. '
If a case does not fall within precise statutory language, the court may
forget a statute and reach its decision by principles of common law.
Under a code, however, if a gap appears, it is the court's duty to find
by extrapolation and analogy a solution consistent with the policies of
the code. 2
The Code follows Professor Hawkland's definition in that it is
logically divided into interlocking articles, each dealing with one major
subdivision of the entire subject. These articles are co-ordinated with
one another by the use of cross references and definitional cross references which are contained in the comments to the sections.3 3 The
official comments to each section are persuasive authority as to the
meaning of the Code, but they are not part of the Code in the sense that
they do not become substantive law upon adoption of the Code by the
state.3 4 Therefore, if a conflict arises between the provisions of the Code
and the comments, the provisions control. The fact that there is no
direct reference from one article or section to another as in the Sherrock
case, does not mean the articles are completely independent of each
other. They are only relatively independent of each other because if they
were absolutely independent, "the code would cease to be a code and
would be a digest in the Anglo-American common law sense." 36
"Hawkiand, Uniform Commercial "'Code"Methodology, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291 (1962).

"Id.at 292.
"Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1043 (1961).
3Hawkiand, supra note 30, at 301.
I ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102:11 (2d ed. 1970).

331d.

"'Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 330, 337 (1951).
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The important factor in dealing with problems which arise under
the Code is that the Code does provide its own method of interpretation.
This methodology provides that when a problem arises, the courts
should look to the applicable codified principle and its underlying purposes and policies to reach a solution." If the Code falls short of
deciding a controversy, the Code may "itself be developed or 'applied
to promote its underlying reasons, purposes, and policies.' ,s As noted
by Professor Hawkland, the methodology used to solve unforeseen
problems which arise under the Code is primarily by analogy. 3' This
approach has been used by some courts to apply certain provisions of
article 2 to other types of transactions, 0 including secured transactions. 4' In particular, section 2-302, which deals with unconscionable
contracts, has been applied to secured transaction agreements" regardless of the fact that a strict interpretation of the language of article 2
would limit the unconscionable contract doctrine to article 2. The approach used in these cases, however, was in accordance with Code methodology as the problem was solved by extrapolating and analogizing to
find a solution consistent with the underlying policies and purposes of
the Code. The policy for allowing a court to refuse to enforce an unconscionable contract was just as applicable to security contracts as to sales
contracts, and thus, these courts refused to strictly construe section 2102 which limits the scope of article 2.11
The issue raised in the Sherrock case cannot be solved by a strict,
"statutory-type" construction of the Code. Code methodology requires
that the court look to the underlying policies and purposes of the codified principle and, if necessary, to find by extrapolation and analogy a
solution consistent with these policies. One of the basic objectives of the
Code is to promote and facilitate the free flow of commerce in goods. 4
This policy is preserved in section 9-307(1) by protecting a security
"King, The New Conceptualism of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 30,
36 (1965).
'Franklin, supra note 36, at 333.
3'Hawkland, supra note 30, at 314.
"E.g., Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing House, 59 Misc.2d
226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. City Ct. 1969).
"See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super.
372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971); Dean v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d
154 (1971). Contra, Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 79 N.M. 673, 448 P.2d 474 (1968).
"Cases cited note 41 supra; Comment, II B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV., supra note 2, at 136,
"See cases cited note 41 supra.
"Note, Section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C.: The Scope ofthe ProtectionGiven a Buyer in Ordinary
Course of Business. 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 985, 990 (1968).
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interest created under article 9 "as long as it does not interfere with the
normal flow of commerce." 45 Similarly, this policy objective is preserved in the article 2 sections which deal with the entrustment of goods.
The entrusting provisions provide that "any entrusting of possession of
goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives him power
to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
business."46 Under the Code it is immaterial why possession was left
with the merchant seller as long as there is a delivery and an acquiescence in his retention of possession.4 7 Since the entrusting provisions of
article 2 and section 9-307(1) are designed to operate concurrently as a
"single principle protecting persons who buy in ordinary course out of
inventory," 4 the consistency of the two sections is destroyed when the
Sherrock decision is applied. Both sections refer to article 1 for the
definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of business"; however, in a
Sherrock situation a merchant buyer is only held to the standard of
"honesty in fact," whereas a merchant buyer under the entrusting provisions is held to the additional article 2 standard of "reasonable commercial standard of fair dealing." The result is that a person who entrusts
goods to a dealer is better protected than a secured creditor who has a
written security agreement with the same dealer. Because the policy
underlying both sections is the same, the fact that the drafters of the
Code imposed a commercial reasonableness standard on a merchant
buyer dealing with a seller who is under an entrustment arrangement
would indicate that the same policy should apply to a seller who is under
a security agreement. Surely the drafters of the Code did not intend that
the mere entrusting of goods would be provided more protection than a
written security agreement. By strictly construing the language of the
Code without examining the underlying policies of the section, the court
in Sherrock fails to follow the Code method of interpretation which
requires that the Code "be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies." 4
The Sherrock court failed to examine the effect its decision will
have on a secured creditor's reliance on section 9-306(2), which provides
that a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding an unau"Lee, Perfection & Priorities Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Wyo. L.J. 1, 34
(1962).
4
BUCC § 2-403(2).
7UCC § 2-403(3).
11UCC § 2-403, Comment 2.

'9UCC § 1-102(l).
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thorized sale by the debtor and continues in any identifiable proceeds
including collections received by the debtor. Naturally, a secured creditor would rely on this section since it provides him with the only means
of recovering some of his loses if the unauthorized sale is made to a
"buyer in the ordinary course of business." If a merchant buyer's conduct is such that the secured creditor is deceived into thinking there has
been no merchandise sold "out of trust," by the time the creditor discovers the unauthorized sales, the debtor will have disposed of the proceeds.
The court lightly touched on the area, stating that "[ft]here was no
evidence that Commercial relied to its detriment upon the retention of
possession by Dover of the automobiles purchased by the Sherrocks." 0
However, as pointed out by the chief justice in his dissenting opinion,
"Commercial Credit was in fact misled by this action . .

.

. It was

entitled to rely on the presence of those cars in the showroom and to
assume that they were still subject to their floor plan lending. This being
so it made no effort to reach the proceeds received by Dover Motors
from Sherrock."' Thus, by allowing a merchant buyer to act in a commercially unreasonable manner and thereby mislead a secured creditor,
the Sherrock decision may be "devastating because although the floor
plan lender may be willing and able to absorb the loss when a 'retail'
buyer in the ordinary course of business buys one car and cuts off the
security interest, the loss ceases to be bearable when the buyer buys a
52
number of cars on the 'wholesale' level.1
With the article 1 definition of good faith applied to merchant
buyers, the Sherrock decision significantly reduces the obligation under
which these merchants must conduct themselves in transactions which
involve a secured transaction. The "honesty in fact" definition of good
faith has historically been construed as applying only to the actor's
subjective state of mind.13 This standard has been criticized due to the
inherent difficulties in determining that a person subjectively believes his
conduct is in bad faith since it is a person's natural tendency to rationalize his conduct in a light most favorable to himself." Professor Farn10290 A.2d at 649.
"Id. at 652.
5=Murray, Security Interests in Inventory Priorities and Problems, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 634,
654 (1971). Although Murray discusses the lower court's decision in the Sherrock case (269 A,2d
407), he indicates that any time a merchant buyer qualifies as a buyer in due course, the result
may be "devastating" on a secured creditor.
'See Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 666, 671 (1963).
"'Aronstein, Good Faith Performance of Security Agreement: The Liability of Corporate
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sworth, a well known authority in the area of commercial law, suggests

that "good faith performance [as opposed to good faith purchase] properly requires some objective standard tied to commercial reasonable-

ness."' 55 The sales definition of good faith has such an objective standard
the merchant must observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair

dealing in the trade." By rejecting this objective standard of good faith,
the Sherrock decision significantly reduces the merchant buyer's duty
where he is involved in transactions in which the inventory is under a

security agreement.
Since one of the main objectives of the Code is uniformity through-

out the various jurisdictions," the weight given the Sherrock decision in
other jurisdictions may result in a harnessing effect on other "cros-

sover" movements since these movements are based on a liberal con-57
struction of the Code to promote its underlying policies and purposes.

Although the doctrine of stare decisis is deeply engrained in American
jurisprudence, under Code methodology its application should be less
vigorous here, and the courts should more readily return to the statutory

text for their answers.58 As stated by Professor Hawkland, "[c]ases
construing the Code should be given high credit, but it should not be
forgotten that the Code itself is its own best evidence of what it means.
If cases construing it are determined to be 'wrong,' courts should be free

to say so and to effectuate prompt rectification by going to the Code
itself. . . .. Professor Hawkland goes on to point out, however, that
"

if a decision is "right," as distinguished from the "best," it should be
followed."
Managers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 31-33 (1971); see Farnsworth, supra note 53. See also Eisenberg,
Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ.
L. REV. 1 (1971).
"Farnsworth, supra note 53, at 671. According to Farnsworth, there are two senses in which
the Code speaks of good faith-good faith purchase which deals only with the actor's state of mind
and good faith performance which goes into the fairness or reasonableness of the actor's performance. The issue of good faith raised in the Sherrock case deals with its use in the latter sense.
"UCC § 1-102(2)(c).
"See Comment, I I B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV., supra note 2. In justifying "crossover" from
article 2 to article 9 for the unconscionable contracts section (§ 2-302) which allows a court to deny
enforcement of a contract if found to be unconscionable at the time it was made, the argument
advocating liberal interpretation of the limiting section of article 2 (§ 2-102) is heavily relied upon.
Since the language of § 2-102 expressly applies to "transactions in goods" and the word "transactions" is not defined in the code, it should be interpreted by the court as sufficiently broad enough
to extend coverage of article 2 beyond the mere sale of goods or contract for the sale of goods to
other types of transactions including secured transactions. Id. at 131.
mHawkland, supra note 30, at 319.
521d.
"ld.
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If the Sherrock decision is determined to be "right," another possible solution to the problem is to revise the good faith definition in article
I to include an objective standard of commercial reasonableness for
merchants. A standard could be drafted to include the "observance by
a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or
trade in which he is engaged."'" Such a standard was included in the
1949 draft of the Code, but was deleted because the language was said
to be ambiguous and might be read to freeze commercial practices."2
This rationale has long since become obsolete, and today's sophisticated
and highly technical commercial world requires that an objective standard of good faith be applied to merchant buyers in all transactions,
especially those involving secured creditors.
THOMAS S. BERKAU
"Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv.
798, 812
(1958).
021d.

